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Disenrollment Patterns of Elderly in Managed Care 
and Fee for Service 
Kenneth G. Manton,* H. Dennis Tolley,t Robert Newcomer,* 
James C. Vertrees,§ and Charlene Harrington~ 
Abstract 
As the trend to provide health care through managed care facilities in-
creases, the need to examine ,vhy insured individuals voluntarily terminate 
managed care coverage grows. Voluntary termination of coverage, or dis enroll-
ment, has both social and fiscal implications. Particularly among the elderly, 
patterns of disenrollment likely are related to self assessment of care needs 
and levels of health. In this paper we examine the patterns of dis enrollment 
among elderly enrollees as a function of health status and disability. We focus 
on disenrollment patterns from an experimental prepaid extended care facil-
ity, called a social HMO (S/HMO) and compare this pattern with dis enrollment 
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within a sample of HMO enrollees and with a fee for service sample. The anal-
ysis is based on a frailty index defined using a fuzzy set model. The results 
indicate that bias in the enrollment process is exacerbated by disenrollment 
patterns that depend on the level of frailty and disability. Those with a greater 
degree of disability and chronic illness tend to disenroll into the fee for service 
coverage. Healthier persons, on the other hand, have a lower likelihood of dis-
enrollment. This suggests that managed care is not providing for the needs of 
the patients most in need of care. 
Key words and phrases: fuzzy set, health care, health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO), Medicare 
1 Introduction 
This paper presents an analysis of patterns of voluntary termination 
of coverage among individuals enrolled in an experimental managed 
care environment and compares these patterns with those enrolled in 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and those covered under fee 
for service (FFS). Voluntary termination of coverage, or dis enrollment, 
can result in fortuitous gains or unexpected losses if those disenrolling 
are more or less healthy and/or disabled than the average of those cov-
ered. Differential likelihood of dis enrollment for individuals with dif-
fering levels of disability and health care need is considered a prime 
cause of deterioration in the claims experience for individual and small 
group coverages. The effects of differential dis enrollment among the 
enrollees of a managed care provider also can be significant. Although 
methods of formally recognizing and reserving for differential dis en-
rollment are not widespread, the trends toward increasing the role of 
managed care makes understanding the effects of dis enrollment on the 
profile of the enrollees essential. 
It has been proposed that a major cause of dis enrollment under in-
dividual health coverage is the individual's ability to assess his or her 
own probability of making a claim. Those insureds who feel a greater 
degree of impairment, as measured by their own personal index, are 
thought to remain with a coverage plan, while those who feel little or 
no impairment will shop around for cheaper coverage or more extensive 
coverage for the same price (Bluhm, 1982). Under this model of per-
sonal optimization, claims experience deteriorates over and above any 
attenuation in the selection effect as the block of business matures and 
over any effect due to aging of the individuals covered. Many feel that 
accepting this model entails setting up a premium reserving system in 
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an effort to be equitable to the insureds. With no premium reserve, the 
model predicts increases in the net premium in excess of the increased 
costs due to aging and selection effects. 
The fact that benefit selection can result in increased costs to the 
insurer is well identified in the literature. l Choice is also often present 
among those seeking coverage through an HMO or other managed care 
provider, whether they are seeking coverage as indiViduals, under a 
group arrangement by a large employer, or as a postretirement bene-
ficiaries. Levels of satisfaction of care received from a managed care 
provider often are determined by convenience, accessibility, and qual-
ity of care. Personal satisfaction, level of insurance protection, and ac-
cess to alternatives seem to playa primary role in decisions to change 
the type of coverage or the provider of coverage (Rossiter et al., 1989). 
Thus, individual choice may have an antiselection effect on managed 
care plans. 
Several studies have found that enrollees who are classified as sicker 
than average also have a higher likelihood of dis enrolling from HMO 
coverage (Brown, 1988; Tucker and Langwell, 1989). Such a pattern ef-
fectively provides an ongoing selection process among the enrolled, re-
turning those requiring more care to FFS coverage. The principal causes 
of dis enrollment from HMO coverage identified by these researchers 
are concern about physician competency, ability to maintain continuity 
of care, and inconvenience. In studies of the elderly, those Medicare 
clients switching plans from one HMO to another are found to be in 
better health than those returning to FFS coverage. The prime motiva-
tions for switching from one HMO provider to another are convenience 
and premium rates, motivations similar to those posited for switching 
FFS coverages in Bluhm's individual coverage model. (See also Pascoe, 
1983 and Zastowny et al., 1983.) 
In 1985 the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) began a 
demonstration of SOCial/health maintenance organizations (SjHMOs).2 
The demonstration project consisted of four SjHMOs that would pro-
vide managed care for the elderly, offering both standard Medicare ben-
efits (e.g., hospital and physician) and expanded Medicare benefits such 
as drugs, hearing aids, and glasses. Three sites offered dental benefits, 
though these were reduced or eliminated by 1987 due to high use. Thus, 
for most members, SjHMOs are high option HMOs offering basic and 
expanded benefits. Unique to SjHMOs is long-term care coverage (e.g., 
1 See Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992) for illustrations and references. 
2Elderplan and SCAN Health Plan were started by long-term care providers. Seniors 
Plus (Group Health and the Ebenezer Society) and Medicare Plus-II (Northwest Kaiser-
Permanente) were high option plans in established HMOs (Newcomer et al., 1991). 
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nursing home care, homemaker care, and respite care) limited to $6,500 
to $12,000 per annum (depending on the plan) for those who meet their 
state's Medicaid criteria for nursing home care. Because of the concern 
about adverse selection, SjHMOs were required by HCFA to screen ap-
plicants for health. Enrollment was designed to limit the number of 
enrollees initially qualifying for nursing home care to 5 percent. This 
resulted in a number of nursing home care applicants being placed on a 
waiting list for subsequent enrollment. Limiting the enrollment so that 
only 5 percent of individuals enrolled qualified for nursing home care 
combined with marketing and the perceived filtering effect of a required 
health assessment produced a healthier membership (Newcomer et al., 
1990). 
Harrington et al. (1991) and Newcomer et al. (1990, 1991) examine 
client satisfaction and its effect on SjHMO disenrollment. Previous re-
search on staff and group Medicare HMOs has found that dis enrollment 
reinforces favorable enrollment bias to give the HMO an increasing ad-
vantage over FFS relative to health of the enrolled (Brown, 1988). In this 
paper we examine whether dis enrollment reinforces or counteracts the 
initial enrollment bias in the SjHMO. Samples of FFS and HMO members 
in the same locale were drawn at the beginning of the demonstration. 
All members in the SjHMO, FFS, and HMO samples were followed for 
three years. The experiences of these three samples are compared here 
to examine dis enrollment patterns associated with costs prior to, and 
health at, enrollment. 
To assess the degree to which dis enrollment patterns are functions 
of poor health or disability, we generate a measure of case mix using 
the health and disability information obtained at enrollment. Because 
this information contains many variables, we summarize health and 
disability status into six sets. The health and disability status of each 
individual are indexed by a fuzzy grade of membership score3 with 
respect to each of these six sets (Manton, Woodbury, and Tolley 1994). 
3Later on we will describe how these scores can be generated from the data obtained 
at enrollment. Actuaries can apply this method, provided the same assessment infor-
mation described below is obtained for each individual enrolled. The overall pattern 
of the grade of membership scores block defines the case mix of the block. 
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2 Description of Samples Studied 
2.1 Locations 
The samples used in this paper consist of elderly (65 years and older) 
Medicare-eligible members from three different types of coverage: (i) 
S/HMO; (ii) TEFRA 4 HMO; and (iii) Medicare beneficiaries receiving care 
under FFS. The plans were in four communities: 
• Elderplan (Brooklyn, New York); 
• SCAN Health Plan (Long Beach, California); 
• SeniorPlus (Minneapolis, Minnesota); and 
• Medicare Plus-II (Portland, Oregon). 
Because the Brooklyn site initially had no TEFRA HMOs, there are 11 
different samples. The number of individuals in each sample is given 
in Table 1. The sample design covers certain age groups to ensure ad-
equate power in forming certain statistical tests. The design effect re-
sulting from this sampling has been removed in the analyses presented 
here, however, by conditioning on case mix. Because S/HMO clients 
voluntarily enrolled and were not randomly selected, individual health 
differences are statistically adjusted.5 
Two constraints to enrollment implicitly operating are competition 
from other locations and relative cost of care. Brooklyn and Portland 
were relatively new areas for HMO enrollment of the elderly, with 7 
percent and 16 percent of the elderly, respectively, enrolled in some 
HMO at the beginning of the project. Long Beach and Minneapolis were 
more established, with 24 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the 
elderly enrolled. Competition had a negative impact on the ability of 
the S/HMOs to enroll members quickly. The primary consideration in 
setting initial premium levels was to be competitive with existing HMO 
4The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) allows HMOs the option of 
providing health care to Medicare beneficiaries under a prepaid contract. In order for 
the HMO to have a population of interest to sample for comparison with S/HMO, the 
HMO had to be a operating under the prepaid (or at risk) option of TEFRA. 
5To test if case mix represents health factors affecting enrollment, we examine mor-
tality differences between FFS and S/HMO after case mix adjustment. Most differences 
are explained. Remaining differences due to unmeasured attributes (e.g., market, ac-
cess, economic and consumption variables) are controlled by using site as a variable. 
Surveys (Le., consumer chOice, plan satisfaction and dis enrollment) describe marketing 
and individual preferences (Newcomer et aI., 1990; Harrington et aI., 1991; Newcomer 
et aI., 1991). 
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Table 1 
Sample Design and Sample Sizes 
SjHMO Demonstration Project 
Type of Provider 
Location SjHMO FFS HMO 
Brooklyn 2,680 3,408 
Long Beach 1,919 3,556 1,000 
Minneapolis 1,720 2,934 1,000 
Portland 4,517 6,761 1,000 
TOTAL 10,836 16,659 3,000 
options in each of the areas. Premiums were less than those of com-
peting Medicare supplemental policies, but greater than HMO Medicare 
alternatives (Harrington and Newcomer, 1991). Despite the intent to 
keep the SjHMOs competitive, relative cost differences are present. 
SCAN Health Plan, for example, had premiums of approximately $25 
per month compared to HMO premiums of zero. Medicare Plus-II had 
higher premiums than other HMOs in Portland, but appeared to have 
little problem with enrollment or with increases in premium rates. 
2.2 Health Assessment 
To assess health and disability level, information on 31 items is ob-
tained at the time of enrollment using the health screening form (HSF) 
based on the national long-term care survey (NLTCS) screening instru-
ment (Durako, 1987). This instrument measures three areas: 
• Activities of daily living (ADLs) such as toileting, dreSSing, and 
bathing (Katz and Akpom, 1976); 
• Instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) such as preparing 
meals, laundry, housework (Lawton and Brody, 1969); and 
• Medical conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, etc. 
A brief description of these three areas is given in column 1 of Table 2. 
When applying for membership in the SjHMO, individuals were re-
quired to complete the health screening forms. This was done usually 
by mail. If some responses were inadequate, SjHMO staff followed up 
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by telephone. Consequently, health screens are available for 98.3 per-
cent of S/HMO enrollees.6 For members in FFS samples, health screen-
ing forms were done by phone. In either group, if impairments are re-
ported on two or more instrumental activities of daily living or on one 
or more activities of daily living, a detailed assessment is conducted to 
confirm impairment. The health screening form response rate is 80.5 
percent in FFS and 85.7 percent in HMOs. The response rates do not 
include 20.3 percent of the FFS and 4.5 percent of the HMO members 
in samples who were found to be institutionalized or dead (in Medicare 
files). FFS sample members not located are included in the response 
rate calculations. 
Not all variables associated with health are contained in this list 
of 31 items. To test for the adequacy of the 31 items as a measure 
of health, we examine the ability of the health scores generated from 
these 31 variables to explain mortality. Scores explain most differences 
between S/HMOs and FFS, suggesting little effect of unobserved health 
variables (Manton et al., 1994). We also examine site differences in prior 
costs, mortality, and dis enrollment between S/HMO, FFS, and HMO. Dif-
ferences not related to case mix suggest the influence of unobserved 
nonhealth variables, such as psychological, market, and economic fac-
tors. Consequently, all analyses presented here are adjusted using site, 
plan type, and living arrangement variables. 
2.3 Prior Use and Expenditures 
Medicare Part A and B data are drawn from the Medicare Automated 
Data Retrieval System (MADRS) for all plans. National file searches 
are made to locate persons spending part of the time outside a site. 
Medicare costs (for those 65 and older) in the 12 months prior to be-
ing interviewed are determined for FFS sample members (whether or 
not responding to the health screening form). For individuals who are 
members of a managed care plan, Medicare costs prior to enrollment 
are not available. These individuals are not used in any analyses involv-
ing prior costs. There are some individuals who had some prior health 
care cost data but not for the complete 12 months preceding the study. 
Generally such individuals had previous cost data covering more than 
180 days. For these individuals the data available are used to calculate 
a per diem rate which is inflated to 12 months. 
6No health assessment was made at the time the individual terminated SjHMO or 
HMO coverage. There was a satisfaction questionnaire, however administered at ter-
mination. The results of the analysis of the satisfaction data are given in Newcomer et 
al. (1991). 
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2.4 Nonresponse Bias 
Although the nonresponse rate for SjHMO enrollees on the health 
screening form is low (less than 2 percent), the nonresponse rates for 
the health screening form among the FFS sample and HMO sample range 
from 14 percent to 20 percent. Such a high nonresponse rate may bias 
measures of prior cost and function, because elderly survey nonrespon-
dents tend to be frail (e.g., Manton et al., 1991). To examine the poten-
tial bias we use average Medicare cost of the populations at each site 
and compare these with the average Medicare cost for the sample pop-
ulations. Average Medicare costs per utilizer in the site populations 
($3,449; $3,139 excluding nursing home residents) are higher than in 
FFS samples. 
We had complete Medicare utilization data for the six counties in 
the catchment area of the four SjHMOs. These data indicate that 64 
percent of eligible persons annually use Medicare-covered services. Ap-
plying this 64 percent figure to the per capita cost estimate in the site 
populations yields $2,009 per annum per eligible person or 15.2 per-
cent higher than in the samples ($1,746) reported here. The bias is in 
the direction and of the size (15 percent) found in studies of survey 
nonresponse (Manton et al., 1991; NCHS, 1964). Two year prior average 
annual costs in the National Medicare HMO Demonstration are $1,102 in 
HMOs and $1,682 in FFS (Rossiter et al., 1989). Prior costs in SjHMOs 
($1,316) are 19.4 percent higher than in those HMOs. Costs for the 
SjHMO FFS sample are only 4 percent higher than the FFS samples in 
the National Medicare HMO Demonstration. Because FFS sample costs 
are lower than for FFS site populations, the nonresponse bias in the FFS 
sample is against demonstrating favorable enrollment in SjHMOs. 
3 Heterogeneity and Case Mix 
Dahl (1991) shows that for individual health coverages the effects 
of rerating, aging of the insured, and antiselection are perfectly con-
founded without some measure of health and disability on both the 
continuing insured and those terminating coverage. By perfectly con-
founded we mean that observed increases in utilization and per capita 
cost could be generated by changes in premium, aging, or antiselec-
tion or by any combination of these in such a way that there is no way 
to quantitatively determine the sources of these increases. Because of 
such confounding, it is impossible to determine which of these sources 
is the cause of claims deterioration. Separating the effects of aging of 
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the members, function, and mortality on choice of provider type for 
managed care also requires a measure of health and disability. Such 
a measure must go beyond the standard AAPCC underwriting factors 
(i.e., age, gender, welfare and institutional status) because these predict 
less than 1 percent of the individual costs (e.g., Lubitz et al., 1985). 
The health screening form assessment provides a basis for devel-
oping such a measure. A 31 dimensional index, however, is difficult 
to implement. As noted in the recent actuarial literature (e.g., Young, 
1993), when classification risks for a collection of individuals are to be 
reduced to a few actuarially viable components, the methods of fuzzy 
sets are useful. These methods allow the reduction of highly multidi-
mensional data to a few fuzzy sets.7 Each individual is classified as 
a fuzzy member of these sets using grade of membership scores (Os-
taszewski,1993). 
A small number of meaningful sets can be determined using a quali-
tative assessment of past experience or can be generated from the data 
using computational procedures such as maximum likelihood (Manton, 
Woodbury, and Tolley, 1994). In either case, the sets should represent 
a reasonable separation of risks.8 Each individual in the 11 samples is 
given a grade of membership (GoM) score indicating the degree to which 
the person is a member of each of these sets. Thus, each of these sets 
is fuzzy in that the degree to which any individual is a member of any 
set can vary between 0 (not a member) to 1 (a complete member). 
The grade of membership scores are estimated from the data con-
tained on the health screening forms. We denote the grade of member-
ship score for individual i for the kth fuzzy set as Bik with 
K 
L Bik = 1, 0:::; Bik :::; l. 
k=l 
(1) 
Let f.kj denote the probability of individual i giving a positive response 
to question j for an given that i is a complete member of set k, i.e., 
7Estimation of the fuzzy set structure resembles discrete factor analysis in that the 
statistical procedure looks for a few explanatory characteristics. (See, for example, 
Dillon and Goldstein (1984, Chapter 3) for more on factor analysis.) Usually these 
characteristics are described by a few dimensions of the data space. These characteris-
tics describe sets of individuals. Unlike factor analysis, however, the fuzzy set method 
does not require each individual to be a crisp member of these sets, but the individ-
ual may be a partial member of several sets. Note that a crisp member is a complete 
member of member of a set in the classical sense. In the classical definition of sets, an 
element is either a member of a set or not a member of the set. 
BEy reasonable separation of risks we mean that the sets need to be more than simply 
a statistical construct. They should have meaning as regards to level of health, health 
care need, utilization, mortality risk, and so forth. 
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who has (Bik = 1). The probability that i gives a positive response to 
question j is (Woodbury and Clive, 1974): 
K 
Pij = L BikAkj, 
k=l 
where K is the number of fuzzy sets. 
(2) 
The probability, Pij, can be viewed as a binomial probability for 
questionj. As shown by Suppes and Zanotti (1981), there exists a vector 
of parameters Ajkl ;:: 0 and a set of grade membership scores, Bib for 
each individual, i, such that the likelihood9 is given by: 
1 (K )YiJ1 
L = ~ ~ JJ k~l BikAjkl , (3) 
where AjkO + Ajkl = 1, YijO + Yijl = 1 and 
.. = {I if individual i gives a positive response to question j; and 
YIJI 0 otherwise. 
We choose estimates of both the BikS and the AkjlS that maximize this 
likelihood (Manton, Woodbury, and Tolley, 1994). Comparing equations 
(2) and (3) we see that Ajk = Ajkl. 
The data indicate that there are six fuzzy groups. These six groups 
are defined in the listing below. They represent different classifications 
of healthy, disabled, and frail. A regression formula for calculating 
these scores for any particular health screening form response profile 
is given in Table 3.10 
Group 1 = Healthy: Means free of medical problems and impairments, 
young (average age 71 years), often male, married, uses few ser-
vices, and has low mortality. Such persons may see little benefit 
to S/HMO long-term care benefits if premiums are high. 
9This likelihood is similar to that produced by the product binomial model. When 
there are more levels of responses than just the two considered here. the model be-
comes the product multinomial likelihood with different levels of each multinomial 
indexed by the I subscript of y. 
IOThe grade of membership for each set for an individual is obtained by adding the 
entries in the relevant columns in Table 3 for each of the 31 characteristics present 
in the individual. This will give six different totals. Negative totals are adjusted to be 
zero. The totals then are standardized to l. These standardized totals are the grade 
of membership scores for the individual. 
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Group 2 = Acutely Ill: Has multiple medical conditions (e.g., 56 per-
cent have cancer) but little impairment. It is similar in age to 
Group 1 (average age 72.2 years) and likely married and male. 
Group 2 used the most acute care in the prior year (e.g., hos-
pitalization) with mortality higher than Group 1 but lower than 
Groups 3, 4, and 6. If HMOs provide the most effective acute care, 
this group may prefer HMOs over S/HMOs. The phrase acutely ill 
emphasizes differences between groups, i.e., some conditions in 
Group 2 persist and produce intermittent or terminal disability 
(e.g., cancer); others are severe and rapidly progress to death (or 
recovery). 
Group 3 = IADL Impaired: Has instrumental activities of daily liVing, 
mobility, and neurological impairment. The instrumental activi-
ties of daily living [money management, telephoning, medications 
(Manton and Soldo, 1985)] suggest this group is cognitively im-
paired. This group is older (average age 78.8 years), dependent, 
uses long-term care, and has high mortality. Because of its long-
term care needs, it may be retained by S/HMOs. 
Group 4 = Chronic Circulatory: Has diabetes, hypertension, atheroscle-
rosis, and stroke but no cancer or heart trouble. It is old (average 
age 81.1 years) and female with higher mortality than Group 2. 
Given high acute care needs, persons in this group may dis enroll 
from S/HMOs or HMO to FFS. 
Group 5 = Older Healthy: Is functional, but has joint problems. It is 
older than Group 1 (76.2 years) and more female. It has the second 
highest marital rate. Service use is low, and mortality is similar to 
Group 1. This group may disenroll to FFS or HMO. 
Group 6 = Frail: Has multiple co-morbidities and impairments. It uses 
the most acute and long-term care services, is old (89 years), and 
has the highest mortality. Because of its long-term care needs, it 
may be retained by S/HMOs. 
The pure type, or complete member, of any of these six fuzzy sets 
is characterized by the probabilities of responses on each of the 31 
items in the health screening form. The values of i\kjl provide a profile 
describing the attributes associated with each of the groups. These 
profiles are in Table 2. For example, 100 percent of the individuals 
completely in either fuzzy set 3 or fuzzy set 6 will need help preparing 
meals. None of the individuals completely in the other fuzzy sets will 
need help with this task. 
,.... 
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Table 2 
Parameter Values A jkl Estimated for 31 Health and Functioning Measures 
for Four Social/Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Projects 1984-1989 
A jkl x 100 
Freq (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
"-
Needs Help With: 0 
c 1. Preparing meals 7.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ..... 
2. Laundry 9.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ::J ~ 
3. Light housework 9.4 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0 
4. Grocery shopping 13.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ...... 
5. Managing money 6.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 98.9 » 1"'1 
6. Taking medicine 4.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 71.1 .-+ c 
7. Making phone calls 4.4 0.0 0.0 96.1 0.0 0.0 41.7 PJ 
..... 
8. Eating 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.9 PJ 
9. Getting in/out of chairs or bed 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
"'0 
10. Walking around inside 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ..... PJ 
11. Driving/using public transportation 14.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1"'1 .-+ 
12. Toileting 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1"'1 
13. Dressing 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 SO 
14. Bathing 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 < 0 
15. Uses a wheelchair 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
16. Uses a walker 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.7 N 
17. Uses a cane 11.3 0.0 0.0 48.5 87.8 0.0 68.8 -z 18. Is bedfast 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.4 0 
Notes: Freq = Population Frequency; (1) = Healthy; (2) = Acutely Ill; (3) = Impaired; (4) = Chronically Ill; (5) = Older N 
Healthy; and (6) = Frail. 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Parameter Values A jkl Estimated for 31 Health and Functioning Measures 
for Four Social/Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Projects 1984-1989 
A jkl X 100 
Freq (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Medical Conditions 
19. Diabetes Mellitus 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 10.5 
20. Hypertension 37.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
21. Heart trouble 21.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.4 
22. Neurological problems 7.0 0.0 0.0 73.8 0.0 0.0 37.8 
23. Stroke 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 66.5 
24. Lung or breathing problems 13.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6 
25. Chronic cough 6.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 
26. Cancer 4.0 0.0 56.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 
27. Hardening of the arteries 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 74.1 
28. Stomach/bowel problems 17.4 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.8 
29. Bladder problems ll.S 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.2 
30. Rheumatism or Arthritis 52.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
31. Other health problems 21.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 0.0 100.0 50.1 
Weight Prevalence 44.7 11.3 9.1 11.9 lS.9 4.1 
Notes: Freq = Population Frequency; (1) = Healthy; (2) = Acutely Ill; (3) = Impaired; (4) = Chronically Ill; (5) = Older 
Healthy; and (6) = Frail. 
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Table 3 f-' 00 
Regression Coefficients for Grade of Membership Scores for Each Fuzzy Set. ~ 
Responses From the Health Screening Form Assessment 
(Values Standardized to Sum to Unity) 
Reg. Variable K=l K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 K=6 
Intercep 0.289692 0.298944 0.152671 0.144529 0.081982 0.032183 
Prepmeal -0.218351 0.021623 0.111356 -0.014032 -0.024097 0.123501 
Laundry -0.054227 -0.009097 0.066951 0.002101 -0.019452 0.013724 
'--
Housework -0.024242 0.004899 0.080811 -0.027868 -0.029617 -0.003983 0 c 
Grocshop -0.129651 -0.014232 0.055990 0.111429 -0.018410 -0.005125 ...., ::::> 
Manmoney -0.022644 -0.005768 0.114757 -0.060307 -0.008998 -0.017040 ~ 
TakeMeds 0.068975 -0.022808 0.048879 -0.060066 -0.030088 -0.004892 0 ....., 
Phone 0.005079 0.001174 0.076400 -0.042793 0.009573 -0.049433 » t"\ M-
Eat 0.118764 0.125928 -0.135862 -0.004571 0.030091 -0.134350 c $l.I 
Getinout 0.000304 0.001282 -0.102795 -0.005648 0.006355 0.100502 ...., $l.I 
Walkinsi -0.150372 0.046225 -0.054573 -0.016254 0.130158 0.044816 -""0 
Travel -0.128237 -0.000714 0.043889 0.130489 -0.035331 -0.010097 
...., 
$l.I 
t"\ 
Toilet 0.097242 -0.000401 -0.124278 -0.014610 -0.027394 0.069439 M-t"\ 
Dress 0.002352 -0.021699 -0.057029 -0.014573 -0.002557 0.093506 _ro 
Bathe -0.002614 -0.032714 -0.050598 0.001058 -0.030534 0.115403 < 0 
Diabetes 0.007040 -0.049095 0.006535 0.007652 0.024065 0.003803 
Hyprtent -0.098511 -0.016627 0.004660 -0.020715 0.127511 0.003682 N -
HeartTro 0.079626 -0.105630 0.000703 0.005596 0.021165 -0.001460 z 
Neurocom -0.031191 0.074705 -0.048456 -0.011831 0.035221 -0.018448 
~ 
N 
Strokshm -0.013295 0.079024 -0.050048 -0.042608 0.030193 -0.003267 -~ 
\D 
Notes: Reg. Variable = Regression Variable \D ~ 
Table 3 (cont.) 
Regression Coefficients for Grade of Membership Scores for Each Fuzzy Set. 
Responses From the Health Screening Form Assessment 
(Values Standardized to Sum to Unity) 
Reg. Variable K=l K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 K=6 
Lungprob 0.069886 -0.096427 0.001286 0.012580 0.011855 0.000820 
Chchough -0.021299 -0.039337 -0.002120 0.016927 0.037001 0.008828 
Cancer -0.087591 0.024720 0.001723 0.014896 0.035232 0.011020 
Circprob 0.079016 -0.063062 0.006610 -0.029049 0.012688 -0.006203 
Stombowl 0.085451 -0.097491 0.003616 0.010906 0.006414 -0.008897 
Urinprob 0.040365 -0.069146 0.006774 0.013648 0.019773 -0.011414 
Rheum 0.107036 -0.019814 0.022714 -0.024747 -0.078665 -0.006523 
Othrhlth 0.301930 0.001910 0.003473 0.000485 -0.306481 -0.001317 
Wheelcha -0.022655 0.040403 -0.050348 0.051972 0.014341 -0.033712 
Walker -0.032638 0.050688 0.006774 0.022476 0.013698 -0.061000 
Cane 0.134663 0.014294 -0.008748 -0.166583 0.014227 0.012146 
Bedfast -0.095239 0.167366 -0.060080 0.028062 0.035397 -0.075506 
Notes: Reg. Variable = Regression Variable 
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Also considering use of a cane (item 17), the percentages of individ-
uals completely in each of the six groups with this characteristic are, 
respectively, 9 percent, 9 percent, 48.5 percent, 87.8 percent, 0 percent, 
and 68.8 percent. Recall that these are theoretical individuals. There 
may be few, if any, individuals who are complete members (i.e., have 
scores of 100 percent) of any specific fuzzy set. The likelihood of a per-
son being a complete member decreases as the number of items used 
to describe persons increases. 
The grade of membership scores for each individual determine the 
degree to which the individual may be classified into each of the six 
sets. These grade of membership scores reflect the level of frailty and 
disability of each individual and are used to define a case mix. They 
also may be treated as a type of regression variable with regard to a 
response of interest. In particular, we are interested in the probability 
of changing coverage as a function of the level of disability and frailty. 
Because the Bik score for each individual is a surrogate for the probabil-
ity of changing coverage, a model for the probability of change should 
be based on these. For a complete member of the kth fuzzy set let AkT 
denote the probability of transition to another form of care during an 
interval. For individual i let PiT denote these same probabilities. Each 
individual will have different values of such probabilities as indexed 
by i because each individual will have different grade of membership 
scores, Bib to each of the fuzzy sets. We use the representation similar 
to equation (2) above with the subscript j replaced by T. Explicitly, 
K 
PiT = L BikAkT . 
k=l 
(4) 
In equation (4), AkT parameters vary according to the type of provider 
(SjHMO, HMO, or FFS) and are specific to the period of time since en-
rollment. The period of time is the three year period of the project. 
We then set up the likelihood for the dis enrollment data for the three 
year period as a competing risk model where the end of the study is the 
competing risk. Thus, individuals terminating the S/HMO and joining 
the FFS or HMO could be followed as a new entrant into one of those 
samples. We use PiT as the probability of dis enrollment. Given that 
the Bik are known (determined using the 31 health variables), the only 
unknown parameters in this model are the AkT parameters. These are 
estimated using maximum likelihood similar to equation (3) (Manton et 
al., 1994). 
Once the AkT have been estimated, the likelihood of dis enrollment 
from the S/HMO or HMO can be determined for any particular hypo-
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the tical individual for whom the 9ik are known by using equation (4). 
The probability of voluntary termination of coverage for an individual 
with 9ik scores determined from the health screening form using the 
parameters in Table 2 can be estimated by blending the estimated AkT 
values as given in equation (4). 
Naturally one can estimate other characteristics of interest such as 
utilization, cost, or mortality. In any case, the actuary can estimate the 
likely values of the characteristic of interest by determining the profile 
of 9ik scores for the block of business of interest and then using these 
scores to blend the relevant estimated AkT values. Below we will report 
the AkT values estimated for dis enrollment. 
4 Enrollment Findings 
4.1 Enrollment and Disenrollment 
Table 4 lists the average value of the 9ikS for each of the six groups at 
the beginning of the study and at the end of each of the three years. At 
baseline (year 0), Group 1 has average values of 50.2 percent for S/HMO 
members, 39.9 percent for FFS members, and 51.4 percent for HMO 
members. For the healthy fuzzy set, the S/HMOs and the HMOs attract 
similar populations. In addition, these two populations are healthier, 
in general, than the FFS population because of the greater percentages 
in Groups 1 and 5 (the healthier groups) and the lower percentages in 
Groups 2, 3, 4, and 6 (the sicker groups). The selection processes that 
either explicitly or implicitly are established with regard to S/HMO and 
HMO enrollment are functioning to enroll a healthier population. 
Over the three years the average scores for Group 1 increased 10 
to 12 percent for the three treatments. Group 5 realized a lower rate 
of increase for S/HMOs and HMOs and a slight decrease for FFS. Other 
groups decrease in prevalence with the exception of Group 2 for FFS. 
Increases in the healthy groups (Group 1 and Group 5) and decreases in 
the other groups suggest that attrition due to mortality and dis enroll-
ment is favorable for all three treatments. Hence, the S/HMOs receive 
a positive benefit from the mortality and dis enrollment patterns. Ad-
ditionally, Group 6, a target group for the S/HMOs, is less prevalent 
in S/HMOs and HMOs than in the FFS and declines faster than in the 
FFS. By the end of the third year the average scores for the S/HMO and 
the HMO have converged to approximately the same value, except for 
Group 5. 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Mortality on Health Score Av~rages for S/HMOs, HMOs, 
and FFS Populations as Defined at Baseline Over Three Years for One, 
Two, and Three Year Survivors 
gk 
Group/Treatment Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 I1g 
1. Healthy 
S/HMO 50.2 51.3 52.5 56.3 +12.0% 
FFS 39.9 41.7 43.4 44.2 +10.4% 
HMO 51.4 53.0 54.1 54.6 +10.6% 
2. Acutely III 
S/HMO 9.4 9.1 9.0 9.1 - 3.1% 
FFS 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.8 +1.4% 
HMO 11.2 10.8 10.7 10.3 -7.8% 
3. IADL Impaired 
S/HMO 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.3 -11.2% 
FFS 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.3 -7.4% 
HMO 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.3 -12.1% 
4. Chronic Circulatory 
S/HMO 10.4 10.2 9.4 9.5 - 8.1% 
FFS 13.1 12.9 12.4 12.2 - 7.5% 
HMO 10.6 10.1 9.8 9.7 - 8.4% 
5. Older Healthy 
S/HMO 19.6 19.9 20.4 21.6 +10.4% 
FFS 18.8 18.7 18.4 18.3 - 2.7% 
HMO 17.5 17.8 17.7 18.0 +2.7% 
6. Frail 
S/HMO 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.1 -54.6% 
FFS 5.5 4.3 3.6 3.3 -39.1% 
HMO 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.0 -53.2% 
Note: I1g = Percentage change in average scores from year 0 to year 3. 
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4.2 Prior Cost of Care 
A surrogate proposed as an indicator of poor health or expected 
high utilization in managed care (and to a lesser extent for individual 
health care coverage) is prior utilization. We use prior Medicare costs 
for the 12 months prior to the study as a measure of this utilization and 
compare it with the mortality outcome of each of the individuals. The 
results are listed in Table 5. In year one S/HMOs have the highest per 
enrollee costs for nonsurvivors ($4,467) and the lowest for survivors 
($1,192). FFS costs are highest for survivors ($1,650), and HMOs have 
the lowest costs for nonsurvivors ($2,629). Over the three years prior 
costs for S/HMO and HMO nonsurvivors converge toward those of FFS. 
The difference in prior cost among survivors, however, is relatively con-
stant. This indicates a potentially fundamental difference in the use of 
health care facilities among those who voluntarily join a managed care 
organization and those who do not. Additionally, we see that the ability 
of prior costs to predict mortality declines over time. 
5 Disenrollment Findings 
The major purpose of this study is to examine the S/HMO and HMO 
dis enrollment patterns as a function of health status. Disenrollment 
may increase or decrease any favorable bias in S/HMO or HMO enroll-
ment. Table 6 summarizes episodes by health group. The probabilities 
of transition reported in Table 6 are estimated using equation (4). The 
first column in Table 6 describes the six groups and the types of cover-
age. The next three columns indicate the estimated probabilities that 
an individual will change coverage, e.g., "moved from an S/HMO to FFS," 
or "moved from FFS to an HMO," if the individual is a complete mem-
ber of the group. The next column gives the probability of dying for 
a complete member of the group. The last column is for the original 
HMO. An individual may be in the HMO under study and subsequently 
be discharged to another HMO (column 3). The numbers in parentheses 
in each column are the average number of days before such a transition. 
Asterisked values indicate retention rates. 
From Table 6 we see that for complete members of Group 1 in the 
S/HMO, 73.6 percent will remain in the S/HMO for the entire study 
with the mean number of days equal to 1062.8, and 8.9 percent will 
be discharged to HMO status. The average length of time remaining in 
S/HMO for those discharged to HMOs is 525.7 days. 
Table 5 
Changes in the Prior (to Study Entry) 12 Month Medicare Costs (Reimbursements) for 
Survivors and Nonsurvivors Over Three Years 
Treatment 
SjHMO 
FFS 
HMO 
Year 1 
Alive Dead 
$1,192 
N=8,334 
$1,650 
N=15,162 
$1,203 
N=2,831 
$4,467 
N=311'" 
Ratio = 3.75 
$3,298 
N= 990 
Ratio = 2.00 
$2,629 
N= 140 
Ratio = 2.19 
Note: Ratio = Dead ($) / Alive ($) 
Year 2 
Alive Dead 
$1,137 
N=7,939 
$1,591 
N=14,251 
$1,143 
N=2,728 
$3,246 
N= 706 
Ratio = 2.85 
$2,951 
N = 1901 
Ratio = 1.85 
$2,689 
N = 243 
Ratio = 2.35 
"Number of deaths with Medicare prior service use data. 
Year 3 
Alive Dead 
$1,067 $2,941 
N=7,527 N= 1,118 
Ratio = 2.76 
$1,522 $2,957 
N=13,568 N = 2610 
Ratio = 1.94 
$1,107 $2,445 
N=2,610 N= 361 
Ratio = 2.21 
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We estimate that 12.3 percent of the S/HMO enrollees who are com-
plete members will move to FFS status during a three year period of 
coverage. These individuals will stay an average of 441.2 days before 
making the transfer. Last, 5.1 percent of the S/HMO enrollees who are 
complete members of Group 1 will die, with an average of 584.0 days 
from enrollment to death. The retention rates for FFS and S/HMO are 
similar for Group 1 and to a lesser extent for Group 5. For the acutely 
ill Groups 2, 3, and 6, however, the retention rates are highest for FFS. 
Additionally, there is a significant outflow of members from S/HMO to 
FFS status for these groups. The S/HMO concept is designed to serve 
(Le., to provide long-term care services) those in Group 3 and Group 
6. This outflow may be indicative of an unmet need or dissatisfaction 
among those who are likely to require the greatest health care services. 
The probabilities in Table 6 can be used to estimate the retention 
rate for any individual as follows. First the Bik scores are determined for 
the individual of interest. If the individual is enrolled in the S/HMO, the 
likelihood of changing to FFS coverage, for example, is the weighted sum 
of the probabilities of changing from S/HMO coverage to FFS as given in 
Table 6 for each of the six groups. The weights used for each of these 
probabilities are the Bik scores of the individual. The expected retention 
of a collection of insureds is determined as the average retention all 
individuals. Depending on the distribution of the Bik scores, there will 
be a larger or smaller net flow of frail individuals and a relatively larger 
or smaller retention of healthy individuals among the covered. Other 
characteristics such as the variation in the aggregate retention, length of 
stay with the insured, cost, and utilization (not given in this paper) also 
may be calculated for a collection of insureds using the set of Bik scores 
for the insureds. Thus, the Bik can be used to define characteristics of 
the collective even though the collective may not be a homogeneous 
group of individuals. 
In Table 7 we adjust dis enrollment patterns for mortality. The first 
column describes the initial groups and treatments. The next three 
columns show the coverage to which persons move. Retention is in the 
final two columns. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the risks 
of change relative to the total rate (over all groups). 
Most differences between HMO and S/HMO dis enrollment are due 
to the likelihood the HMO members change plans. In Groups 1 and 
5, HMO dis enrollees are less likely than S/HMO dis enrollees to reenter 
FFS. There is no difference in reentry to FFS by the frail. 
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Table 6 
Episode·Based Analysis of S/HMO, HMO, and FFS Populations 
Discharged To 
Starting S/HMO HMO FFS Death Ending in 
Group HMO 
Group 1: Healthy 
S/HMO 73.6" 8.9 12.3 5.1 
(625.7) (441.2) (584.0) 
FFS 1.4 20.3 73.1 " 5.1 
(389.3) (371.5) (1003.5) (521.5) 
HMO 0.5 20.3 9.7 3.5 65.7* 
(480.4) (275.0) (371.6) (469.0) (770.5) 
Group 2: Acutely III 
S/HMO 61.8" 6.9 13.6 17.0 
(1048.8) (511.5) (357.8) (575.1) 
FFS 1.4 14.8 70.0" 13.9 
(448.6) (345.1) (1030.0) (476.4) 
HMO 0.2 25.4 10.4 9.4 53.9* 
(520.3) (276.7) (346.8) (374.6) (776.5) 
Group 3: IADL Impaired 
S/HMO 54.6* 5.6 18.3 21.5 
(1047.6) (634.3) (388.2) (515.2) 
FFS 1.4 12.7 64.1" 21.8 
(364.3) (254.1) (1018.4) (467.3) 
HMO 0.5 22.2 13.4 13.7 48.7" 
(487.5) (239.2) (345.5) (398.6) (779.0) 
Group 4: Chronic Circulatory 
S/HMO 62.2* 6.4 13.2 17.7 
(1057.8) (668.3) (409.0) (539.5) 
FFS 0.6 11.9 64.3" 23.2 
(421.7) (286.4) (1035.4) (473.6) 
HMO 1.2 15.9 13.4 13.1 55.9* 
(151.6) (222.6) (456.6) (436.4) (827.7) 
Group 5: Older Healthy 
S/HMO 69.1" 11.4 14.1 5.4 
(1051.0) (535.5) (430.3) (605.9) 
FFS 0.8 19.2 63.6" 16.4 
(326.3) (279.4) (1002.9) (472.7) 
HMO 0.9 18.2 10.1 6.3 64.1 " 
(444.1) (234.7) (349.7) (465.8) (766.4) 
Group 6: Frail 
S/HMO 31.3* 0.7 14.8 53.2 
(1065.7) (428.0) (393.6) (484.1) 
FFS 0.2 5.0 41.7* 53.2 
(269.0) (237.7) (1044.8) (401.3) 
HI\10 0.8 12.1 20.0 37.3 29.2" 
(491.2) (326.5) (441.5) (308.4) (847.6) 
Total Proportion of Episodes Ending in: 
S/HMO (67.9%)* (8.5%: (13.2%) (10.2%) 
FFS (1.1%) (16.9%: (67.4%)" (14.6%) 
HMO (0.6%) (20.0%: (10.7%) (7.1%) (61.1%)" 
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Table 7 
Case Mix and Total Discharge Rates for S/HMO, HMO, and FFS 
Service Episodes Over Three Years With Mortality Eliminated 
Discharged To TDR Enders 
Starting S/HMO HMO FFS 
Group 1: 
S/HMO 9.4 l3.0 22.4 77.6% 
FFS 1.5 21.4 22.9 77.0% 
HMO 0.5 21.1 10.1 31.7 68.3% 
Group 2: 
S/HMO 8.3 16.4 24.7 74.2% 
FFS 1.6 17.2 18.8 81.2% 
HMO 0.2 27.9 11.4 39.5 59.3% 
Group 3: 
S/HMO 7.1 23.3 30.4 69.3% 
FFS 1.8 16.3 18.1 74.4% 
HMO 0.6 25.8 15.5 41.9 56.5% 
Group 4: 
S/HMO 7.8 16.0 23.8 75.9% 
FFS 0.8 15.5 16.3 83.6% 
HMO 1.4 18.3 15.4 35.1 64.3% 
Group 5: 
S/HMO 12.1 14.9 27.0 73.0% 
FFS 1.0 23.0 24.0 76.3% 
HMO 1.0 19.5 10.8 3l.3 68.8% 
Group 6: 
S/HMO 1.5 31.6 33.1 67.0% 
FFS 0.4 10.7 11.1 89.2% 
HMO l.3 19.2 31.8 52.3 46.4% 
Total 
S/HMO 9.4 14.7 24.1 75.9% 
FFS l.3 19.8 21.1 78.9% 
HMO 0.6 21.6 11.6 33.8 66.2% 
Avg. Our. 
S/HMO (1057.8) (596.1) (420.5) (551.8) 
FFS (387.5) (331.7) (10l3.1) (466.9) 
HMO (405.0) (262.0) (375.0) (421.2) (776.7) 
Notes: TDR = Total Discharge Rate; Avg. Dur. = Average Duration in Days; 
Enders = Percentage ending in the state they started in. 
Figures in parentheses indicate class speCific risk of transition relative to 
the marginal rate. 
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When considering the net change in HMO members relative to the 
FFS client pool, we see the same pattern as described above. Explicitly, 
HMOs receive a net relative increase in clients from the FFS sector for 
the healthy and acutely ill and a net relative decrease from the frail 
groups. For the chronic care cases, the experience is neutral between 
the FFS and HMO transfers. Consequently, the HMOs are recipients of 
fortuitous reverse cumulative antis election, whereas the FFS client pool 
experiences an accumulation of antiselection. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we present an analysis of dis enrollment patterns of 
elderly in two different types of managed care plans: the TEFRA HMO 
and the S/HMO, representing coverage expanded to include long-term 
care services. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
different dis enrollment patterns are observed and if differential enroll-
ment increases or decreases any enrollment bias in a managed care pop-
ulation. To adjust disenrollment for differences in frailty and disabil-
ity, we develop a case mix index based on fuzzy set theory. A formula 
based on data gathered on the health screening form survey is included 
so that individual scores can be determined for other enrolled groups. 
Comparisons of prior utilization (costs) using this case mix index in-
dicate that it captures differences in health care need as measured by 
this surrogate. 
The results indicate that the S/HMO and the HMO have favorable en-
rollment in that the case mix for both of these types of managed care 
is healthier as measured by the case mix index than the FFS sample 
observed. The differences are confirmed in the differential mortality 
patterns and the differences in prior utilization. Disenrollment works 
in favor of the managed care sectors in that those with higher levels of 
frailty have a higher likelihood of dis enrolling from managed care than 
healthy enrollees. The result of the observed disenrollment pattern is 
to give managed care a further advantage in needed care relative to the 
FFS client population. This is evidence that the cumulative antis election 
process identified by Bluhm (1982) works in reverse in HMO-FFS tran-
sitions. There is evidence, however, that healthier individuals transfer 
from one HMO to another. Thus, it indicates that as a greater portion 
of the elderly population is enrolled to receive care under a managed 
care format, the collective experience for managed care facilities will 
degenerate as a result of a decrease in the rate of discharges to FFS. 
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In addition to the financial implications of the results presented 
here, the data suggest that the major reason for dis enrollment could 
be dissatisfaction with services. Those who are frail or are in more 
need of care have the highest dis enrollment rate. Apparently, the type 
of service and care provided by a managed care facility is best for those 
who need little care or only acute care. 
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Modeling Insurance Cash Flows for Universal Life 
Policies 
Robert E. Hoyt* 
Abstract 
This paper develops a methodology that can be used by insurers to con-
struct predictive models for their own insurance cash flows. The insurance 
cash flow components evaluated include premium flows, policy loans, and 
cash value surrenders. Also, the paper evaluates several hypotheses in the 
insurance literature that attempt to explain insurance cash flows. 
Though the results are theoretically consistent, they produce some interest-
ing contrasts to findings of similar studies for whole life policies. For example, 
these results confirm that: (i) the credited rate strategy is important to policy 
performance; (ii) the emergency fund hypothesis appears to apply to policy 
loan utilization, premium payments, and total insurance cash flows; (iii) the 
arbitrage potential with regard to policy loans is reduced; and (iv) direct recog-
nition of policy loans seems to be effective in reducing the disintermediation 
risk of traditional whole life insurance policies with fixed policy loan rates. 
Although policyholders do increase their use of policy loans as inflation 
increases, the overall results suggest that they tend to increase contributions 
to their universal life policies in order to maintain levels of protection in real 
terms. Finally, interest rate risk does exist for companies issuing universal 
life because changes in market interest rates lead to decreases in premiums 
and in total insurance cash flows. This lends support to the alternative funds 
hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Universal Life 
Universal life insurance can be described as a flexible premium, flex-
ible benefit life insurance policy consisting of a savings or cash value 
account and a term or pure insurance component. Charges for expenses 
and pure insurance protection are deducted from, and interest is cred-
ited to, the cash value account (generally on a monthly basis). The 
policyholder decides on the timing and amount of premium payments, 
subject to certain limits. Premium payments received from the policy-
holder are credited to the cash value account. Universal life is character-
ized by a high degree of disclosure. The interest credited each month 
is stated, as are the expenses and pure insurance charges. This split 
of the traditional whole life policy components that is characteristic of 
universal life insurance is referred to as unbundling. 
The interest or credited rate on the policy is adjusted on a regu-
lar basis in line with market interest rates. The credited rate usually is 
guaranteed for no more than one year, with a permanent rate guarantee 
of from 4 percent to 4.5 percent. Unlike traditional whole life poliCies, 
universal life poliCies often permit partial withdrawals. In addition, 
policy loans are permitted. Universal life policies are characterized as 
being loan intolerant, however, as they generally provide either vari-
able policy loan rates or directly recognize policy loan utilization in the 
credited rate. 
The introduction of universal life insurance poliCies in 1979 resulted 
from significant changes in the insurance and financial services indus-
try. Changes in the economy as a whole contributed to their intro-
duction and subsequent popularity as well. Deregulation in the finan-
cial services industry has led to even greater demand for life insurance 
products that are competitive with other investment vehicles. A Fed-
eral Trade Commission (1979) report alleging a 1.3 percent return on 
whole life insurance heightened consumer dissatisfaction with tradi-
tional cash value policies. 
Given the premium and benefit flexibility, as well as crediting of mar-
ket rates of interest, universal life gained popularity. Based on figures 
obtained from the Life Insurance Fact Book over several years including 
(1983-1991), universal life sales increased from 12 percent of ordinary 
premium in 1983 to sales of over 32 percent in 1985. These same fea-
tures, however, contributed to the modest decline in its popularity in 
the latter part of the 1980s, with sales of universal life representing only 
27 percent of ordinary life premiums in 1991. Universal life insurance 
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remains an important product representing 24 percent of ordinary life 
insurance in force in 1991. 
The high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s created 
a massive outflow of funds from existing cash value products as pol-
icyholders took policy loans at unprecedented levels and surrendered 
policies to take advantage of high market interest rates. 1 Policy loan 
problems for some insurers became severe-replacement of their own 
in-force business with a direct recognition policy was seen as the only 
solution. High inflation rates contributed to the increasing dissatisfac-
tion with traditional cash value policies because premiums and benefits 
generally were fixed in amount, with no specific provision for adjust-
ment in the amounts as a result of inflation. 
1.2 Objectives 
The significant flexibility provided to the policyholder by universal 
life, coupled with the unbundled structure and extensive disclosure of 
policy provisions and charges, makes it a particularly interesting in-
surance product to model. These features undoubtedly increase the 
sensitivity of universal life cash flows to changes in both endogenous 
and exogenous factors. This increased sensitivity also makes it more 
important that the insurer understand the factors that influence uni-
versallife cash flows. 
Thus the objective of this paper is threefold: 
• First, to present a methodology that can be used by insurers to 
construct predictive models for their own insurance cash flows. A 
set of significant exogenous economic input variables is identified 
for each cash flow component. These variables then are used to 
develop models for the components of universal life cash flows . 
• Second, the paper evaluates several hypotheses in the insurance 
literature that purport to explain insurance cash flows. This eval-
uation provides an assessment of the significance of specific fac-
tors in explaining insurance cash flows. Identifying specific fac-
tors should aid actuaries in the product development process. 
The insurance cash flow components evaluated include premium 
flows, policy loans, and cash value surrenders. 
IThe policy surrender rate grew steadily from 8.1 percent in 1980 to a peak of 12.3 
percent in 1985. Policy loans reached 9.3 percent of assets in 1981 before beginning a 
steady decline over the past decade; see Life Insurance Fact Book, 1994. 
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• Third, the paper exposes actuaries to the non-actuarial literature 
on insurance cash flows. 
2 Review of the Literature 
This section discusses some of the potential theoretical relation-
ships between the input and output variables. First, several hypothe-
ses that have been proposed in the literature to explain insurance cash 
flows are described. Next, the results of several prior studies related to 
insurance cash flow modeling are discussed. Then hypothesized rela-
tionships are presented for each of the groups of cash flow variables. 
These groups are, generally, premium flows, policy loan flows, and cash 
value surrenders. 
2.1 Cash Flow Hypotheses 
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain cash flows in in-
surance policies.2 The arbitrage/yield spread hypothesis suggests that 
policyholders are influenced by differences between the credited inter-
est rate and market interest rates. As this spread ( credited interest 
rate minus market interest rate) increases, premium payments would 
be expected to increase while policy loans and surrenders would be 
expected to decline. In the case of policy loans, the arbitrage/yield 
spread hypothesis asserts that policyholders are motivated by differ-
ences between the policy loan rate and market interest rates (Bykerk 
and Thompson, 1979). As this spread increases, the level of policy 
loans will increase. 
The emergency fund hypothesis asserts that policyholders view their 
insurance poliCies as sources of needed funds in cases of emergency 
(Wood, 1964; Rejda, 1966; Outreville, 1990). Hence, higher policy loan 
demand, lower premium payments, and increased policy surrenders 
may be expected during periods of high unemployment or low earnings. 
The alternative funds hypothesis relates to the availability of funds 
in credit markets (Schott, 1971; Pesando, 1974). This hypothesis sug-
gests that when alternative sources of funds are difficult to obtain, pol-
icyholders may turn to their insurance policy for funds either through 
increased policy loans, increased policy surrenders, or decreased pre-
mium payments. 
2See Carson and Hoyt (1992, p. 242) for a description of these hypotheses with 
respect to policy loan demand. Cargill and Troxel (1979) provide a cogent discussion 
of these concepts and of the effect of inflation on life insurance demand. 
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The rising prices/inflation hypothesis states that policy loan demand 
increases, surrenders rise, and premium payments decline as the need 
for additional sources of income becomes greater in periods of rising 
prices (Day and Hendershott, 1977). A contrary hypothesis for the di-
rection of premium flows during periods of inflation, however, is the 
real protection hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that increased pur-
chases of insurance may occur during periods of inflation as policy-
holders seek to maintain a level of real insurance protection (Houston, 
1960; Neumann, 1968; Fortune, 1972; Cargill and Troxel, 1979). 
2.2 Insurance Cash Flow Modeling 
Numerous prior studies have investigated the relationships between 
various economic and institutional variables (input variables) and insur-
ance cash flows (output variables). Several of these have devoted special 
attention to the impact of various input variables on policy loan demand 
(Schott, 1971; Pesando, 1974; Bykerk and Thompson, 1979; Carson and 
Hoyt, 1992). Others also have considered premiums flows and sur-
render activity (Cummins, 1975; Schott, 1977; Berger, 1983; Curry and 
Warshawsky, 1986). 
Curry and Warshawsky (1986) look at the impact of various input 
variables on aggregate insurance cash flows from 1952 to 1985. They 
find that rising nominal market interest rates gave policyholders the 
opportunity to earn higher rates of return than those available on tradi-
tional cash value life insurance which led to an increasing flow of funds 
away from such products. Lapses and surrenders also increased as mar-
ket interest rates rose. In addition, they find that as interest rates rose 
above the contractual loan rate, policyholders exercised the option to 
take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity by borrowing against their 
cash values to invest in assets earning current interest rates. 
Schott (1977) performs insurance cash flow analysis based on data 
from his company, The Equitable. He points out that a reasonable 
proposition is to take individual cash flow items and test each for statis-
tical associations with life insurance or external economic and financial 
variables. He indicates, however, that multicollinearity and functional 
instability of the parameters must be viewed as potential problems. 
Berger (1983) analyzes the impact of various input variables on life 
insurance cash flows at Metropolitan Life. He finds that life insurance 
surrenders can be explained by a model containing only the unemploy-
ment rate and the yield on three month Treasury bills. Increases in un-
employment are found to lead to increased surrenders, and increases 
in the T-bill rate also are found to generate increased surrenders. 
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Several prior studies have devoted special emphasis to modeling 
policy loan flows. Schott (1971) investigates the impact of various in-
put variables (including the four to six month commercial paper rate 
and the percentage change in the money supply) on the net increase 
in policy loans.3 Cummins (1975) and Berger (1983) consider modeling 
policy loan flows. Bykerk and Thompson (1979) also perform a compre" 
hensive analysis of policy loan demand. In addition, Carson and Hoyt 
(1992) assess the impact that redesigned policy loan provisions in life 
insurance poliCies and changes in financial markets have had on the 
demand for policy loans after 1980. 
2.3 Hypothesized Relationships Between the Input and Out-
put Variables 
Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain variations in the 
cash flows of insurance poliCies. These hypotheses lead to the expected 
analytic relationships between the various insurance cash flows or out-
put variables (premiums, policy loans, and policy surrenders) and the 
input variables (unemployment, interest rates, inflation, yield spread, 
and others) that are presented in Table 1. 
Market interest rates are used to test the alternative funds hypoth-
esis. Higher interest rates reflect reduced availability of funds in credit 
markets. Also, if interest rates represent the returns available from 
alternative investments, a decline in these rates would make the guar-
antees in a universal life policy more attractive. Hence, premium flows 
would be related negatively to interest rates, while the demand for pol-
icy loans and surrenders would increase with increases in these rates. 
The change in the money supply, CHGM1, also is used to measure the 
availability of funds in credit markets. Specific definitions of the vari-
ables mentioned in the next several paragraphs are provided in Table 
2. 
SPREAD1 and SPREAD2, the differences between the credited rate 
and market interest rates, are used to test the arbitrage/yield spread 
hypothesis. As the yield differential for investing dollars in the uni-
versal life policy increases relative to other options, premium flows 
increase and loan utilization and surrenders decrease. 
3In particular, Schott (1971) found that the four to six month commercial paper rate 
and the percentage change in the money supply produced the highest adjusted R2. He 
also tested net changes in consumer credit and changes in consumer prices. 
Table 1 
Expected Relationships Between Input and Output Variables 
Input Variables 
Output Variables CRATE SPREAD ARBIT CHGMI INFLATE UNEMPLOY EARN 
NEWPREM + + + or- + 
RENPREM + + + or- + 
REPPREM + + + or- + 
NISSUE + + + or- + 
NPAY + + + or- + 
LNREPAY + + + or- - or + 
NEWLOAN + + + 
TLOAN + + + or- - or + 
NETFULL + + + 
Notes: CRATE = Credited interest rate; SPREAD = Yield spread; ARBIT = Loan rate - Credited rate; CHGMI = Change in 
money supply; INFLATE = Rate of inflation; UNEMPLOY = Unemployment rate; EARN = Earnings. 
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Table 2 
Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
Variable Description of the Variable 
Panel A: Premium Activity 
NEWPREM 
RENPREM 
REPPREM 
NISSUES 
NPAY 
Total amount of premiums received from new 
policyholders; 
Total amount of premiums received from existing 
policyholders; 
Total amount of premiums paid by cash values 
transferred from old policies; 
Number of new policies issued; 
Number of premium payments made; 
Panel B: Policy Loan Activity 
LNREPAY 
NEWLOAN 
TLOAN 
Amount of outstanding loans repaid in the month; 
Amount of new loans made in the month; 
Total amount of outstanding loans; 
Panel C: Surrender Activity 
NETFULL Total amount of full cash value surrenders after 
adjustment for surrender charges; 
Panel D: Other Internal Variables 
CRATE 
CASHVAL Value 
LOANRATE 
Current credited interest rate for all funds received 
in the month; 
Aggregate cash value of all existing policies; 
This is the policy loan rate, including opportunity 
cost. LOANRATE = 8 + (CRATE - 4), where 8 percent 
is the contractual loan rate and (CRATE - 4) repre-
sents the opportunity costs because the loaned 
cash value is credited with only the guaranteed 
rate; 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
Description of the Variable 
Panel E: Interest Rates 
CD 
CPAPER 
AAA 
BM 
TBILL3 
TBILL6 
TBILLYR 
TNOTE 
TBOND 
Average yield on 90 day certificates of deposit; 
Average yield on 30 day commercial paper; 
Average yield on corporate bonds rated Aaa; 
Average yield on corporate bonds rated Baa; 
Average yield on three month Treasury bills; 
Average yield on six month month Treasury bills; 
Average yield on one year Treasury bills; 
Average yield on five year Treasury securities; 
Average yield on long-term Treasury securities; 
Panel F: Other Economic Variables 
INFLATE 
UNEMPLOY 
EARN 
CONINT 
CHGMI 
Unadjusted monthly inflation rate (CPHV); 
Percentage of unemployed civilian workers; 
Average weekly earnings of production or nonsu-
pervisory workers of major corporations; 
Rate on short-term consumer loans from nonbank 
financial institutions; 
Monthly percentage change in the money supply 
(Ml); 
Panel G: Combined Endogenous/Exogenous Variables 
SPREAD 1 
SPREAD2 
ARBIT 
Yield differential between the credited rate and the 
yield on 90 day certificates of deposit, i.e., 
CRATE - CD; 
Yield differential between the credited rate and the 
yield on three month T-bills, i.e., CRATE - TBILL3; 
Arbitrage, i.e., Loan Rate - Credited Rate. 
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The spread between market rates, such as TBILL3 and CPAPER, and 
the loan rate paid on policy loans (LOAN RATE) is used to test the arbi-
trage hypothesis. The greater the spread, the greater the incentive for 
the policyholder to utilize policy loans. Due to the provision for direct 
recognition of policy loans that is used by the company being evaluated, 
however, the arbitrage variables may be insignificant.4 
The unemployment rate, UNEMPLOY, and the level of earnings, EARN, 
are used to test the emergency fund hypothesis. Hence, premium flows 
are related negatively to UNEMPLOY, while the demand for policy loans 
and surrenders increases with increases in UNEMPLOY. The expected 
correlations for EARN are reversed. The impact of UNEMPLOY on loan 
repayments, LNREPAY, is unclear because increasing unemployment 
may make repayment difficult for many policyholders, but it will lead 
to increased policy surrenders which will result in loan repayments if 
the surrendered poliCies have outstanding loans. 
The inflation rate, INFLATE, is used to test between two compet-
ing hypotheses, the inflation/rising prices hypothesis and the real pro-
tection hypothesis. The first suggests a negative relationship between 
premium flows and INFLATE, while the demand for policy loans and 
surrenders increases with increases in INFLATE. The real protection hy-
pothesis suggests a positive correlation between premium flows and 
INFLATE. 
Additionally, the amount of outstanding loans, TLOAN, represents 
the amount of loans available for repayment. Hence, the correlation 
between LNREPAY and TLOAN is expected to be positive. As the amount 
of cash value, CASHVAL, places a cap on the amount of loans that can 
be made, increases in cash value are expected to be related positively 
to NEWLOAN. 
3 Data Sources 
3.1 Endogenous Data 
The endogenous insurance data represent the experience of a large 
stock life insurance company's universal life policy from the end of 
4The universal life policy of the company considered in the study provides that the 
loaned cash value is credited with only the guaranteed rate, 4 percent. The contractual 
loan rate is 8 percent. Hence, the effective loan rate is LOANRATE = 8 + (CRATE - 4), 
where the second term represents the opportunity cost of borrowing. Note that the 
arbitrage potential, TBILL3 - LOANRATE, reduces to SPREAD2, a constant. In other 
words, due to the direct recognition of policy loans in this policy, the arbitrage and 
yield spread concepts are linked closely. 
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the third quarter of 1982 to the end of the first quarter of 1986. The 
data are monthly observations. Attempts were made to collect data 
from additional insurers that offer universal life policies. A number 
of insurers, however, could not provide the requested data due to the 
lack of comprehensive databases on their universal life policies. Other 
insurers had existing databases, but considered the requested data to 
be proprietary. 
Nevertheless, use of this insurer's universal life insurance data is 
not expected to bias the results for the following reasons. First, the 
sampled insurer is relatively large, being among the top 40 life insurers 
and among the top 20 stock life insurers based on life insurance in 
force. Second, the sampled insurer's universal life policy features are 
reasonably representative of the policies being offered by other insurers 
and its policy is approved in all states. Hence, although only one insurer 
is represented, the behavior of policyholders across the U.S. is reflected 
in the cash flows. Several other insurance cash flow studies have been 
forced to rely on data from one insurer (Schott, 1977; Berger, 1983). 
Finally, the sampled insurer's policy loan and surrender experience over 
the estimation period is generally equivalent to the experience in the 
industry.5 
3.2 Exogenous Data 
The exogenous economic data come from several government pub-
lications. The interest rate data represent the averages of weekly rates 
for each month of the observation period. The weekly rates are taken 
from u.s. Financial Data, which is published by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. The data for unemployment and earnings are taken 
from Employment and Earnings, and the data for inflation are taken 
from CPI Detailed Report, both published by the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, the data for the consumer 
interest rate and the change in the money supply (M1) are taken from 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin, published by the Federal Reserve Board. 
The data variables considered in the study are presented in Table 2. 
SIn 1985 the industry surrender rate was 12.3 percent while the surrender rate for 
the sampled insurer was 14.8 percent. The percentage of assets in policy loans for 
the industry in 1985 was 6.6 percent and for the sampled insurer the figure was 7.9 
percent. For the sampled insurer the percentage of universal life insurance in force in 
1985 relative to ordinary life insurance was 6.2 percent. The comparable figure for the 
industry was 8.9 percent. 
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4 Empirical Estimation Procedure 
The first step in the estimation procedure is to determine a set of 
input or independent variables that can be justified as predictors of the 
insurance cash flow variable being considered. Second, the correlations 
between the various independent variables and the cash flow variables 
are examined to determine whether the correlations confirm the expec-
tations identified in Table 1 and to gain some insight into the predictive 
power of the individual independent variables. Also, evaluation of the 
correlation matrix allows an initial assessment of how severe potential 
problems of multicollinearity may be.6 
Third, the ridge trace plots are calculated for the set of independent 
variables to determine which variables appear to have coefficients that 
stabilize quickly and are nonzero. The ridge trace for each independent 
variable is calculated using the procedure RIDGEREG in the SAS statis-
tical package. 7 The results indicate a subset of variables that should 
be considered for elimination from the model, specifically, those that 
have either unstable or zero coefficients. 
Fourth, ridge regression is used to allow estimation of the coeffi-
cients without the negative and confounding influences introduced by 
multicollinearity, which is present in most of the estimations. Ridge 
regression achieves this by adding small positive amounts to the diago-
nal of the X' X matrix.8 This produces biased regression estimates but 
can reduce the mean standard error. A discussion of ridge regression 
is found in Hoerl and Kennard (l970a, 1970b, 1976).9 
In applying the regression analysis, backward elimination and for-
ward stepwise regression are used. The ridge regression model is com-
pared against the same model estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. This comparison permits assessment of the impact, if any, 
that multicollinearity has on the estimation. If the results are not greatly 
different, the OLS regression model is preferred due to the unbiased-
6 Multicollinearity refers to the mathematical estimation problems associated with 
estimating parameters in a regression model in the presence of high levels of cross-
correlation between independent variables. Multicollinearity is not necessarily a prob-
lem if the sole purpose of the regression model is prediction of the dependent variable. 
7SASVersion 5.18. Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute, Inc., 1986. 
SHere X' denotes the transpose of the matrix X. 
9 An alternative procedure for the estimation of the models in the presence of mul-
ticollinearity would be principal components analysis. Principal components analysis 
has the advantage over ridge regression of producing unbiased estimators. Unfortu-
nately, the calculation in principal components analysis makes the results difficult to 
interpret because the estimator is a mixture of all of the original coefficients. Greene 
(1993: 273) points out that it is unlikely that these combinations can be interpreted in 
any meaningful way. 
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ness of OLS regression estimates. During the ridge regression analysis, 
the RP-criterion, which is developed in Erickson (1981), also is evaluated 
to assess the appropriateness of the model. IO 
Finally, the residuals from the regression model are analyzed. The 
residuals are evaluated to determine if any nonstochastic trend is present 
over time. Also, the residuals are checked for heteroscedasticityll and 
to assess whether higher order terms of the independent variables are 
indicated. Appropriate adjustments are made if any violations of the 
model assumptions are identified from the residual analysis. 
Schott (1977) points out that one potential problem with cash flow 
analysis is the need to forecast values for the independent variables in 
order to obtain estimates of the cash flow variable. After some com-
parative analysis of the regressions, it is determined that this potential 
problem can be addressed by lagging the input variables at a small cost 
in loss of predictive power. Therefore, as indicated by the (t - 1) sub-
scripts on most of the input variables, the majority of the input series 
are lagged one month. 
Insurers have an interest in estimating insurance cash flows, but 
they also care about identifying the specific factors that influence these 
cash flows. Identifying these specific factors is important as part of the 
product development process. As a result of this twofold interest by in-
surers, the best model identified is the model that explains the greatest 
amount of variation, as measured by R2, and in which the independent 
variables are each statistically significant. 
Extrapolation of regression results beyond the range of estimation 
should be done with caution. This includes applying the results esti-
mated below without modification to other time periods or to other 
insurers. The analysis has been framed in the context of the general 
hypotheses (emergency fund, inflation/rising prices, alternative funds) 
to increase the likelihood that the results will be relevant to insurers in 
general. The results below give insurers some direction in identifying 
the factors that are likely to impact insurance cash flows and demon-
strate the mechanics of the regression modeling procedure. 
IOThe optimal model has the minimum ridge prediction (RP) value. 
II Heteroscedasticity refers to the problems generated in regression analysis when 
the variance of the residuals is not constant. SpeCifically, in several of the models 
various variance-stabilizing transformations of the dependent variable are utilized. 
These include square root, log, and inverse transformations. 
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5 Parameter Estimation for the Cash Flow Models 
5.1 Estimated Cash Flow Models for Premiums 
The best model identified for NEWPREM, the aggregate flow ofpremi-
urns from policyholders purchasing new policies, results from regress-
ing In(NEWPREM) on the input variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and 
SPREAD 1. 12 The results of the ridge regression are similar to the results 
using OLS regression, so the OLS model is reported here. 13 The model 
is: 
Lo 9 (NEWPREMt ) 1B.7 - 0.461 x BAAt-1 
+ 0.645 x INFLATEt- 1 
- 0.157 x UNEMPLOYt-1 
+ 0.277 X SPREAD1 t- 1 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.732.14 
(1) 
As anticipated, new premium flows are sensitive to the yield pre-
mium available for investing dollars in a universal life policy as opposed 
to other options. This is supported by the positive sign on SPREAD 1 and 
conforms with the expectations of the arbitrage/yield spread hypothe-
sis. The negative sign on UNEMPLOY indicates that increases in unem-
ployment could be expected to reduce the amount of new premiums 
paid, which supports the emergency fund hypothesis. The single input 
12The specific variables that appear in the model, BAA versus AAA or SPREAD 1 versus 
SPREAD2, are less important than the broader hypotheses that the specific variables 
represent because the specific variables are likely to be sensitive to the time period 
under study. Some previous studies of insurance cash flows, such as Carson and Hoyt 
(1992), specify the models in terms of changes rather than levels of the dependent 
variable. In addition, various studies have used constructs known as stock adjustment 
models. Carson and Hoyt report that the results of the estimation are not altered sig-
nificantly by the choice of changes versus levels. Also, the coefficients on the stock 
adjustment construct in their model for policy loans indicate that the stock adjust-
ment framework is not statistically significant. The purpose of the present paper is 
to evaluate various hypotheses while providing models that can serve to predict the 
insurance cash flows. It seems that predicting the level of cash flows would be the 
most useful to practicing actuaries. Therefore, the models are estimated in terms of 
levels of cash flows instead of changes. Reference to stock adjustment models can be 
found in Carson and Hoyt (1992, p. 246). 
13The values in parentheses for the OLS regression models are the t-statistics. Values 
of 2.00 or greater are statistically significa~t at no less than the 0.05 level. For the ridge 
regression models, the values cannot be considered to have a t-distribution due to the 
biased nature of ridge regression. They can be interpreted in a similar fashion, however, 
with values above 2.00 suggesting statistically significant relationship. 
l-lThroughout this paper, all figures are presented to three significant digits. Small 
or large numbers arc reported using scientific notation. 
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variable with the most predictive power is BAA. In accordance with the 
alternative funds hypothesis, the coefficient on this variable is nega-
tive which suggests that as money stocks tighten, fewer funds would 
be used to purchase universal life policies. The positive coefficient on 
INFLATE seems to suggest that as inflation increases, individuals per-
ceive a need for increased insurance. In reaction to this perception, they 
increase their nominal purchases of insurance. This increased demand 
leads to an increase in nominal premium cash flows as inflation rises. 
This is consistent with the real protection hypothesis. 
The best model identified for REPPREM, the aggregate flow of premi-
ums paid by cash values transferred from replacement of old policies 
(non-universal life policies), results from regressing REPPREM on the 
input variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results 
of the ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, 
so the OLS model is reported here. The model is: 
REPPREMt 7.52 X 105 - 3.09 X 104 x BAAt- 1 
+ 8.56 x 104 x INFLATEt- 1 
- 3.51 x 104 x UNEMPLOYt-l 
+ 4.52 x 104 x SPREAD2 t- 1 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.698. 
(2) 
The results for REPPREM are similar to those for NEWPREM. But there 
are some differences. First, SPREAD2 replaces SPREAD1 and is some-
what more significant in the model for replacement premium flows. 
The replacement of SPREAD1 by SPREAD2 is probably not especially 
important. SPREAD1 is the spread between the credited rate and the 
yield on CDs, while SPREAD2 is the spread between the credited rate 
and the 90 day T-bill rate. One interpretation may be that individu-
als considering new policy purchases are interested in the competitive-
ness of the policy relative to alternative investments such as CDs. On 
the other hand, individuals considering replacement of currently held 
policies are interested in the attractiveness of the policy relative to the 
risk-free rate in the market. 
Second, a comparison of the elasticities with respect to each of the 
predictor variables suggests the following about the differences be-
tween the estimated equations for NEWPREM and REPPREM. The elas-
ticities for INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and the spread variables are relatively 
similar between the two equations which suggests little difference in 
the sensitivity of NEWPREM and REPPREM to these three predictors. 
The elasticities for BAA differ substantially between the two equa-
tions. The elasticity of NEWPREM with respect to BAA is 3.7, while the 
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similar figure for REPPREM is only 1.2. This seems to suggest that the 
relative availability of money stocks (alternative funds hypothesis) has 
less of an impact on the decision to replace an existing policy than it 
does on the decision to purchase a new universal life policy. 
The best model identified for RENPREM, the aggregate flow of premi-
ums paid on existing policies, results from regressing REPPREM on the 
input variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results 
of the ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, 
so the OLS model is reported here. The model is: 
RENPREM t 3.01 X 103 - 1.07 X 102 x BAAt - 1 
+ 60.0 x INFLATEt- 1 
- 1.25 x 102 x UNEMPLOYt-l 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.925. 
(3) 
The major difference between the model for RENPREM and the mod-
els for NEWPREM and REPPREM is the absence of an interest rate spread 
variable in the expression for RENPREM. This difference suggests that a 
certain amount of inertia exists with regard to the payment of renewal 
premiums. That is, a change in the level of the credited rate relative to 
the yield available on alternative investments does not have as great an 
impact on the decision of existing policyholders to make premium pay-
ments as it does on the decision of potential policyholders to purchase 
a universal life policy. 
Finally, several additional variables related to premium flows are 
analyzed. These include NISSUES, the number of new policies issued, 
and NPAY, the number of premium payments made on existing policies. 
The best model identified for NISSUES regresses NISSUES on the input 
variables BAA, INFLATE, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results of the 
ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, so the 
OLS model is reported here. The model is: 
NISSUESt 1.01 X 102 - 5.50 x BAAt - 1 
+ 5.39 x INFLATEt-l 
- 1.77 x UNEMPLOYt-l 
+ 2.25 x SPREAD2 t - 1 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.882. 
(4) 
The results of the regression are similar to those for NEWPREM and 
REPPREM. Specifically, the spread between the credited interest rate on 
the universal life policy and the yield on alternative investments has a 
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statistically significant impact on the number of new policies issued, as 
well as on the total amount of premium received on new policies. 
The best model identified for NPAY results from regressing NPAY 
on the input variables BAA and UNEMPLOY. The results of the ridge 
regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, so the OLS 
model is reported here. The model is: 
NPAYt = 3.00 x 102 - 11.9 x BAAt-l - 11.0 x UNEMPLOYt-l (5) 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.956. 
The results of the regression are similar to those for RENPREM. In-
terestingly, the spread between the credited interest rate on the univer-
sal life policy and the yield on alternative investments does not have 
a statistically significant impact on the number of premiums paid on 
existing policies, nor does the spread have a significant impact on the 
total amount of premium received on existing policies. 
The absence of INFLATE as a predictor in the model for NPAY seems 
to lend some support to the earlier interpretation of the inflation vari-
able in the premium flow models. That is, the positive coefficient on 
INFLATE in the premium flow models suggests that increased infla-
tion causes policyholders to recognize a need for increased nominal 
amounts of insurance. In reaction to this, they increase the amount of 
premium payments. An increase in the number of payments, however, 
would not necessarily be expected. Again, this result is consistent with 
the real protection hypothesis. 
5.2 Estimated Cash Flow Models for Policy Loans 
The best model identified for LNREPAY, the aggregate amount of ex-
isting policy loans that are repaid, results from regressing LNREPAY on 
the input variables TLOAN and EARN. Due to the high cross correlation 
(r) between the input variables (r = 0.795), the results of the ridge 
regression are reported here. The model is: 
LNREPAYt 
Bias parameter: k = 0.0053; 
-6.06 X 102 + 2.23 x EARNt-l 
+ 9.97 x 10- 5 x TLOANt-l. 
Coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.946; and 
Ridge prediction criterion: RP = 72.58. 
(6) 
As anticipated, policy loan repayments are related positively to level 
of earnings, EARN, confirming the emergency fund hypothesis. Al-
though UNEMPLOY had the expected sign, it was not significant, given 
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EARN is already in the model. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that 
the spread between market interest rates and LOANRATE is not a sig-
nificant predictor in the regression. This probably is a result of the 
fact that the universal life policy being considered here is not loan tol-
erant. Specifically, policy loans reduce credited interest earnings on 
the portion of the policy cash value supporting the loan to only the 
guaranteed rate. This apparently reduces the significance of any ar-
bitrage potential. This result contrasts with the findings of previous 
researchers for whole life policies which traditionally have used a fixed 
loan rate (Schott, 1971; Cummins, 1975; Bykerk and Thompson, 1979). 
The result is consistent, however, with the findings of Carson and Hoyt 
(1992) for policy loan utilization in the 1980s. 
The best model identified for NEWLOAN, the aggregate amount of 
new policy loans, results from regressing NEWLOAN on the input vari-
ables CASHV AL and INFLATE. The results of the ridge regression are 
similar to the results using OLS regression, so the OLS model is reported 
here. The model is: 
NEWLOANt -4.02 + 1.36 x 10-5 x CASHVALt-l 
+ 96.6 x INFLATEt-l 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.717. 
(7) 
The predictive power of the model is only slightly reduced by using 
the value of cash values lagged one month. Increases in the amount 
available to be borrowed, CASHV AL, increase the amount of new loans. 
In accordance with the rising prices/inflation hypothesis, an increase in 
the level of inflation increases the amount of new loans. Again, as seen 
with respect to loan repayments, the arbitrage variable is not significant 
in the model. This seems to further support the notion that the loan-
intolerant nature of universal life reduces the potential for arbitrage 
gains through the exercise of the policy loan privilege. 
The best model identified for TLOAN, the aggregate amount of out-
standing policy loans, results from regressing TLOAN on the input vari-
ables CASHVAL, EARN, and SPREAD 1. Due to the high cross correlation 
between the CASHVAL and EARN (r = 0.887), the results of the ridge 
regression are reported here. The model is: 
TLOANt 2.46 X 106 + 4.59 X 10-2 x CASHVALt-l 
- 8.99 x 103 x EARNt-l 
- 1.61 x 104 x SPREAD1 t-l. 
Bias parameter: k = 5.60 x 10-4 ; 
(8) 
Hoyt: Universal Life Cash Flows 
Coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.985; and 
Ridge prediction criterion: RP = 5.87 X 108 .1 5 
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All of the input variables in the model have the expected signs. As 
observed with respect to the amount of new loans, increases in the 
amount available to be borrowed, CASHV AL, increase the amount of 
total loans outstanding. EARN, which is significant in describing the 
amount of loan repayments, is also significant in describing the amount 
of outstanding loans. Of special interest is the fact that SPREAD1 is 
significant in the model for total loans. Specifically, decreases in the 
yield spread between the credited rate and alternative investment re-
turns increase the total amount of loans outstanding. That is, failure 
to maintain a competitive credited rate could lead to disintermediation 
through increased exercise of the policy loan privilege. 
Interestingly, UNEMPLOY is not significant in any of the policy loan 
models. This is important in light of the prior findings and contro-
versy surrounding the relationship between unemployment and policy 
loan utilization. Most previous studies find little correlation between 
unemployment and policy loan demand (Schott, 1971; Cummins, 1975; 
Bykerk and Thompson, 1979). The general opinion in the industry, how-
ever, is that policyholders use policy loans as a source of needed funds 
in periods of increased unemployment. 
Even though the models identified here did not find UNEMPLOY to 
be a significant variable, some support for the emergency fund hypoth-
esis is suggested. EARN is significant in the model for TLOAN, suggest-
ing that reduced earnings may result in increased policy loans. Also, 
UNEMPLOY is a significant predictor of premium flows and, due to the 
discretionary nature of premium payments on a universal life policy, 
reduced premium payments may serve to replace some of the demand 
for increased policy loans. 
5.3 Estimated Cash Flow Model for Surrenders 
Because the total amount of net surrenders would be expected to 
increase with the increase in the amount of cash values available upon 
surrender, the actual output variable considered here is the ratio of net 
full surrenders (gross full surrenders less deduction of any surrender 
charges) to aggregate cash values. 16 The correlation of 0.754 between 
ISNote that RP cannot be compared across models. It only is used within a given 
estimation model to indicate optimal fit. For example, the best fit is obtained by mini-
mizing RP. Here RP is large due to the units of measure for TLOAN. 
16Data on partial surrenders also are available from the insurer in the study. Activity 
is reported in only 20 of the 39 months covered in the study. The paucity of partial 
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NETFULL and CASHVAL supports this conclusion. The best model iden-
tified for the ratio of NETFULL to CASHVAL results from regressing the 
reciprocal of this ratio on UNEMPLOY and UNEMPLOY2. The inverse 
of the output variable is used as a variance-stabilizing transformation. 
Also, initial plots of the residuals against UNEMPLOY suggest the need 
for the quadratic term. Due to the high cross correlation between the 
input variables (r = 0.999), the results of the ridge regression are re-
ported here. The model is: 
( 
NETFULL ) -1 
CASHVAL t 
3.91 X 104 - 1.07 X 104 x UNEMPLOY t - 1 
+ 7.31 X 102 x UNEMPLOY2 t -1. 
Bias parameter: k = 2.00 x 10-5; 
Coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.717; and 
Ridge prediction criterion: RP = 4.45 X 104. 
(9) 
Although the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is negative, this is consis-
tent with the predicted positive relationship between unemployment 
and surrenders because the regression is performed on the inverse of 
the output variable. The positive coefficient on UNEMPLOY2 suggests a 
decreasing impact of changes in UN EMPLOY as the level of unemploy-
ment increases. These results support the emergency fund hypothesis. 
5.4 Regression Model of Combined Insurance Cash Flows 
To assess the impact of aggregating the individual cash flow equa-
tions above to form total insurance cash flows, a regression model is 
fitted to the historical data for insurance cash flows. Insurance cash 
flows at time t, INSCF t , are defined as: 
INSCF t TOTAL PREMIUMS 
+ POLICY LOAN INCOME 
- NET INCREASES IN POLICY LOANS 
- DEATH BENEFITS 
- SURRENDER BENEFITS 
- EXPENSES & COMMISSIONS 
- FEDERAL INCOME TAXES. 
surrender activity makes a meaningful modeling of this cash flow impossible. Although 
it would be interesting to investigate the impact of the surrender charge on policy 
surrenders, the availability of data from only one insurer, coupled with the fact that 
the insurer did not vary its surrender charge specification during the period of the 
study, make this impossible. 
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The best model identified for INSCF results from regressing INSCF 
on the input variables BAA, UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2. The results of 
the ridge regression are similar to the results using OLS regression, so 
the OLS model is reported here. The model is: 
INSCFt 3.34 X 106 - 1.41 X 105 x BAAt-l 
- 1.34 x 105 x UNEMPLOY t - 1 
+ 6.55 x 104 x SPREAD2 t - 1 (10) 
with coefficient of determination: R2 = 0.780. 
Two major results of this estimation are worth noting. First, the 
variable INFLATE is not present in the regression model for total in-
surance cash flows. In other words, it appears that inflation is not a 
significant predictor once death benefits, expenses, commissions, and 
so forth are netted out of insurance cash flows. This adds additional 
support to the earlier conclusion that policyholders adjust premium 
payments in order to maintain real levels of protection. 
Second, the three predictors that are significant in the model, BAA, 
UNEMPLOY, and SPREAD2, are found in the premium flow models. This 
is not surprising because premium flows are the dominant component 
of total insurance cash flows. These findings support the alternative 
funds, emergency fund, and arbitrage/yield spread hypotheses as ex-
planations for total insurance cash flows. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the results of the various regression 
models estimated in the paper. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, several regression models for insurance cash flows on 
a universal life policy are developed. The models relate various theo-
retically justifiable input variables, both exogenous and endogenous, 
to the relevant cash flow or output variables. The results are theoreti-
cally consistent, but produce some interesting contrasts to findings of 
similar studies for whole life policies. 
Several interesting results are found. First, not surprisingly, the 
credited rate strategy is important to policy performance. New and re-
placement premium flows are sensitive to the credited rate yield spread, 
as is the amount of total policy loans. Second, the emergency fund hy-
pothesis appears to apply to policy loan utilization, premium payments, 
and total insurance cash flows. That is, increases in unemployment lead 
to decreased premium payments and increased surrenders, as well as 
Table 3 tv f-' 
00 
Regression Model Results 
Dependent Variable R2 Intercept and Independent Variables (Sign of Coefficient) 
(Equation) (Value of Coefficient's t-Statistic*) 
log(NEWPREM) 73.2% 18.7 BAA (-) INFLATE (+) UNEMPLOY (-) SPREADI (+) 
Equation (1) (15.09) (-4.33) (3.19) (-2.32) (3.15) 
REPPREM 69.8% 7.51 X 105 BAA (-) INFLATE (+) UNEMPLOY (-) SPREAD2 (+) 
Equation (2) (5.02) ( -2.57) (3.49) (-4.62) (3.94) I.-0 
RENPREM 92.5% 3.01X103 BAA (-) INFLATE (+) UNEMPLOY (-) s:: ..... 
Equation (3) (20.36) (-9.25) (2.01) (-15.48) ::l PJ 
NISSUES 88.2% 1.01X 102 BAA (-) INFLATE (+) UNEMPLOY (-) SPREAD2 (+) 0 ....., 
Equation (4) (12.98) (-8.82) (4.23) (-4.48) (3.76) » 
NPAY 95.6% 3.00X 102 BAA (-) UNEMPLOY (-) r. .... s:: 
Equation (5) (29.54) (-15.38) (-18.82) PJ :::::!. 
LNREPAY 94.6% -6.06x102 EARN (+) TLOAN (+) e:!.. 
Equation (6) (-8.54) (8.96) (8.00) -0 ..... 
NEWLOAN 71.7% -4.02 CASHVAL (+) INFLATE (+) PJ r. .... 
Equation (7) (-0.27) (9.24) (4.06) r. It> 
TLOAN 98.5% 2.46X106 CASHVAL (+) EARN (-) SPREADI (-) -< Equation (8) (8.37) (27.18) (-8.53) (-3.60) 0 
(NTFULLjCASHV ALt 1 94.0% 3.91X104 UNEMPLOY (-) UNEMPLOy2 (+) tv 
Equation (9) (9.14) (-9.67) -(10.62) z 
INSCF 78.0% 3.34x106 BAA (-) UNEMPLOY (-) SPREAD2 (+) ~ 
Equation (10) (8.36) (-4.45) (-6.29) (2.04) tv 
"The t-statistics values in parentheses of 2.00 or greater are statistically significant at no less than the 0.05 level. \.0 
\.0 
~ 
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to decreased total insurance cash flows. Decreases in earnings lead to 
increased total policy loans. Third, the arbitrage potential with regard 
to policy loans is reduced. Direct recognition of policy loans seems to 
be effective in reducing the disintermediation risk that exist in tradi-
tional whole life insurance policies with fixed policy loan rates. Fourth, 
although policyholders do increase their use of policy loans as inflation 
increases, the overall results suggest that they tend to increase contri-
butions to their universal life policies in order to maintain levels of 
protection in real terms. This provides support for the real protection 
hypothesis. Finally, interest rate risk does exist for companies issuing 
universal life because changes in market interest rates lead to decreases 
in premiums and in total insurance cash flows. This lends support to 
the alternative funds hypothesis. 
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Modal Premium Factors in Ordinary Life Insurance 
James B. Ross* and Criss G. Woodrufft 
Abstract 
For ordinary life policyholders who want to pay more frequently than an-
nually, insurers construct schedules of modal premium factors that reflect 
additional charges for the costs of collection, forgone interest, and premiums 
uncollected or refunded in the year of death. Competition within the industry 
forces convergence of such schedules. On the other hand, if such factors for a 
given company reflect its own experience (in expense, interest, mortality, and 
persistency), the differences between companies will force schedules apart. 
Analysis of a large group of life insurers over the 1972-1982-1992 period 
shows that modal premium factors are dustered closely, that they are becom-
ing more dispersed over time, and that the mean factors are increasing as a 
percentage of premiums. These findings are consistent with the viewpoint 
that modal premium factors are beginning to reflect individual company ex-
perience and that the companies increasingly are able to cover the additional 
costs of business written on other than an annual basis. 
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Introduction 
Companies selling products under installment purchase plans must 
make adjustments for the costs of lost interest and of handling pay-
ments. If the borrower defaults on a collateralized obligation, the com-
pany has recourse; if the default occurs on a nonrecourse instrument, 
the seller/lender has repayment procedures that are intended to max-
imize the recovery. With the exception of their single premium prod-
ucts, life insurers sell most of their products on the installment pur-
chase plan. Two important differences distinguish these plans from 
the typical commercial transaction: 
• The buyer may die at any time, triggering the benefit provisions 
and generally making further premium payments unnecessary un-
der the terms of the contract; and 
• At his or her option, the buyer may discontinue premium pay-
ments, an action that triggers the applicable nonforfeiture option. 
The actuarial calculation of modal or fractional premiums (premi-
ums payable on a basis more frequent than annual) contains some com-
plicating elements not present in the calculation of annual premiums. 
For payment modes other than annual, the company adds a carrying 
charge as compensation for the additional expenses associated with 
more frequent premium collection, the loss of interest income due to 
the deferment of some portion of the year's premium, and the higher 
lapse rates that may arise when premiums are paid other than annu-
ally. Further, to the extent that companies do not collect any remaining 
modal premiums in the year of death or refund the unearned portion 
of such premiums already made, the carrying charge also may include 
an element of life insurance (Black and Skipper, 1994). 
Typical practice is to calculate gross premiums on an annual pay-
ment basis and adjust them until they satisfy company criteria of ade-
quacy, equity, and competitiveness. Modal premium factors (MPFs) are 
computed for each of the other modes of payment (quarterly, monthly, 
bank draft, payroll deduction, and government allotment) in light of 
company experience with the additional elements mentioned above. 
These modal premium factors are published for use by agents and oth-
ers in converting annual premiums to premiums for the more frequent 
payment modes. The most common factors are simple percentages 
(e.g., each semiannual premium payment is equal to 51 percent of the 
annual premium), but a significant minority of companies uses a per-
centage and a constant that may differ by payment mode. 
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The life insurance business was changed dramatically by the intro-
duction of the universal life insurance contract in the late 1970s and, 
to a lesser extent, by variable life insurance introduced at roughly the 
same time. The 1982 Life Insurance Fact Book is the first to report a 
market share for these policies: 7 percent of new policies issued and 
12 percent of new face amount issued. Market share reached a high 
point in 1985 of 32 percent of new policies and 41 percent of new face 
amount. In recent years the market share of these contracts, which do 
not require premium payments in specified amounts on specified due 
dates, has leveled at about 20 percent of new policies and 27 percent 
of new face amount. 
This study addresses the modal premiums that are payable on poli-
cies other than universal life and variable life. These issues constitute 
roughly 80 percent of new policies and 73 percent of new face amount. 
The operational cost structures of life insurers undoubtedly were im-
pacted by the reduction in new issues flowing through conventional 
billing and collection systems. At the same time the shift in new issues 
to flexible premium contracts required new accounting systems to be 
built. Our research does not provide us with useful unit costs over time 
with which to gauge this impact. 
This paper addresses both average industry practice and the extent 
of variation in the modal premium schedules for a large sample of life 
insurance companies. Different companies experience different billing 
costs, earned rates of interest, rates of mortality, and rates of persis-
tency. In theory, these differing factors should lead to a dispersion of 
modal premium factors among companies. In practice, important de-
sign elements include a simplification of the factor system for improved 
agent and client understanding and a consideration of competitive fac-
tors (staying close to competitors' schedules); both of those elements 
would tend to cause the schedules to converge. 
This study also investigates temporal changes in industry practice. 
To the extent that they are based on the additional costs associated with 
these more frequent payment modes, modal premium factors should 
change to reflect changing costs. We also determine how the variability 
in the modal premium factors changes over time. Because company 
practice relative to collection of unpaid modal premiums in the year 
of death is an element in the modal premium factors, we provide an 
analysis over two decades of the changing practices of companies in 
that area. 
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2 Literature Review 
Bowerman (1932) draws together the history, theory, and practice 
(as determined from a survey of the 40 largest companies in 1930) 
of fractional premiums. Although his primary purpose is to address 
the adjustments necessary to accommodate company reserving prac-
tice with respect to fractional premiums, Bowerman includes a discus-
sion of the corresponding adjustments to net premiums. Bowerman 
identifies 1921 as the first year for the practice of not deducting un-
paid ordinary fractional premiums for the balance of the year of death 
(Travelers) and 1925 as the first year for the practice of "refunding the 
'unearned' portion of whatever premium had been paid beyond the pol-
icy month in which death occurred, even on annual premium policies 
... " (Metropolitan). 
Several of his comments about practice in the early 1930s are inter-
esting in light of this study's findings. He points out that" ... when 
comparatively few people asked for premiums payable fractionally, a 
fair sized loading was charged. When, however, a large proportion of in-
sureds demand the privilege of paying premiums more often than once 
a year, the tendency has been ... to reduce the excess of the fractional 
over the annual premium ... " He indicates the awareness of higher 
lapse rates on premiums payable more frequently and notes that gains 
to the company on surrender are increased by the change to the more 
liberal practice. 
Bowerman reports that in 1932 only 40 percent of the 40 largest 
companies provided the refund and nondeduction benefits in connec-
tion with fractional premiums. (The other companies continued their 
long-established practice of simply deducting the unpaid fractional pre-
miums at death.) He provides a revealing contrast to current consumer 
behavior in citing this typical distribution of ordinary fractional premi-
ums circa 1932: annual premiums constituted 50 percent of the total; 
semiannual, 22 percent; quarterly, 23 percent; and monthly, 5 percent. 
Preston (1934) reports the lapse rate on monthly business to be 250 
percent of the lapse rate on annual business, indicating a significant op-
portunity cost for companies writing business on a fractional premium 
basis. Guertin (1944) discusses the valuation implications of immedi-
ate payment of death claims and nondeduction of deferred premiums. 
Gillan (1960) points out that "to the extent that persistency on other 
than annual premium business is worse than that on annual premium 
business, fractional premiums should be increased to cover the higher 
cost of amortizing initial expense." Such differential persistency was 
not recognized at that time, nor does it appear to be currently. Broffitt 
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(1983) provides the reasoning and the algebra to correct net premiums 
payable annually to net premiums on any fractional payment basis. A 
clear exposition of net fractional premiums, complete with full deriva-
tions in actuarial notation, is provided for both true premiums at m 
intervals and for apportionable ones in Bowers et al. (1986). 
3 Data and Methodology 
The sample consists of those companies for whom modal premium 
factors are reported by Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) for the 
years 1972, 1982, and 1992. Data are available for 78, 181, and 104 
companies, respectively. The number of companies available for anal-
ysis grew substantially from 1972 to 1982, but then shrank for 1992 
due to a change in A.M. Best's reporting practices. Industry average 
data (specifically pertaining to sales on all lives by ordinary agents) are 
from The Buyer Study: United Statesforthe years 1972,1982, and 1992, 
published by LlMRA International; U.S. 25-Month Persistency, also pub-
lished by LlMRA International; and from the Life Insurance Fact Book, 
published by the American Council of Life Insurance. 
Table 1 presents industry data on the yearly premium, voluntary 
termination rate, deaths per 1,000, and investment income return for 
the years 1972, 1982, and 1992. 
Table 1 
Average Industry Data 
Yearly Premium 
Voluntary Termination Rate* 
Deaths per 1000** 
Investment Income Return 
1992 
$1,032 
8.3% 
5.1 
8.58% 
* Termination rate is for all years combined. 
**Deaths per 1000 population, adjusted for age. 
1982 1972 
$450 $200 
10.0% 6.0% 
5.5 7.0 
8.87% 5.69% 
The basic data set for our analysis consists of a vector of six modal 
premium payment modes: semiannual (SA), quarterly (QTR), regular 
monthly (MON), monthly preauthorized automatic bank draft (BANK), 
monthly payroll deduction (SAL), and monthly government allotment 
(ALLOT). A.M. Best also presents data for most firms regarding dispo-
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sition of premiums paid beyond the date of death. For each payment 
mode for each of the years 1972, 1982, and 1992 we calculate univari-
ate statistics induding mean, mode, median, maximum, minimum, and 
range for the modal premium factor. In addition we calculate the per-
centage of reporting companies that offer a particular payment mode 
(%COS) and report each payment mode as a percentage of total policies 
(%POL), total premiums paid (%PREM), and total volume (face value of 
policies written, %YOL). These statistics are presented in Table 2. Table 
2 also presents average persistency by payment mode. 1 
We then test the mean, variance, and several proportion measures 
for each modal premium factor for stationarity across time. The test 
for stationarity of the mean is a standard Z-test for equality of two 
population means. The test for stationarity of variance is a standard 
F-test for the ratio of the variances of two populations. Using another 
standard Z-test we test for differences across time in the proportion 
of companies offering a particular payment mode and for differences 
in the proportions of total policies, total premiums, and total volume 
accounted for by each premium modality. 2 
4 Analysis and Findings 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 present descriptive statistics for the 
six payment modes for 1992, 1982, and 1972, respectively. Tests us-
ing the Shapiro-Wilk W-statistic3 show that none of the payment mode 
variables are normally distributed. Therefore, we present medians and 
modes for each variable in addition to the mean. Two measures of 
variability are reported, the standard deviation and the range. 
In the absence of additional costs associated with premium modal-
ities, modal premiums would be one half, one fourth, or one twelfth 
of the annual premium for semiannual, quarterly, or monthly modes. 
The carrying charges or excess premiums levied in actual practice are 
substantial. 
I These are average 25 month persistency rates on individual ordinary life insurance 
policies as reported by LIMRA International for the periods 1973-1974 and 1983-1984. 
Data for the 1993-1994 period are not yet available. 
2Complete description of these statistical tests can be found in Daniel and Terrell 
(1986). 
3For a description of such tests, see Royston (1982). 
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Table 2 
Saml2le Characteristics 
Panel A: SA QTR MON BANK ALLOT 
(1992 Saml2le) 
NUMBER 104 100 34 88 16 
MEAN 51.73% 26.52% 9.22% 8.70% 8.67% 
SD 0.97% 0.73% 0.50% 0.23% 0.23% 
MEDIAN 51.50% 26.50% 9.00% 8.66% 8.67% 
MODE 52.00% 26.50% 9.00% 8.50% 8.33% 
MAX 57.04% 30.00% 10.65% 9.53% 9.14% 
MIN 50.50% 25.50% 8.50% 8.30% 8.30% 
RANGE 6.54% 4.50% 2.15% 1.23% 0.84% 
%COS 100.00% 96.15% 32.69% 84.62% 15.38% 
%POL 4.00% 9.00% 17.00% 46.00% NA 
%PREM 4.00% 8.00% 16.00% 39.00% NA 
%VOL 5.00% 10.00% 11.00% 45.00% NA 
Panel B: SA QTR MON BANK ALLOT 
(1982 Saml2le) 
NUMBER 181 181 113 152 33 
MEAN 51.48% 26.35% 9.07% 8.61% 8.56% 
SD 0.68% 0.60% 0.37% 0.15% 0.24% 
MEDIAN 51.25% 26.25% 9.00% 8.60% 8.50% 
MODE 51.00% 26.00% 9.00% 8.50% 8.50% 
MAX 55.72% 30.00% 11.00% 9.11% 9.60% 
MIN 50.29% 25.50% 8.50% 8.16% 8.30% 
RANGE 5.43% 4.50% 2.50% 0.95% 1.30% 
%COS 100.00% 100.00% 62.43% 83.98% 18.23% 
%POL 7.00% 12.00% 8.00% 43.00% NA 
%PREM 5.00% 10.00% 8.00% 41.00% NA 
%VOL 7.00% 12.00% 6.00% 42.00% NA 
PERSIST" 68.00% 61.00% 55.00% 70.0% NA 
Panel C: SA QTR MON BANK ALLOT 
(1972 Saml2le) 
NUMBER 78 78 68 55 7 
MEAN 51.39% 26.14% 8.92% 8.60% 8.58% 
SD 0.89% 0.52% 0.28% 0.19% 0.12% 
MEDIAN 51.00% 26.00% 8.83% 8.58% 8.58% 
MODE 51.00% 26.00% 8.75% 8.50% 8.50% 
MAX 54.93% 28.23% 9.73% 9.33% 8.83% 
MIN 50.50% 25.50% 8.53% 8.33% 8.50% 
RANGE 4.43% 2.73% 1.20% 1.00% 0.33% 
%COS 100.00% 100.00% 87.18% 70.51% 8.97% 
%POL 6.10% 12.40% 18.70% 38.00% NA 
PERSIST*" 75.00% 64.00% 61.00% 72.00% NA 
* 1983-1984 25 month persistency rate. 
,'* 1973-1974 25 month persistency rate. 
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For 1992, for example, excess premiums averaged 1.73 percent per 
period (3.46 percent nominal annual rate) for the semiannual payment 
mode and 1.52 percent per period (6.08 percent nominal annual rate) 
for the quarterly mode. The 1992 per period (per annum) excess pre-
miums for the regular monthly, bank draft, payroll deduction, and gov-
ernment allotment averaged 0.89 percent (10.64 percent), 0.37 percent 
(4.4 percent), 0.37 percent (4.4 percent), and 0.34 percent (4.0 percent), 
respectively. Thus, we see that carrying charges are smallest for semi-
annual and greatest for regular monthly business. 
Standard deviations show that all variables are grouped tightly about 
the mean and support the hypothesis that competitive factors tend to 
drive the modal premium factors together. On the other hand, the 
considerable range observed for some variables (for example the 6.54 
percent for SA for 1992) indicates that practices of some firms differ 
considerably from the industry average. Analysis of frequency distribu-
tions shows that simple modal premium factors are used most widely. 
The most common SA factors for 1982 are 51 percent (N = 65), 52 per-
cent (N = 43), and 51.5 percent (N = 24); for QTR for 1982 the most 
common factors are 26 percent (N = 54) and 26.5 percent (N = 52). 
Thus, most companies employ simple modal premium factors for ease 
of agent use (and customer understanding). 
Analysis of the various proportion measures shows that monthly 
bank drafts are the most popular alternative to annual premium pay-
ment; 46 percent of the policies written in 1992 and 43 percent of the 
policies written in 1982 specified this payment mode. The least popu-
lar payment mode for all years is payroll deduction. While all reporting 
companies offer the SA payment mode and nearly all offer quarterly 
payments, these modes are not particularly popular with consumers, 
accounting for only 7 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of policies 
written in 1982 and falling to 4 percent and 9 percent, respectively, for 
1992. Regular monthly payments were the third most frequently of-
fered mode in 1972, but fell behind monthly bank drafts in 1982, and 
fell sharply in 1992. Monthly bank drafts were offered by 71 percent 
of companies in 1972; this figure jumped to 84 percent in 1982 and to 
85 percent in 1992. 
For the 1973-1974 period the SA mode offered the best persistency 
at 75 percent, followed closely by the BANK and SAL modes with 72 
percent and 70 percent, respectively. The QTR and MON modes show 
much worse persistency at rates of 64 percent and 61 percent, respec-
tively. Given an annual persistency rate of 82 percent for this period, 
we see that the SA mode provides the best relative persistency at 91.5 
percent of annual, followed closely by BANK at 87.8 percent of annual 
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and SAL at 85.4 percent of annual. QTR and MON demonstrate the 
worst relative persistency at 78.1 and 74.4 percent respectively. 
The best persistency rate for the 1983-1984 period was BANK at 70 
percent, followed by SA, SAL, and QTR. The persistency rate for MON 
drops to 55 percent, indicating that only slightly over half of the policies 
specifying this mode paid the first modal premium in the third policy 
year. Compared with the baseline annual persistency of 75 percent for 
this later period, BANK provides the best relative persistency at 93.3 
percent, followed by SA, SAL, and QTR at 90.1, 82.7, and 81.3 percent 
of annual, respectively. Again, MON has the worst relative persistency 
at only 73.3 percent of annual. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports changes in the modal premium factor 
means and standard deviations and in several proportional measures 
over the period 1982-1992; Panel B reports similar data for the 1972-
1982 interval. With the exception of the SAL and ALLOT variables for 
1972-1982, we see increasing means for all modal premium factors 
over the study period; the increases in the means for QTR and MON 
for 1972-1982 and for SA, BANK, and SAL for 1982-1992 are statisti-
cally significant at the indicated levels. Thus, as a percentage of annual 
premiums, companies are charging more for the option to not prepay 
premiums. Standard deviations for three of the six modal premium fac-
tors increased for the 1972-1982 period, with statistically significant 
increases in variability for MON and ALLOT. Statistically significant de-
creases in variability were observed, however, for SA and BANK. For 
the 1982-1992 period, standard deviations increased for four of the 
six modal premium factors, with statistically significant increases for 
SA, MON, and BANK. We find then that even though the variation about 
the mean for all modal premium factors was small, this variability gen-
erally increased over time. Thus, company differences in the costs of 
deferred premiums appear to have become more important over the 
period of this study. 
Even though all companies offered the SA payment mode in each 
year, it seldom was elected, accounting for only 6 percent of policies 
written in 1972,7 percent in 1982, and 4 percent in 1992. The QTR op-
tion was only somewhat more popular, accounting for 12 percent, 12 
percent, and 9 percent of policies in 1972,1982, and 1992, respectively. 
In contrast to their practice for the SA mode, the proportion of compa-
nies offering the QTR mode declined significantly (Z = -2.00) over the 
1982-1992 period. The MON option accounted for almost 19 percent 
of policies in 1972, declined significantly (Z = -2.25) to 8 percent for 
1982, but rebounded to a strong 17 percent of policies for policies in 
1992. 
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Table 3 
Changes in Sample Characteristics 
(Tests of significance in parentheses)a 
Panel A: 
1992-1982 
SA QTR MON BANK SAL ALLOT 
MEAN 0.25% 0.17% 0.15% 0.09% 0.13% 0.11% 
(2.31)" (1.94) (1.58) (3.16)" (2.11)* (1.43) 
SD 0.29% 0.13% 0.13% 0.08% -0.03% -0.01% 
(2.02)" (1.48) (1.84)" (2.34)" (1.37) (1.10) 
%COS 0.00% -3.85% -29.74% 0.64% -0.11% -2.85% 
NA (-2.00)" (-4.41)'''' (0.12) (-0.02) (-0.54) 
%POL -3.00% -3.00% 9.00% 3.00% -1.00% NA 
(-0.93) (-0.69) (1.94) (0.43) (-0.29) NA 
%PREM -1.00% -2.00% 8.00% -2.00% -2.00% NA 
(-0.34) (-0.49) (1.75) (-0.29) (-0.65) NA 
%VOL -2.00% -2.00% 5.00% 3.00% -1.00% NA 
(-0.60) (-0.45) (1.27) (0.43) (-0.34) NA 
Panel B: SA QTR MON BANK SAL ALLOT 
1982-1972 
MEAN 0.09% 0.21% 0.15% 0.01% -0.12% -0.02% 
(0.80) (2.96)" (3.13)*" (0.22) (-1.22) (-0.34) 
SD -0.21% 0.08% 0.09% -0.04% -0.02% 0.12% 
(1.74)* (1.34) (1.78)"" (1.60)" (1.20) (4.36)" 
%COS 0.00% 0.00% -24.75% 13.47% 7.80% 9.26% 
NA NA (-4.20*" (2.30)" (1.54) (1.93) 
%POL 0.90% -0.40% -10.70% 5.00% 2.00% NA 
(0.26) (-0.09) (-2.25)" (0.72) (0.60) NA 
PERSISTb -7.00% -3.00% -6.00% -2.00% -8.00% NA 
aThe test for change in variance is the F-test for equal variances. All other 
tests of significance are two-tailed Z-tests. 
"Significant at 5 percent level. 
"*Significant at 1 percent level. 
bBased on 1983-84 and 1973-74 25 month persistency data. 
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The proportion of companies offering the MON mode declined sig-
nificantly, however, (Z = -4.21 for 1972-82 and Z = -4.41 for 1982-
1992) over the study period, from 87 percent in 1972 to only 33 per-
cent in 1992. Thus, although the MON option has remained popular 
with customers (and perhaps with agents), fewer and fewer companies 
will write business on this basis. The percentage of policies specifying 
the BANK payment mode increased from 38 percent in 1972 to 46 per-
cent in 1992; likewise the proportion of companies offering this mode 
increased from 71 percent in 1972 to 85 percent in 1992 (Z = 2.43). 
The proportion of companies offering the SAL and ALLOT options in-
creased substantially over the 1972-1982 period, but the percentage of 
policies specifying these options remained small over the entire period 
of study. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows deteriorating persistency for all modes. 
The persistency rate for the BANK payment mode declined the least; 
BANK had the best persistency for the 1983-1984 period. The SAL 
mode showed the worst deterioration, but the decline for SA and MON 
was also relatively large.4 
BANK persistency showed a strong improvement to 93.3 percent of 
annual policies. QTR also showed an improvement in relative persis-
tency, while SA, SAL, and MON show deterioration in average persis-
tency. The LIMRA figures are mean lapse rates averaged across a large 
number of companies. It is important to bear in mind that individual 
companies have specific sales practices and target markets that affect 
their relative lapse rates by mode. Accordingly, differences in mean 
lapse rates by mode cannot be attributed simply to modality itself. 
It should be noted that the deterioration in persistency from the 
1970s to the 1980s affected all modes of payment and was probably 
largely occasioned by (i) the unattractiveness of fixed premium whole 
life insurance in an environment in which market interest rates moved 
strongly upwards, and (ii) the introduction of universal life, which was 
used for many years as a replacement product for whole life insurance. 
Most reporting companies include a clause regarding the disposition 
of premiums paid beyond the death of the insured. The most common 
clause stipulates that premiums beyond the month of death paid will 
be refunded. Other common clauses call for refunding premiums paid 
beyond the date of death or waiving of unpaid modal premiums beyond 
the date of death with no refund mentioned. Table 4 shows the propor-
tion of firms specifying each of these clauses for our sample years. The 
4UMRA also reports that persistency rates for policies specifying annual premiums 
declined from 82 percent for the 1973-1974 period to 75 percent for the 1983-1984 
period. 
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proportion of firms offering to refund unearned premiums increased 
from 61 percent in 1972 to 86 percent in 1992. In contrast to common 
practice early in the century, few companies refuse to refund premi-
ums paid beyond date or month of death or deduct modal premiums 
due beyond the date (month) of death from the proceeds. As company 
practices have changed from not refunding unearned premiums to re-
funding them, the companies have had to raise their annual premiums 
to cover the additional cost. This change in company practice makes 
the cost of the refund benefit in the year of death roughly equivalent 
for all modes, including annual. 
Table 4 
Disposition of Unearned Premiums 
1993 1983 1973 
Refund Beyond Date of Death 37% 29% 18% 
Refund Beyond Month of Death 49% 52% 43% 
Waive Beyond Date of Death 12% 18% 38% 
No Premium Refund 2% 1% 0% 
Unpaid Premiums Deducted 0% 0% 1% 
5 Related Consumer Issues 
In calculating modal premium factors, the company must make pro-
vision for forgone interest, expense of billing and collection, and the 
cost of whichever practice it follows regarding modal premiums in the 
year of death. Thus, companies may use the different modal premium 
factors to seek equity among policyholders in pricing modal premiums. 
From the consumer's point of view, the modal premium factors are fixed 
factors set by the company. The authors believe that consumers seldom 
explicitly evaluate the extra cost of paying on a modal basis and that 
when they do so, they think primarily in terms of interest rates (finance 
charges). If the consumers were equipped to carry through the calcu-
lations on this Simplified view of the charges for modal premiums, we 
think they would calculate the finance charge in the same way as the 
internal rate of return is calculated in Table 5. 
Table 5 is based on average premiums and average modal factor 
data for 1992 and shows payment schedules for the SA, QTR, MON, 
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Table 5 
Internal Rates of Return (IRR)* 
Mode Payment IRR 
ANN 1,032.0 00.00% 
SA 533.65 14.85% 
QTR 273.69 17.36% 
MON 95.15 25.28% 
BANK 89.75 9.86% 
* Assuming premiums paid on time 
and BANK payment modes. All cash flows are assumed to occur at the 
beginning of the monthly periods shown. The internal rate of return 
ORR) is calculated based on the implicit loan to the consumer and rep-
resents the effective cost to the consumer of not prepaying the annual 
premium, i.e., paying a modal premium instead. 
For example, for the SA mode in Table 5, the impliCit loan is the 
$1,032 annual premium less the $533.85 prepaid or $498.15. The poli-
cyholder repays the loan with interest six months later with a payment 
of $533.85. The cost to the consumer, stated as an annual return, is 
14.85 percent. Obviously, when reviewed only in terms of financing 
costs, if the consumer can borrow the $498.15 at a better rate than 
that, he or she would be better off prepaying the annual premium. 
The internal rates of return for the other modes are calculated in 
the same fashion. The BANK mode (with an effective cost of only 9.86 
percent) is the best buy; the MON mode (with an effective cost of 25.28 
percent) is expensive. Most consumer credit readily available is at a 
lower rate than this. 
The issue we see is that the consumer finance charge calculation 
above is flawed. (Mortality, lapse, and collection costs, all of which are 
important to the insurer, are ignored. Table 6 shows how lapse rates 
vary by premium payment.) These flaws in reasoning, however, are not 
easy for consumers to grasp. Taken at face value, the implied finance 
charges are at the high end of bank lending rates. They do not appear to 
be consistent with other interest rates regularly quoted in life insurance 
operations: rates in the cash value guarantees, rates currently credited 
on universal life contracts, current rates impliCit in dividend scales, 
rates credited on premiums paid in advance, rates charged on policy 
loans, etc. 
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Table 6 
25-Month Persistency Rate 
Mode 1973-1974 1983-1984 
ANN 82% 75% 
SA 75% 68% 
QTR 64% 61% 
MON 61% 55% 
BANK 72% 70% 
SAL 70% 62% 
Source: LIMRA International 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
This study examines modal premium factors for a large sample of 
life insurance companies over a 20 year period to determine the extent 
of variability in modal premium factors at given points in time, how 
industry practice has changed over time, and how variability in modal 
premium factors has changed over time. Our analysis yields several 
interesting conclusions. 
The monthly bank draft is the dominant mode of payment, and has 
gained an increasing share of policies written over time.5 This is not 
surprising when we consider that this mode has advantages for both 
the policyholder and the company. The policyholder electing this mode 
need not prepay the entire annual premium and does not need to mail 
periodic payments. The company benefits from the improved persis-
tency, relative to other non-annual modes, and lower transactions costs 
characteristic of this mode. LIMRA reports for the 1984-1984 period 
that the 25 month persistency rate for the BANK mode (70 percent) was 
only slightly worse than that for the annual payment mode (75 percent). 
Despite its relatively high transactions costs and poor persistency, 
the regular monthly mode was surprisingly durable, accounting for 17 
percent of policies written in 1992. Given that relatively few companies 
offer the MON mode, this anomaly must be due to customer prefer-
ences or strong agency attitudes among these companies. (Even in 1992 
the alternative monthly bank draft option was unavailable for users of 
banking facilities that did not accept bank drafts and for those buyers 
SWhile this study deals specifically with sales by ordinary agents, we find this result 
to be tru~ for home sales as well. 
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who did not use banking facilities at all.) Although widely available, the 
semiannual and quarterly modes were used little. We find that some 
companies have responded to the lack of interest in the QTR option by 
dropping it from their offerings, but the universal availability of the SA 
option is puzzling. 
Analysis of the variability of the modal premium factors shows that 
most firms set their modal premium factors within narrow limits of the 
industry averages. Thus, we conclude that competitive pressures are 
more important in determining modal premium factors than are com-
pany differences in transactions costs, forgone interest income, per-
sistency, and mortality. This finding is interesting in the absence of 
evidence that customers compare policies on this basis. We do observe 
a tendency toward greater variability of modal premium factors across 
time, however, indicating that divergent company costs have become a 
more important consideration in recent years. 
We further observe an increase in the average level of modal pre-
mium factors over time. This finding, combined with geometric in-
creases in average annual premiums, shows that the companies prob-
ably are compensated better for the modal premium business today 
than in 1972.6 Alternatively, the cost to the consumer for the option 
not to prepay premiums has increased. Average industry data indicate 
that while persistency has deteriorated over the period of study, aver-
age mortality has improved. We observe no secular trend in average 
earned interest income, and we speculate that transactions costs asso-
ciated with modal premium collection have increased. Thus, we get a 
mixed picture of the change in components over time. To the extent 
that the rise in modal premium factors has outpaced associated costs, 
companies increasingly are able to cover the costs of policies for which 
premium collection is other than annual. 
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Predicting Automobile Insurance Multi-Regional 
Base Pure Premiums 
Edward Nissan* and Iskandar S. Hamwit 
Abstract* 
Multi-regional insurance base premiums are customarily computed by a 
top-down method where national or state projections are adjusted to reflect 
regional differences. This paper proposes a methodology for a bottom-up pro-
jection. A weighing scheme that minimizes the variance of the estimator is 
suggested as a criterion to establish an overall multi-regional rate. 
Key words and phrases: ratemaking, loss severity, minimum variance, casualty 
insurance 
1 Introduction 
Sometimes it is necessary for an insurance company to determine 
premium rates for a particular line of business solely on the basis of its 
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own loss experience. 1 When the number of insureds within a class or 
region is too small to rate accurately (without reference to a larger body 
of data), the general approach is to use experience rating techniques, 2 
of which credibility theory is a special case, to combine loss information 
belonging to several classes and/or regions. If the data are combined, 
this larger source of data can be used to determine the current year's 
experience rated multi-class or multi-regional base pure premium. This 
base pure premium then must be adjusted to reflect the previous year's 
pure premium and class or regional differences. Credibility theory can 
be used to decide on the relative weight to be placed on previous year's 
pure premium versus this year's base pure premium. The objective of 
this paper is to provide a way to calculate the current year's multi-class 
or multi-regional base pure premium and not to decide the way that this 
base pure premium has to be adjusted to produce a final pure premium 
for each class or region. 
The seminal work on the estimation techniques for premium rates 
across class or territories was done by Bailey (1963). Bailey suggests 
the calculation of territorial or class differential rates by iterative ap-
proximation to arrive at a set of estimates that provides the best fit 
and to ensure fairness and equity. In addition, he recognizes and gives 
formulation to the additive relativities at higher levels of classification 
to modify basic rates. 
A comprehensive study of pricing in the state of Illinois was con-
ducted by Witt (1979) to discover whether the rate intended to cover 
loss costs, expenses, and underwriting profit margins is adequate and 
at the same time equitable to consumers. This concern for equity was 
addressed further by Chang and Fairly (1978, 1979), who discuss the 
traditional multiplicative and the closely associated log-linear methods. 
They find both are biased toward some drivers when applied to the State 
of Massachusetts. They suggest using an additive procedure that they 
claim would eliminate biases and improve overall accuracy. 
Subsequently, Fairley, Tomberlin, and Weisberg (1981), in their study 
of pricing in New Jersey, address the issues of the merits and drawbacks 
of the multiplicative and additive methods. They point out that typi-
cally only a single state is used during a single period. They recommend 
the inclusion of more regions and time periods, in a scheme that they 
demonstrate for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977. 
1 Anti-trust considerations in the future may require companies to use their own 
data in all but the most extreme situations. 
2For an overview of experience rating and credibility theory, see, for example, 
Daykin, Pentikii.inen, and Pesonen (1994, pp. 179-189) or Venter (1990, Chapter 7). 
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In a more recent article, Brown (1988) provides a clear summary 
description of the multiplicative and the additive approaches. He ex-
plains that a driver's rate by the multiplicative approach is obtained by 
BRm XXi xYj, while forthe same driver the rate would be BRa + (Xi + Yj), 
using the additive approach (where BRm and BRa are base rates for the 
multiplicative and the additive portion, respectively, and Xi and Yj are 
the adjustments, such as the class and driving record of the insured). 
The difference between the two methods may be simply stated as per-
cents versus cents adjustments. Brown goes on to suggest the use of 
the generalized linear models approach for estimating the components 
of the multiplicative as well as the additive versions. 
The traditional approach in multi-regional ratemaking is excellently 
summarized by Finger (1990) who provides a variety of examples. The 
traditional multi-regional approach relies on an iterative procedure em-
ploying regional and class relativities to adjust the pure premium for 
each region. A final iteration that uses base exposures instead of earned 
exposures produces a convergent rate for all regions and all classes that 
accurately may represent the historical experience. Note that both re-
gional and class relativities are employed simultaneously to produce 
a convergent base rate; these, in turn, are adjusted further for higher 
levels of classification when appropriate. 
McClenahan (1990, Chapter 2) believes that the traditional approach 
of finding a state-wide average rate that subsequently is distributed, us-
ing territorial relativities, among the various territories within the state 
and then, using classifications relativities, among the classes within 
each territory has worked fairly well in practice. 
Excellent comparative assessments of alternative approaches avail-
able for predicting multi-regional premiums are provided by Sant (1980), 
Weisberg and Tomberlin (1982), Weisberg, Tomberlin, and Chatterjee 
(1984), and lee (1989). lee also makes an important contribution by 
classifying the methodologies according to the functional form of the 
model and estimation method. The methods of most relevance to this 
research are those based directly on observed pure premium data, in 
contrast to those that divide the observed data into frequency and 
severity components.3 
3 According to Finger (1990) the pure premium approach, because it requires more 
information and also can produce frequency, severity and pure premium relativities, 
is more accurate than the loss ratio method. Under the loss-ratio method, incurred 
losses are divided by earned premiums; under the pure premium method, incurred 
losses are divided by number of exposures. Interestingly, Brown (1993) shows that 
the loss ratio and pure premium methods are algebraically equivalent when used in 
calculating classification differentials and for changing the average portfolio rate. 
240 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994 
2 Objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to present a statistical method for esti-
mating multi-regional base premiums for a particular line of insurance: 
automobile physical damage coverage. Here we have insureds who are 
in the same class, but who are located in more than one territory or 
region. The multi-regional base premium is the total dollar amount of 
claims spread over the whole number of insured persons. The focus is 
only on that portion of the pure premium that is directly attributable 
to claims. Neither profit nor expense margins are included in the rate. 
In its final form, however, the base rate can be adjusted to include a 
risk margin to ensure that the probability of the total claims exceeding 
the funds generated by the base premium is less than some specified 
quantity, such as 5 percent or 1 percent.4 This margin will compensate 
for the variability of the underwriting risk. 
The contribution this paper makes is in the implicit use of a sam-
pling prototype methodology akin to stratified sampling, employing 
observed data to estimate a basic rate that can be adjusted by either 
multiplicative or additive factors. According to Deming (1950, p. 213), 
in stratified sampling, random samples are drawn from a universe di-
vided into separate strata or classes. The purpose of stratification is to 
find out what properties of the various classes govern the variance of 
the estimate of the mean of the entire universe. Furthermore, it is de-
sired that the estimator be efficient (minimum variance). In this paper, 
the sampling universe is divided into separate strata by the geographic 
location (called regions) of drivers. The concern then is to find an over-
all linearly weighted mean that has the minimum variance. 
What remains to be defended next is the assumption that the claims 
resulting from automobile accidents and by implication, pure premi-
ums, constitute random samples. Support for this assumption comes 
from Darnell and Evans (1990, p. 13) who explain that the conditions 
of the world within which data are generated are outside the control 
of the investigator and therefore do not satisfy the foundation of the 
classical probability model that requires the assumption of repeated 
experiments. Economists and social scientists almost exclUSively deal 
with data generated outside such an experimental context. 
Darnell and Evans explain that observed economic variables may 
be treated as if resulting from a single drawing from a population.s 
4When risk margins are determined in this manner, the resulting premium is called 
a percentile premium (Gerber 1979, Chapter 5). 
sIt is precisely this type of argument that Butler (1993) puts forth in an interesting 
article in which he proposes the usc of car-mile exposure rather than car-year as a basis 
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An advantage of a sampling prototype is that the observations need 
not follow any particular probability distribution such as, for example, 
when regression models are employed. 
In regression models, the error terms depend on many factors in-
cluding omission of explanatory variables, model specification, aggre-
gation of variables, and functional misspecifications. The combined 
effects of these factors may render the coefficients of the least squares 
regression not to be most efficient because they may lead to false con-
clusions in hypothesis testing. For example, Brown (1988) mentions the 
exponential family of probability distributions, each with specific esti-
mators that must be determined from a sample. Similarly, the proce-
dure suggested by Chang and Fairly (1978,1979) uses regression mod-
els that assume the error term follows the customary requirement of 
normal distribution. Such distributional assumptions are not binding 
in sampling. With a sufficiently large number of observations, as com-
mon in practice, there is good reason to assume, according to Cochran 
(1953), that the estimators of population parameters such as the mean 
are approximately normally distributed. 
The method proposed in this paper differs from other techniques 
advocated for multi-regional rate prediction because it uses informa-
tion on the mean and variance of loss severity for many regions and 
for several prior years. It uses a minimum-variance criterion to assign 
yearly weights for regions. 
3 The Model 
Consider an insurer that sells automobile physical damage coverage 
to several classes of insureds. Each class of insureds consists of pol-
icyholders spread over several regions. It is assumed that the claims 
generated by a single class of insureds in the same region and the same 
year are mutually independent and have identical policies. 
The following notation is used throughout this paper: 
For i = 1, ... ,L andj = 1, ... ,K, let us define: 
K Number of regions, K = 1, 2, ... ; 
L Number of years, L = 1,2, ... ; 
nij Number of claims in year i and region j; 
Nij Number of insureds in year i and region j; 
of pricing and explains that in the Bailey and Simon (1959, 1960) model, automobile 
accidents can be envisioned as a random sampling of the class population on the road. 
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E[Xij ] 
E[ST) 
E[Pij] 
Observed claim severity from the kth claim 
in year i and region j, for k =: 1,2, ... nij; 
1 nij 
- L Xijk =: observed average claim severity; 
nij k=l 
J.lij; 
1 ~ - 2 
---1 L.... (Xijk - Xij) 
nij - k=l 
observed variance of claim severity; 
2 (Tij' 
1 flij 
- L Xijk =: Observed pure premium; 
Nij k=l 
nij . 
j\[:J.lij, 
I) 
Weight for year i and region j, aij ;:::: 0; and 
Weight for year i, bi ;:::: 0 ; and 
Weight for region j, Wj ;:::: O. 
Note that for each year, the aij weights sum to one, i.e., Ij aij 1 
while Ii bi =: 1 and Ij Wj =: 1. 
Clearly, the variance of Xij for year i and region j is 
2 
_ (Tij 
Var[Xi'] =: - (1) ) nij 
while the variance of the observed pure premium per insured is 
- nij 2 
Var[Pij] =: N~(Tij . 
I) 
(2) 
The multi-regional base premium for year L + 1, Pel + 1), is deter-
mined by a linear combination of all of the observed pure premiums 
Pij (across all regions and for the preceding L years). Thus P (L + 1) can 
be written in its most general form as 
L K 
pel + 1) =: L L CijPij (3) 
i=l j=l 
where the cijs are general nonnegative weights that sum to one. In 
Section 4 we will describe procedures for choosing the weights. 
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4 Determination of Base Premiums 
4.1 Independent Regions 
The assumption of statistical independence among regions can be 
defended on the grounds that regions are physically separate and, there-
fore, what occurs in one region will have no bearing on what occurs in 
another region. Except in certain infreqlJ.ent occurrences like highway 
pile-ups and natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, it is un-
likely for automobile physical damages to be statistically dependent 
events. Furthermore, independence assumption routinely is made in 
many statistical studies for the sake of simplicity. Another assumption 
that is made is that the group of insureds is homogeneous. Accord-
ing to Tiller (1990, p. 91), "While homogeneity is the goal of manual 
ratemaking, it is not usually possible to achieve." 
In the case where insureds come from the same class but are located 
in different territories, however, there is greater degree of homogeneity 
among them in terms of expectation of loss than among insureds who 
belong to different classes and different territories. When, in one year, 
a group of insureds can be considered homogeneous for the purpose of 
auto physical damage coverage, such homogeneity is likely to continue 
over time. 
To assign proper weights aij to each region, let h be the weighted 
observed pure premiums across regions for year i, i.e., 
K 
h = L aijPij, for i = 1, ... ,L, 
j=l 
(4) 
where L.j aij = 1, j = 1, ... , K. Under the independence assumption, 
its variance is given by 
K 
- '\' 2 nij 2 f ' Var[Pd = L.. a ij - 2 O'ij' or t = 1, ... ,L. 
j=l Nij 
(5) 
In a similar manner, mUlti-regional base premium for year L + 1, 
P (L + 1), is defined as a weighted average of the h s by assigning weights 
bi such that ,L bi = 1. It follows that 
L 
P(L + 1) = '\' b·P· L.. 1 1., (6) 
j=l 
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with mean and variance given by 
L K n" L b i L aij~J1ij 
i=l j=l Nij 
E[P(L+l)] (7) 
~ 2l~ 2 nij 2] L b i L aij N 2, (Jij . 
1=1 )=1 I) 
Var[P(L + 1)] (8) 
It should be noted that both nij and Nij are treated as given constants 
rather than random variables as is done in some models.6 Here, it is as-
sumed that in each year the population Nij is fixed, and a corresponding 
sample nij is drawn. 
Consider the linear estimator given in equation (4). Its estimated 
variance is given by: 
K 
- '\' 2 nij 2 
est. Var[Pd = L aij-2 sij . 
j=l Nij 
By the constraint imposed on the weights whereby L.j aij = 1, we can 
eliminate aiK to get 
K-1 K-1 
- '\' 2 nij 2 '\' 2 niK 2 
est. Var[Pd = L aij-2 sij + (1 - L aij) -2 SiK' 
j=l Nij j=l NiK 
(9) 
Differentiating equation (9) with respect to aij, for j = 1, ... , K - 1 and 
setting each of the K - 1 equations equal to zero to satisfy the first 
order condition for minimization yields the following linear system of 
equations: for j = 1,2, ... ,K-l 
K-1 
niK 2 '\' nij 2 niK 2 
-2 SiK Lair + aij-2 Sij = -2 SiK' 
NiK r=l Nij NiK 
(10) 
In spite of its initial appearance, the set of equations (10) easily can 
be solved by simple row operations. Let 
nij 2 (Xij = -2 Sij' 
Nij 
It easily can be proved that the solution to the system of equations (10) 
is 
at = (XiK (1 + Ki1 (XiK)-l 
) (Xij j=l (Xij 
for j = 1,2, ... ,K-l (11) 
6Mercer (1985), Stroinski and Currie (1989), and Langford and Capella (1994) use 
models where nij and Nij are treated as random variables. 
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. h * 1 "K-I * WIt a iK = - L.j=I aij' 
Note that the matrix of coefficients of the aijs arising from the sys-
tem of equations (10) is positive definite, and by implication it is strictly 
convex. Hence, the second order condition for global minimum is as-
sured. That is, the arjS do minimize est. Var[l\]; see Hadley (1964, pp. 
83-93). 
The discussion thus far has been limited to obtaining the regional 
weights for the yearly averages of premiums. To establish a criterion by 
which the yearly weights bi in equation (6) are chosen, information from 
several prior years is utilized. This is in line with Jee (1989) who sug-
gests the incorporation of trends in the projected estimate. A scheme 
that fulfills this suggestion is one that uses the standardized ratio of 
consecutive observed yearly means as follows: let 
{3I = 1 and {3i = ph , for i = 2, ... ,L. 
1-1,. 
The yearly weights bi are determined as 
b i = !i fori=1,2, ... ,L. 
Li=I {3i 
(12) 
The rate-maker may use other weighing schemes. For example, the 
rate-maker can recognize the full effect of inflation by adjusting prior 
years' observed premiums by an appropriate cost index. In the case 
of automobile physical damage, for example, the index for repair costs 
would be an appropriate choice. On the other hand, if the rate-maker 
wants to attach greater importance to the more recent experience, a 
weighting scheme that assigns larger weights to more recent years than 
to earlier years is appropriate. 
An empirical example to demonstrate the computations is provided 
in the appendix. The example pertains to automobile physical damage 
coverage. The procedure can be applied to other insurance coverages, 
however, with similar aspects. 
4.2 Dependent Regions 
Suppose that after a series of statistical tests that measure the de-
gree of statistical association for bivariate data'? it is found that the re-
gions are dependent. Then, following Cardoso (1993), we can compute 
7See, for example, Rohatgi (1984, pp. 762-771) or Sachs (1984, Chapter 5) for exam-
ples of such tests. 
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a projected multi-regional base premium by using the past annually ob-
served pure premiums for each of the K regions. This ensures that the 
spatial dependencies among regions are considered because all regions 
may be affected by the same economic factors as well as changes in 
accident frequency. A procedure that takes regional dependency into 
account not only requires the K regional pure premium means and vari-
ances. but also requires the computation of the covariances between the 
(~) regional pairs. 
The following are the suggested steps: 
Step 1: Tabulate the Pijs and their mean and variance across the years. 
A schematic representation of the set of data is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Yearly Pure Premiums By Region 
Year Region 1 Region 2 RegionK 
1 Pll Pl2 PIK 
2 P21 P22 P2K 
L PLl PL2 PLK 
Mean p. I p.2 p.K 
Variance v 2 2 VR I V2 
Step 2: Compute the means. variances. and correlation coefficients for 
j.k = 1 ..... K: 
p.j = (13) 
Vjj (14) 
Vjk = for j '* k; (15) 
Step 3: The projected multi-regional base premium is obtained as a lin-
ear combination of the separate K regional means 
K 
P(L + 1) = 2: wjP. j 
j~l 
(16) 
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with observed variance estimated by 
K K-I K 
- "2 2 "" est. Var[P] = L WjVj + 2 L L VjmWjWm . (17) 
j=I j=I m=j+I 
Step 4: Derive the set of weights {wn that minimize equation (17) 
subject to the condition 2:~=I wj = l. Let Y be the variance-
covariance matrix given by 
Y= {vij} for i,} = 1,2,oo.,K, 
and w be the column vector of weights {w j}. Our problem is as 
follows: 
K 
min wTyw subject to L Wj = l. 
j=I 
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we have 
minL = wTyw - A(wTl - 1) 
where 1 is a column vector of Is. Differentiating L with respect 
to the WjS and the A and then setting these derivatives to zero 
yields: 
V 2 VI2 VIK -1 WI 0 1 
V21 V~ V2K -1 W2 0 
(18) 
VKl VK2 2 VK -1 wK 0 
1 1 1 0 A 1 
Once the variances and correlations have been calculated, the sys-
tem of equations (18) can be solved using standard numerical 
methods such as Cramer's Rule or Gaussian elimination; see, for 
example, Burden and Faires (1985, Chapter 6). See the appendix 
for an example. 
If any of the W j s found is negative, then we must solve the sys-
tem of equations given in equation (17) subject to the following 
additional constraints: Wj ;::: 0, for} = 1,2, 00. ,K. This is now a 
basic quadratic programming problem.s 
8For more on quadratic programming see Rao (1978, Chapter 12.4). In addition, 
there is commercial software available through International Mathematical Subroutine 
Library (IMSL), Visual Numerics, Inc., Houston, Tex., to solve quadratic programming 
problems. 
248 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994 
As an alternative to quadratic programming, we can derive ap-
proximate minimum variance weights based on those aus that 
were derived in equation (11). Define the regional weights as 
L a*. 
- "') 
Wj= LT' 
i=l 
(19) 
These weights then are used in equation (16) to determine the 
overall base premium. 
An empirical example to demonstrate the procedures outlined above 
is provided in the appendix. 
5 Advantages of Proposed Methodology 
The approach discussed in Section 4 and the accompanying em-
pirical examples of the appendix are beneficial in a variety of ways as 
outlined below: 
• The calculated overall base rate can be used as an alternative indi-
cation in credibility considerations. As explained by McClenahan 
(1990), a credibility-weighted indication is desirable when a rate is 
less than fully credible. Thus, for instance, if a rate for a specific 
class is established by a traditional (manual) method, which, in 
the assessment of the actuary, is not fully credible, then a comple-
mentary rate may be advisable in computing a credibility-weighted 
indication. 
• When trending pure premiums, the most commonly used mod-
els according to Cardoso (1993) are the linear model given by 
P = a + bt and the exponential or log-linear model given by 
P = aebt , where a and b are constant and t is a time trend. 
In either case, however, the data used to calculate the pure pre-
mium may contain significant serial correlation, making tests of 
hypotheses for the significance of the regression coefficients in-
valid (Dougherty, 1992). In our method, this correlation is used 
in Section 4.2 to project a base rate for year L + 1 instead of using 
a linear trend equation. 
• Our proposed method also can be used to calculate an overall 
average rate for several territories, regardless of the number of 
classes included in each territory. 
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• The suggested approach, for the case of dependence (see Section 
4.2), takes into account the variation existing within and among 
regions through variances and covariances, while in the case of 
independence (see Section 4.1) it takes into account only within-
regional varia.tion through variances. In both cases, the variation 
is embodied in the final rate through the regional weights. 
6 Summary 
A statistical method has been presented for estimating a multi-
regional base premium rate for a class of insureds who are located in 
different regions. When all of the regions are incorporated in the anal-
ysis, the method generates a country-wide rate for a particular class of 
insureds. Of course, in some insurance lines the grouping of risks into 
separate regional schedules is as important in the interest of equity as 
grouping them into different classifications, as pointed out recently by 
Harrington and Doerpinghaus (1993). Nonetheless, we have focused 
only on determining an average class rate for all regions combined. 
The prevailing practice has been to develop a state-wide rate that 
is subsequently adjusted using relativities first among the various re-
gions within the state and then among the classes within each region. 
In contrast, the proposed method finds a multi-regional class rate first 
that later can be adjusted to reflect any possible regional differences in 
loss experience. With respect to automobile physical damage insurance, 
members of the same class who are located in different geographic ar-
eas are likely to represent a more homogeneous group than those who 
belong to different classes within the same region. Homogeneity im-
parts statistically reliable experience that should allow for the determi-
nation of a fairly accurate rate. Interclass subsidies, characteristic of 
the current system (particularly between rural and city dwellers), would 
be minimized, if not eliminated, because the proposed method starts 
with a multi-regional class rate. This bypasses the step of having to 
calculate an overall state-wide rate for all classes. 
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Appendix: An Empirical Example 
Tables AI, A2 and A3 show the data supplied by an insurance com-
pany for nine years (L := 9) and for regions denoted by I, 2, and 3 
respectively (K := 3). These data are used to illustrate the procedures 
outlined in the paper. For each region, the data given are the number 
of claims (nij), the number of exposures (Nij), the average collision 
claim (Cij), the standard deviation of claims (sij), and the pure pre-
mium (Pij). 
Table Al 
Summary Data for Region I 
Region 1 (Indianapolis and Gary, Indiana) 
Year nl Nl C1 Sn Pl 
1 411 1,279 735 1,411 236.19 
2 398 1,462 785 1,562 2l3.70 
3 364 1,518 867 1,635 207.90 
4 447 1,618 855 1,880 236.21 
5 464 1,505 856 1,703 263.91 
6 260 1,107 811 1,642 190.48 
7 178 924 828 1,618 159.51 
8 181 798 815 1,536 184.86 
9 168 828 819 1,658 166.17 
Mean 206.55 
Source: Data from a major automobile insurance company 
for unmarried, male principle operators under 21. 
Table A4 shows the derived weights aij (from equation (11)), b i 
(from equation (12)), the yearly averages Pi (from equation (4)), and 
the estimated variance Var[Pi ] (from equation (5)). Substituting the 
information from Tables AI, A2, A3 and A4 into equations (6) and 
(8) yields, under the assumption of independence (See Section 4.1), 
P(lO) := 196.24 and estimated Var[P(lO)] := 7.24. 
Let R()( be the 100lX% upper confidence limit of multi-regional pre-
mium, then for say lX := 0.05 and the normal approximation, the esti-
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Table A2 
Summary Data for Region 2 
Region 2 (Los Angeles and San Francisco, Calif.) 
Year n2 N2 C2 Si2 P2 
1 1,240 5,690 752 1,601 163.88 
2 2,007 9,512 794 1,663 167.53 
3 1,969 9,797 861 1,833 173.04 
4 2,319 10,215 941 1,906 213.63 
5 2,302 9,671 948 1,920 225.65 
6 1,859 9,297 1,049 1,941 209.76 
7 1,779 8,312 980 1,917 209.75 
8 1,274 6,566 909 2,000 176.37 
9 1,259 6,769 956 2,036 177.81 
Mean 190.73 
Source: Data from a major automobile insurance company 
for unmarried, male principle operators under 21. 
mated projected (year 10) mUlti-regional premium rate is 
Ro.os = 196.24 + 1.645 x ·J7.24 = 200.67. 
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Under the assumption of dependence (See Section 4.2), the use of La-
grange's multipliers for equations (17) results in the following weights: 
wi = -0.053, wI = 0.433 and wI = 0.620. 
Because one of the weights is negative (WI in this case), quadratic pro-
gramming is used to produce the solution 
wi = 0.0, wI = 0.448 and wI = 0.552. 
Substituting the quadratic programming solution into equations (16) 
and (17) yields the projected base premium P(10) = 201.19, the es-
timated Var[P(10)] = 57.57, and the estimated projected (year 10) 
multi-regional premium rate 
Ro.os = 201.19 + 1.645 x .J57.57 = 213.67. 
The third alternative, using average regional weights, as suggested 
by equation (19), gives the following weights: 
wi = 0.117, wI = 0.734 and wI = 0.149, 
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Table A3 
Summary Data for Region 3 
Region 3 (Rural Mississippi) 
Year n3 N3 C3 Si3 P3 
1 379 1,592 875 1,772 208.31 
2 435 1,842 846 1,861 199.79 
3 448 1,907 891 1,868 209.32 
4 671 2,906 977 1,945 225.59 
5 582 2,464 1,061 1,963 250.61 
6 405 1,940 964 2,020 201.25 
7 313 1,641 1,018 2,203 194.17 
8 313 1,398 1,004 1,893 224.79 
9 323 1,844 986 2,135 172.71 
Mean 209.61 
Source: Data from a major automobile insurance company 
for unmarried, male principle operators under 21. 
giving .PoO) = 195.46 and the estimated Var[.POO)] = 47.18. Note 
that this alternative produces a variance that is smaller than the vari-
ance obtained by quadratic programming. These variances, however, 
should not be compared because as equation (19) does not use the co-
variances while the variance obtained by quadratic programming does. 
The estimated projected (year 10) multi-regional premium rate is 
RO.05 = 195.46 + 1.645 x .J47.18 = 206.76. 
z 
TableA4 In In III 
Regional Weights, Yearly Weights, and Multi-Regional Base Premium ::J III 
::J 
Year * '" * bi 
c.. 
ail ai2 ai3 P Var[fU b·xP :c I. I l. 
III 
1 0.140 0.712 0.149 0.111 180.59 69.86 20.05 3 ~. 
2 0.106 0.785 0.109 0.108 175.93 48.18 19.00 ""0 ., 
IP 
3 0.123 0.756 0.121 0.115 181.74 52.08 20.90 
c.. 
n 
.... 
4 0.095 0.713 0.192 0.133 218.07 57.57 29.00 ::J \.D 
» 
5 0.109 0.715 0.176 0.119 234.22 64.89 27.87 c .... 0 
6 0.107 0.754 0.139 0.098 206.51 61.10 20.24 3 0 
0-
7 0.129 0.746 0.125 0.108 201.30 70.56 21.74 IP 
""0 
184.67 85.52 18.84 
., 
8 0.128 0.723 0.149 0.102 IP 3 
9 0.118 0.698 0.184 0.106 175.50 79.53 18.60 c 3 
In 
Mean 0.117 0.734 0.149 $196.24 
Source: Based on calculations from Tables Al to A3. 
Notes: a'ij is the regional weight for year i and region} and is found from equation (ll); bi is the weight for year i and is 
found from equation (12); 11. is the calculated from equation (4); and Var[I1.l is calculated using equation (5). 
N 
Ul 
Ul 

Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 2, No.2, 1994 
A Statistical Approach to IBNR Reserves 
Bradford S. Gile* 
Abstract 
This paper develops a three dimensional statistical approach to the estima-
tion of the mean and the standard deviation of pure incurred but not reported 
(IBNR) reserves. This means that the time of occurrence, the reporting lag, and 
the claim severity are separately modeled. It is assumed that, beyond any fixed 
time t, the claim number development process is Poisson and that the severity 
of loss depends on the length of the reporting lag. Two key assumptions are 
made to simplify the eS,timation of model parameters: for a given reporting lag, 
(i) the conditional mean of the claim size is a linear function of the reporting 
lag, and (ii) the conditional coefficient of variation of the severity is constant. 
Key words and phrases: stochastic loss development, reporting lag, pure IBNR, 
conditional distributions, loss reserves 
1 Introduction 
The development of losses over time is a key problem for both pric-
ing and loss reserving actuaries. Commensurate with the importance 
of the problem, there is a large body of actuarial literature (primarily 
property/casualty, but also health insurance) devoted to loss develop-
ment. 
* Bradford S. Gile, F.S.A., holds a Master of Arts in mathematics from the University of 
Wisconsin (1968). He is director of actuarial research/services at the American Family 
Insurance Group in Madison, Wisconsin. His primary work is in property/casualty 
coverages that cross major lines of insurance. 
Mr. Gile wishes to thank Michelle M. Morrow, F.C.A.S., for her insightful comments 
and suggestions and also the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments to im-
prove this paper. Any errors that may remain in the paper are, of course, solely the 
responsibility of the author. 
Mr. Gile's address is: Actuarial Research/Services, American Family Insurance Group, 
6000 American Phvy., Madison WI 53783-0001, USA. 
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In a general textbook on loss reserve estimation, Salzmann (1964) 
details eight general methods of estimating loss reserves. Each method 
generally involves relatively simple projections of future loss develop-
ment from aggregate triangulations of historical data. The methods 
described in Salzmann are purely deterministic and do not have an ex-
plicit mathematical model as an underlying framework. In the 30 years 
since the Salzmann text was published, these methods have been re-
fined by actuaries and are still widely used today. A basic discussion 
and documentation of such methods is found in Wiser (1990). 
For many years, however, actuaries have recognized two needs of 
modeling the loss development process: (i) a need to facilitate and im-
prove the estimation process with the application of stochastic mod-
els, and (ii) a need to measure probable variations in future loss devel-
opment. McClenahan (1975), for example, constructs a deterministic 
model of paid loss development for "analysis of the effects upon reserve 
adequacy of changes in various exogenous variables and in the testing 
of the established reserves on a prospective basis." Stanard (1985) sim-
ulates loss development triangles under a hypothetical stochastic fre-
quency /severity model to "measure the expected value and variance of 
prediction errors of four simple methods of estimating loss reserves." 
Guiahi (1986) develops a model for IBNR estimation as a stochastic 
process using the number of claims, severity of claims, and reporting 
lag to develop the mean and variance of IBNR reserves. In his paper, 
however, Guiahi assumes that reporting lag and loss severity are inde-
pendent. This assumption, while convenient, is highly unlikely to be 
valid for most sets of insurance loss data. It is also likely to produce 
inadequate IBNR estimates if loss severity increases significantly with 
reporting lag. Pinto and Gogol (1987) analyze excess loss development 
by layer using Pareto distributions fitted to casualty loss distributions. 
Wright (1992) provides an extensive and highly detailed treatment of 
estimating future paid losses from separate development triangles of 
loss counts and loss amounts using generalized linear models. Wright 
deals with many of the issues addressed in this paper in a similar and 
detailed manner. I recommend Wright's paper to the interested reader. 
It should not be inferred from this short list of papers that there is 
a paucity of literature on the subject. For example, van Eeghen (1981) 
presents a comprehensive review of the earlier literature on loss re-
serving. Taylor (1986) provides a detailed description of the compo-
nent parts of loss development models. More recently, in the 1994 
Spring CAS Forum, for example, there are ten papers devoted to the 
measurement of variability in loss reserves. There is, however, a need 
for practical models that readily can be used by practicing actuaries. 
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For some types of insurance, loss development is sufficiently short-
tailed or stable enough to allow relatively simple projections from paid 
or incurred loss triangles. The development patterns for some cover-
ages, however, are long-tailed and unstable over time. For these cover-
ages, traditional aggregate triangulations or frequency/severity studies 
may not provide development data of sufficient credibility to reveal the 
true nature and magnitude of underlying development patterns. 
Loss reserves include: 
• Case estimates on reported losses; 
• Reserves for additional development on reported losses; and 
• Amounts carried to reflect liability for losses incurred but not yet 
reported (lBNR). 
This paper addresses the third component, IBNR, of the total loss re-
serve. The view of IBNR taken here is that of Bornhuetter-Ferguson1 
type methods, which postulate that IBNR is independent of prior loss 
activity and may be expressed as a function of expected losses and time. 
The expected losses are a function of expected loss counts and ex-
pected severity of loss. Thus, it makes sense to look at the development 
of both frequency and severity over time. The key variables in the emer-
gence of reported loss counts are the occurrence date and the report 
date, each represented on a time line with the beginning of the accident 
year set equal to time zero and all subsequent dates represented as the 
time elapsed from the beginning of the accident year to the respective 
date. The time, Z, elapsed between the occurrence date and report date 
will be referred to throughout this paper as the continuous reporting 
lag. 
The first task is to identify a reasonable representation of the under-
lying severity of loss distribution for the losses in general. [See Hogg 
and Klugman (1984) for a thorough discussion of choosing loss distri-
butions.] The size of loss, however, may be a function of the reporting 
lag Z defined above. For each value of Z there may be separate loss 
distributions referred to as conditional distributions to distinguish them 
from the marginal loss distribution. 
The final component of IBNR development is the manner in which 
claim occurrences arise over an exposure period. The most common as-
sumption is that occurrence dates are uniformly distributed throughout 
the accident year; this assumption is adopted in this paper. It should 
I Bornhuetter-Ferguson type methods are loss reserving methods that are based on 
the work of Bornhuetter and Ferguson (1972). 
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be noted, however, that the results of this paper easily can be extended 
to include a more general claim occurrence distribution. 
This three dimensional approach to modeling the loss development 
process (occurrence of loss, loss count development, and loss severity) 
is the framework for the model developed in this paper. Note that the 
primary data to be used in the model development need not be lim-
ited to loss triangulations. When such triangulations are highly volatile 
and involve a limited number of claims, a compilation of each individ-
ual claim by accident date and reporting date may facilitate the actual 
modeling process. 
2 The Mathematical Model 
Following Guiahi (1986), IBNR will be modeled as a three dimen-
sional stochastic process based on the number of claims, severity of 
claims, and reporting lag. The assumption of independence between 
reporting lag and loss severity, however, will be discarded and replaced 
with a model describing the dependence structure between these two 
variables using conditional mean severities. 
The time interval (0,1) is assigned to the accident year. There are 
three basic random variables: occurrence date X, reporting date R, and 
size of loss S. A fourth random variable, denoted by Z, is the continu-
ous reporting lag and is defined as Z = R - X. Table 1 summarizes the 
notation that will be used in connection with the variables X, Z, and S. 
Table 1 
Definition of Random Variables 
Variable Space PDF Mean Variance 
X = Time of Occurrence (0,1) u(·) 1/2 
Z = Continuous Lag (0, ex:» 9 (.) m 
S = Loss Size (0, ex:» f(·) J1 
Note: Space = Sample Space; and PDF = Probability Density Function. 
In the most general model, the three random variables (S, Z, X) 
would be interdependent. It does seem likely, however, that the length 
of the reporting lag should not depend on the occurrence date. That 
is, Z and X should be independent in the statistical sense. It is not 
clear, however, that Sand Z or S and X need be independent pairs. 
If there is a significant underlying loss trend by accident date, then S 
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and X should be dependent. It is well-known that loss size tends to in-
crease with settlement lag, and it may be true that loss size also tends 
to increase with reporting lag.2 If so, then Sand Z also will be depen-
dent. Put another way, trend may have a two dimensional effect on loss 
size. The first dimension is the effect of trend on loss size by accident 
date, and the second is trend over time elapsed since accident date. 
In some cases, however, underlying trend in either dimension may be 
either nonexistent or extremely difficult to establish or quantify. This 
may be true, for example, in some liability coverages where large losses 
playa significant role. 
In this paper, the assumption is made that there is no trend on loss 
size by accident date within an accident year. For any given accident 
year, loss size and accident date are assumed to be independent. More-
over, as has been previously stated, the uniform distribution of occur-
rences assumption often will be appropriate. It follows that S is depen-
dent only upon the continuous lag Z. 
Let J.1k (z) be the kth conditional mean of [S I Z = z], Le., 
J.1k(Z) = E[Sk I Z = z], for k = 1,2, ... , (1) 
and let the coefficient of variation of [S I Z = z] be denoted by cp(z). 
Assuming that g(z) ~ 0, it follows that 
J.1I (z) 
J.12 (z) - (J.1(z))2 
u(z) 
J.1(z) . 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The density g(z) describes how loss counts will develop over time. 
Although other forms are possible, it is common to assume that ulti-
mate claim frequency is either Poisson, negative binomial, or binomial; 
see Panjer and Willmot (1992, Chapter 6). In this case, however, I will 
assume that the ultimate number of claims is a Poisson random vari-
able. In addition, given any fixed point in time t ~ 0, the number of 
counts reported after time t is assumed to be Poisson. 
At this point, the basic assumptions used to develop the model are 
listed: 
Assumption 1: The conditional mean J.1(z) is a linear function of z. In 
particular, 
J.1(z) = K(z-m) +J.1. (5) 
2This relationship between loss size and settlement lag dates back at least as far as 
Salzmann (1964, pages 5-6). 
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Note that a linear function is used for convenience, but it is used 
only after it became apparent that more complex models would 
not provide a superior fit. 
Assumption 2: The coefficient of variation of [S I Z = z] is indepen-
dent of z, and hence is a constant c, i.e., 
cp(z) = c. (6) 
Assumption 3: The continuous reporting lag Z has known probability 
density function g(z) and has mean m and variance (. 
Assumption 4: The number of claims and time of reporting are inde-
pendent. 
Assumption 5: Claim occurrences within the accident year are uniformly 
distributed on (0,1). 
Assumption 6: Loss size S and lag Z are independent of the time of 
occurrence X. 
Assumption 7: Given a fixed time t, the number of counts reported 
after time t, N(t), has a Poisson distribution with mean and vari-
ance denoted by A(t). Clearly, the aggregate ultimate loss count 
is Poisson with mean and variance given by A(O). 
One consequence of Assumptions 1 and 2 is the following: 
£[S2] = /1 2 + (52 = (1 + C2)(K2(2 + m 2). 
Equation (7) can be established easily as follows: 
£[£[S2 I Z]] from Bowers et al. (1986, eqn. (2.2.10)) 
£[/12 (Z)] 
£[(/1(Z))2 + (52(Z)] 
(1 + c2 )£[ (/1 (Z)) 2] from Assumption 2 
(1 + C2)£[(K(Z - m) + m)2] from Assumption 1 
(1 + C2 )(K2(2 + m 2 ). 
3 The Main Results 
(7) 
Now fix a time t > 0, and let Si(t) denote the size of the ith claim 
reported after time t. If IBNR(t) denotes total loss dollars reported 
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after time t, then 
N(tl 
IBNR(t) = L 5i(t). 
i=l 
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(8) 
From Bowers et al. (1986, Chapter 11) or Panjer and Willmot (1992, 
Chapter 6), IBNR(t) is a compound Poisson random variable under the 
assumption that the number of claims and the loss sizes are mutually 
independent random variables. The mean and variance of IBNR(t) are 
thus given by 
E[IBNR(t)] = i\(t)E[5i(t)] 
Var[IBNR(t)] = i\(t)E[5f(t)]. 
(9) 
(10) 
The problem of estimating the mean and variance of the IBNR re-
serve at any given time t thus is reduced to finding the first two mo-
ments of 5i (t). There are two cases to consider: t < 1 and t ;::: 1. The 
first case is needed for incomplete accident years and seems rarely to 
be addressed. Unfortunately, it is this case that usually will generate 
the largest expected values of IBNR and, therefore, cannot be ignored. 
Case I (t < 1): If a loss that occurs at time X is reported after time t, 
it follows that X + Z > t. Thus 5i(t) and [5 I X + Z > t] are 
equivalent random variables, i.e., they have the same probability 
distribution. In other words, 
adt) = E[5i(t)] = E[5 I X + Z > t] 
a2(t) = E[(5i(t))2] = E[52 I X + Z > t]. 
Now as X and 5 are independent, then 
f;=o fz:t-x p(z)g(z)dz u(x)dx 
f;=o f::t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx 
(1 2) L!=o fz:t-x p(z)g(z)dz u(x)dx a2 (t) = + C :=---'Ot--'-"'---"oo---'-'---'------=------fx=o fz=t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx 
(11) 
(12) 
Next, let Ij (t) denote the indicator random variable for the report-
ing of the jth claim after time t, i.e., 
{
I if the jth claim is reported after time t; 
Ij(t) = 0 otherwise. 
Clearly, N(t) = L~~~l Ij(t), and 
Pr[Ij(t) = 1] = {=o t~t-x g(z)dzu(x)dx. 
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Hence, from Assumption 4, the lj(t)s are independent, so 
,\(t) E[N(O)]E[lj(t)] 
'\(0) (=0 L~t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx. (13) 
Case II (t ;::: 1): Here the maximum value that x can take is one so, 
a2(t) 
Again, 
f;=o fz':t-x j.1(z)g(z)dz u(x)dx 
f;=o fz':t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx 
(1 + c2) f;=o fz':t_x(j.1(Z))2 g (z)dz u(x)dx 
f;=o fz':t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx 
(14) 
(15) 
,\(t) = '\(0) (=0 L~t-x g(z)dz u(x)dx. (16) 
Note that in these equations, j.1(z) is given by equation (5) and u(x) = 1 
for 0 ~ x ~ 1. Thus in order to estimate the mean and variance of IBNR 
at any time t for a given accident year, one needs to know the density 
g(z), overall mean severity j.1, conditional mean severities j.1(z), and 
conditional coefficient of variation c. 
If there is no trend across accident years and the conditional means 
and severities apply to all accident years, then the aggregate expected 
value of IBNR simply will be the sum of the IBNR, as calculated in this 
paper, for each of the accident years. If there is trend across accident 
years, but all other aspects of the model (e.g., parameters for 9 (z) and 
c) are assumed to hold across accident years, one only need adjust 
the value of j.1 for each accident year, calculate the model's expected 
IBNR, and sum the results over the accident years. Although the model 
assumes no trend by accident date within the accident year, the effect 
of any trend on the calculated IBNR results is probably minimal and 
safely can be ignored. 
Finally, it may be necessary to have parameters that vary by acci-
dent year to reflect changes in the reporting lag distribution and/or the 
conditional coefficient of variation to calculate expected IBNR in each 
accident year and sum the results. 
In all cases, the expected value of total IBNR is the sum of the ex-
pected values of the individual accident year expected values. More-
over, if one can assume independence of losses by accident year, the 
variance of the aggregate IBNR will be the sum of the individual accident 
year IBNR variances. 
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4 An Application of the Model 
An example using an actual data set will illustrate practical use of 
this model. The data are loss counts and incurred losses by accident 
year and report year for a group errors and omissions (E&O) program. 
This program is selected because it is long-tailed and extremely volatile. 
The basic data in Table 2 and Table 3 show the exposures, reported loss 
counts, and reported losses for report years 1990-1993 on accident 
years 1980-1993. 
Table 2 
Loss Counts by Report Year 
Loss Counts 
AY Exposed 1990 1991 1992 1993 1990-93 
1980 2,599.9 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 2,473.3 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 2,597.6 1 0 0 0 1 
1983 2,646.7 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 2,537.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 2,673.4 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 2,911.6 0 0 1 0 1 
1987 3,055.2 1 0 1 0 2 
1988 2,810.8 2 4 2 0 8 
1989 2,887.2 25 6 3 1 35 
1990 2,907.6 47 46 9 2 104 
1991 2,922.6 64 40 3 107 
1992 3,018.1 50 26 76 
1993 3,034.2 41 41 
Totals 39,075.2 76 120 106 73 375 
Note: AY = Accident Year. 
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The first step is to determine the ultimate frequency and the density 
function 9 (z) from the loss counts and exposures. There are many pos-
sible choices of the form of the density, and several are tried. Because 
there are some claims with extremely long reporting lags, the two pa-
rameter Pareto is selected, truncated somewhat arbitrarily at 15 years. 
Thus for 0 ::; z ::; 15, 
01./3 IX (/3 + Z)IX-l 
g(z) = ..-L for 01.,/3>0. (17) 
1-({3+1S)1X 
Table 3 
Loss Amounts (in $s) by Report Year 
AY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1989-93 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 5,000 0 0 0 5,000 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 0 0 500 0 500 
1987 26,207 0 599 0 26,806 
1988 8,453 72,329 905 0 81,687 
1989 81,196 169,133 9,935 16,136 276,400 
1990 282,473 151,367 98,812 20,271 552,923 
1991 748,559 319,906 78,260 1,146,725 
1992 245,260 122,702 367,962 
1993 318,316 318,316 
Totals $405,319 $1,143,379 $677,909 $557,678 $2,776,319 
Note: AY = Accident Year. 
Occurrences are assumed to be uniformly distributed, with no trend 
in loss size. The parameters (01. and /3) and frequency i\ are determined 
using discrete unweighted least squares with loss counts tabulated by 
discrete lag n. If Ez is the exposure that underlies the counts observed 
for lag n, the problem is to find the parameters i\, 01., and /3 that mini-
mize the sum of squares L: 
minL(i\, 01., /3) = IJi\Ezp(n) - N n )2 (18) 
n 
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where 
A A(O) is the ultimate annual claim frequency; 
n Report year - Accident year = the discrete lag; 
N n Number of reported loss counts for lag n; 
En Associated exposure; and 
p(n) Portion of ultimate loss counts reported for iag n. 
Note that p(n) is given by the equation: 
( ) _ { L~=o f;~+nl~,; g(z)dz u (x)dx p n - I I-x fx=O fz=o g(z)dz u(x)dx 
The least squares estimated values are 
if n *- 0; 
if n = 0; 
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A = 0.0315, &. = 9.4274, and S = 4.8475. (19) 
From equation (17), the estimated density 9 gives mean and variance 
of Z as 
m = 0.5752 and (= 0.4195. (20) 
The next step is to model severity of loss S, both globally and condi-
tionally. A study of all reported mature losses results in the following 
selected global mean and standard deviation: 
p = 8,807 and if = 28,637. (21) 
The severity by discrete lag is volatile due to a paucity of data. Most 
counts are at discrete lag zero, however, so that value of J( is selected 
for which the observed discrete lag zero severity would be reproduced, 
Le., so that 
7 894 = L~=o f;':; (R(z - Fit) + {i)g(z)dz u(x)dx 
, fl I-x 
x=o fz=o g(z)dz u (x)dx 
This gives 
R = 2,707. (22) 
Once R is known, the conditional coefficient of variation, C, is calculated 
using equation (7). The model is now complete, and all of the quantities 
of interest mentioned in this paper can be determined. For the sake 
of brevity, however, only the development of the year end 1993 IBNR 
expected value and standard deviation is shown as Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Year End 1993 IBNR Reserve Estimates 
AY Mean Std. Dev. 
1993 $429,898 $222,206 
1992 107,018 126,463 
1991 31,453 76,055 
1990 10,997 48,984 
1989 4,303 32,941 
1988 1,808 22,730 
1987 912 17,054 
1986 428 12,255 
1985 202 8,791 
1984 102 6,481 
1983 58 5,027 
1982 30 3,755 
1981 15 2,691 
1980 7 1,887 
1980-1993 $587,231 $275,253 
Note: AY = Accident Year, and Std. Dev = Standard Deviation. 
The importance of the value of K, which determines the slope of loss 
sizes by lag, in the reserve estimates is illustrated by two alternative 
calculations. If K = 0, the total IBNR reserve decreases from $ 587,231 to 
$480,489. At the other extreme, fJ(O) = 0, and K = 15313.59 increases 
the reserve to $1,084,335. 
The actual fit of the model to the observed data, especially in the 
case of loss size, is not of great importance, given the strong variation 
in the observations. Moreover, the value of this example lies not in the 
discovery of the true underlying forces operating on the development 
of losses but in the illustration of the model concepts when applied to 
the data. Table 5 does, however, give an indication of goodness of fit. 
5 Some Closing Comments 
The central loss development model described in this paper is de-
signed to provide a logically consistent statistical approach to pure 
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Table 5 
Goodness of Fit 
Discrete Total Actual Model Actual Model 
Lag Exposed County Counts Dollars Dollars 
0 11,882.5 202 202.36 $1,594,608 $1,597,632 
1 11,735.5 137 136.01 675,171 1,246,532 
2 11,528.2 20 23.75 354,658 284,644 
3 11,660.8 10 5.51 128,742 81,421 
4 11,664.8 3 1.52 17,041 26,678 
5 11,451.0 1 0.48 599 9,749 
6 11,177.2 1 0.17 500 3,920 
7 10,768.7 0 0.06 0 1,548 
8 10,454.7 1 0.03 5,000 856 
9 10,254.6 0 0.01 0 313 
10 10,317.5 0 0.01 0 340 
11 7,670.8 0 0 0 0 
12 5,073.2 0 0 0 0 
13 2,599.9 0 0 0 0 
ALL 375 369.91 $2,776,319 $3,253,633 
IBNR estimation. There are strong advantages to this approach, how-
ever, beyond logical consistency: 
• The model allows for reserve valuation at any time t > O. 
• The model can be used to estimate unreported future losses that 
can be checked against actual future emergence of such losses 
within a statistical framework. This is because the model not only 
forecasts expected values but also the expected variation in such 
losses. 
• The model allows for the valuation of incomplete accident years. 
Incomplete accident years pose a serious problem for traditional 
claim run-off triangle methods. 
There are still many basic unanswered questions about this model, 
some of which lie primarily in the apparent arbitrariness of the assump-
tions that have been made. For example, 
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• Do loss sizes increase by reporting lag? If so, is a linear model 
appropriate? With modern hardware and software, the simplifi-
cation of a linear model may not be necessary. 
• Is it realistic to assume that the developments of loss counts and 
loss sizes over time arising from a fixed accident period are mu-
tually independent? 
• How robust is the model? The whole question of model parameter 
errors, which are critical pricing and reserving considerations for 
estimating needed security margins, is ignored. I believe that the 
model is sufficiently robust to be used when loss development is 
highly volatile and the process variance3 is expected to be large 
enough to playa significant part in estimation of the reliability 
of the expected value estimates of IBNR. The example given in 
Section 4 illustrates this point. 
It may be tempting to try to apply the concepts in this paper to the 
claims-made environment, which is especially suited to the develop-
ment of reported losses, for the estimation of claims-made pure pre-
mium components. This temptation may be particularly strong because 
Marker and Mohl (1980) show that an occurrence basis pure premium 
can be decomposed into a sum of claims-made components, with ad-
justment for differences in reporting patterns that arise from the two 
coverage types. Moreover, McClenahan (1988) includes the cost of ex-
tended reporting tails as a component of the occurrence basis pure pre-
mium. This temptation, however, must be dampened severely by two 
major considerations. First, claims-made coverages have arisen largely 
out of concern for strong and unpredictable loss trends. Second, the 
model is based on accident years, while the claims-made environment 
is defined in terms of policy years. For these reasons, I somewhat re-
luctantly have overcome this temptation to produce nice formulations 
3 As used by Herzog (1985), the term process variance refers to "the variance of the 
frequency, severity, or aggregate claim amount of an individual combination of risk 
characteristics," and is, therefore, a conditional variance. The context in Herzog is one 
of a population consisting of a collection of different individual combinations of risk 
characteristics, so that the total variance is the sum of (i) the expected value of process 
variance, and (ii) the variance of the hypothetical means. Here, the context used for 
the term process variance is somewhat different in that it refers to the total variance 
arising from the model, but is also conditional upon the parameters employed in the 
model. In this sense, the term process variance is employed analogously to the term 
process risk. Variance arising from error in the selection of parameters (which is not 
estimated in this paper) is analogous to parameter risk. (See McClenahan (1990, p. 61) 
for definitions of process risk and parameter risk.) 
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from the model using assumptions that will be unrealistic in most real 
world situations. 
I do suggest, however, that if one can devise a more general model 
that incorporates trend, shifts in reporting patterns, and distributions 
of policy inception dates, then Monte Carlo simulations may be used 
to estimate both the expected values and the process variances needed 
to determine IBNR reserves for occurrence basis coverages and claims-
made pure premiums without having to deal with extremely complex 
mathematical formulae. With the powerful desktop computers and 
commercial software readily available today, I believe firmly that prac-
tical results could be obtained at minimal cost. 
SpeCific technical questions as to forms of distributions or func-
tional ways in which loss sizes vary are wide open. This paper makes 
no attempt to answer such questions. Rather, this paper is designed to 
build a practical framework or approach for the practicing actuary to 
develop his or her own model to produce IBNR estimates that can be 
tested scientifically from emerging experience. 
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Safety First and Ambiguity 
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Abstract 
There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that ambiguity (i.e., pa-
rameter risk) impacts pricing decisions by actuaries and underwriters and their 
desire to provide coverage. Stone proposed a safety first model of choice that 
provides a possible explanation for this behavior. This paper analyzes Stone's 
proposed stability and survival constraints and compares the results with those 
predicted by expected utility theory. The analysis is motivated by insurers' in-
creaSing reluctance to provide coverage for certain specific risks such as earth-
quake damage insurance where the probability of loss is ambiguous. We show 
that such behavior is consistent with safety first but is difficult to explain using 
an expected utility approach. 
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1 Introduction 
Stone (l973a, 1973b) put forward a behavioral theory of insurance 
capacity in the spirit of a chance constrained/safety first model of 
choice that still stands as a possible explanation for crises of availabil-
ity in insurance markets. Stone proposes that constraints of stability 
and survival are used by insurance companies for acceptance or rejec-
tion of risks, where stability means regularity in corporate profits over 
time, and survival refers to the specification of a maximum probability 
that aggregate losses exceed surplus. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a more formal analysis of 
these constraints and to compare the results to the predictions of ex-
pected utility theory. Short-run supply functions are derived that deter-
mine the lowest price that a firm will charge to protect a certain number 
of risks against a particular event or, equivalently, how many risks the 
firm will insure at a given price. The actual price that is observed will 
reflect the demand for insurance. Our focus is on the first steps that 
firms are likely to take before entering the marketplace. 
In his analysis of insurer behavior Stone suggests that "second de-
gree uncertainty" (also termed ambiguity) influences decisions on price 
as well as whether a firm will want to offer coverage. Stone does not 
specify how ambiguity would be incorporated in his model of choice, 
however. In the last few years a literature on ambiguity has arisen 
that addresses the issue of economic behavior when there is uncer-
tainty over the parameters of probability distributions (Kunreuther, 
1989; Kunreuther, Hogarth, and Meszaros 1993). 
Of interest to us is the impact of ambiguity on the premium charged 
by the firm and its desire to prm'ide coverage. Our analysis is motivated 
by insurers' recent difficulties in providing coverage for specific risks 
where the probability of a loss is ambiguous. For example, today in-
surers are reluctant to provide coverage to homeowners against earth-
quakes because of a concern that the losses from a catastrophic disaster 
could create capacity problems and possibly cause insolvency. Hence, 
the indllstry has argued for some type of federal earthquake insurance 
program just as they did for flood coverage in the 1960s; for more on 
this, see the Insurance Services Office (1994). As we shall demonstrate, 
this lack of interest by private firms in providing protection is consis-
tent with a safety first model of firm behavior, but is difficult to explain 
using an expected utility approach. 
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2 Safety First and Utility Theory 
Suppose that an insurer is interested in offering one-period cover-
age for a group of n mutually independent risks. At the end of the 
period, each risk is assumed to have a probability e of causing a loss of 
fixed amount fl. (At this point e is assumed to be a known constant. I 
In Section 3, however, we will consider the case where e is a random 
variable.) The insurer's current surplus on hand, w, is assumed to be 
known with certainty. In addition, the insurer is assumed to be risk 
averse with a known continuous concave utility function. 
Under traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern2 expected utility pric-
ing, the premium is set so the insurer is indifferent between taking the 
risk or not. The pricing relation is given by 
where: 
u(W) = E[uCw + nIT - X)] 
u(·) The insurer's utility function; 
IT The insurance premium per risk; and 
X Aggregate losses for the n risks 
Kxfl 
where K is the actual number of losses. 
(1) 
Under Stone's model of safety first behavior, the premium is deter-
mined by constraints of stability and solvency. Expenses are ignored in 
the analysis that follows. Stability requires a probability less than PI 
that the loss ratio exceeds a certain target level r*. Specifically, if there 
are n risks, the premium ITs required to satisfy the stability constraint 
is given by 
Kfl Pr[-- > r*] < PI, 
nITs 
(2) 
'Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by uppercase English or 
Greek letters. 
2Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed expected utility theory for use 
when there is a process of decision making under uncertainty. Expected utility theory 
has been used by actuaries since the 1960s; see, for example, Borch (1968). There are 
many problems associated with expected utility theory, however, such as (i) the lack 
of a unique utility function, (ii) the utility function, even if unique, may be unknown, 
and (iii) the utility function may be concave in some areas and convex in other areas. 
See, for example, Ramsay (1993, Section 3.2) for more on the problems associated with 
expected utility theory. 
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where K is the actual number of losses. Clearly K is binomially dis-
tributed with parameters nand e, i.e., 
(3) 
The survival constraint relates aggregate losses for the risk in ques-
tion to the current surplus plus premiums written. It requires that the 
probability of insolvency be less than P2. The premium ITr required to 
satisfy the survival constraint is given by: 
Pr[Kf> w + nIT,-] < P2. (4) 
Because the safety first constraints do not always provide a defini-
tive premium, it is necessary to include a profit criterion as part of a 
pricing model. Stone indicates that insurers often specify a fixed profit 
margin in making their pricing decisions. Let m represent the profit 
margin for a given risk. If one uses the expected value of losses as a 
reference point, then the profit criterion for any given risk would yield 
premium ITe (ignoring expenses) given by: 
ITe = eP(l + m). 
Of course, the premium may be higher than that implied by the profit 
criterion because of the stability and solvency constraints. 
The expected profit criterion coupled with the safety first constraints 
form a supply function for insurance that relates required premiums to 
the number of poliCies written. Figure 1 illustrates the prices required 
under the safety first constraints. Here e = 0.10, m = 0.10,& = 1, and 
r* = l.0, and the survival constraint is graphed for w = 0, 5, and 10. 
The safety first probabilities are, respectively, Pi = 0.05, P2 = 0.0000l. 
It is evident from Figure 1 that the magnitude of w is only important for 
smaller values of n. For very small values of n (and for w greater than 
zero) premiums will be determined by the stability constraint because 
a relatively high premium is needed for the loss ratio to be less than 
one with the required probability. 
Figure 2 shows the supply function that results from the safety first 
constraints with w = 10 that are graphed in Figure l. This supply 
function is generated from three curves shown in Figure 1: (i) Stability, 
(ii) Survival (w = 10), and (iii) Profit Objective. SpeCifically, the supply 
function is determined as follows: For each value of n, 
IT = max {Stability, Survival, Profit Objective}. 
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For the supply function n, the number of risks insured, is the quantity 
supplied, and IT is the price per unit risk. 
The supply function can be compared with that implied when the in-
surer sets premiums on the basis of expected utility. For an exponential 
utility function 
equation (1) implies 
1 = ± e-A(nrr-k) (n)8 k(1 _ 8)n-k. 
k~O k 
Solving for IT yields 
1 
IT = -In(l + 8(e'\ - 1)) 
i\ 
(5) 
so that IT is independent of nand w. This property of exponential util-
ity pricing, known as additivity, is desirable because the order in which 
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independent risks are taken do not affect the price of each risk. 3 This 
property does not hold for logarithmic and quadratic utility functions. 
We will show in the next section that for logarithmic and quadratic 
utility functions, the premiums are practically constant, increasing very 
slowly as n increases. Premiums will increase substantially with n un-
der all of these utility functions, however, when there is ambiguity in 
the probability distribution associated with lusses. 
3 Ambiguity and Insurance Pricing 
The literature on credibility theory provides the foundation for mod-
eling the impact on premiums if there is ambiguity with respect to 
the parameters of probability distributions; see, for example, Heilmann 
3It is well-known that exponential utility yields premiums that are independent of 
nand 1'1'; see Gerber (1979, Chapter 5). 
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(1989) and Venter (1990) for more on credibility theory. Given the na-
ture of credibility theory, it has been long recognized that Bayesian 
techniques can be utilized to replace the ad hoc formulae that actu-
aries have been using for pricing (Mayerson, 1964). Klugman (1992) 
gives an excellent treatment of the application of Bayesian techniques 
to credibility theory. Although research is being conducted on expected 
utility premium principles (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987) and credibility 
theory, little work has been done on expected utility pricing under pa-
rameter uncertainty.4 
In the literature on ambiguity, uncertainty over the parameters of 
probability distributions often is characterized as disagreement among 
experts.s In such situations, however, we may be able to use mixing 
distributionsG for parameters in modeling such uncertainty. A uniform 
distribution, for instance, may depict a situation in which opinion is 
spread evenly over a range of values. A discrete mixing distribution, 
on the other hand, could be used to represent a case where there are 
substantial differences of opinion and the experts have specific values 
for the parameters. We will see that under extreme ambiguity insur-
ers often will be unwilling to provide coverage at any price when they 
are following safety first principles. This will not be the case under 
expected utility pricing. 
It is useful to contrast the concept of ambiguity, as defined in this 
paper, with that of process risk which often is used to characterize un-
certainty. Ambiguity (also called parameter risk) refers to uncertainty in 
the parameters of the probability or outcome distribution, whereas pro-
cess risk refers to the risk associated with the projection of future losses 
which are inherently random. 7 Actuaries often use mixtures of distri-
butions to model situations where parameters vary over a population; 
see Panjer and Willmot (1992, Chapters 2.8 and 8). We are, however, 
applying mixtures in a different way. The distribution of the parameter 
now is used to characterize parameter risk. This approach differs from 
Bayesian analYSis as there is no updating procedure; rather, the focus 
is the degree of uncertainty about the true value of the parameter. 
With ambiguity, e is the uncertain parameter in the speCification of 
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) X, Fe(x). In this case, e is 
4But see Freifelder (1976, 1979). Goovaerts, De Vylder, and Haezendonck (1984) 
study the effect of parameter uncertainty on premium principles such as the Escher, 
but not utility theory. 
sFor example, in asseSSing risks such as underground storage tank, earthquake, and 
satellite, the scientific community is divided due to the lack of data and causal models. 
6The mixing distribution is the probability distribution of the uncertain parameter. 
7This definition of process risk follows McClenahan (1990, page 61). 
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viewed as a random variable with cdf G(8). Throughout the rest of this 
paper, the probability distribution function (pdf) (if e is continuous) or 
probability function (if e is discrete) of e is denoted by 9(8) = dG(8). 
The pricing equation for expected utility theory is 
U(w) Ee[E[u(w + nIT - X)] Ie] 
f:=-oo J:=o u(w + nIT - x)dFo(x) dG(8). (6) 
Because the mean of e is assumed to be a known constant, ambiguity 
will not influence pricing under risk neutrality. 
To contrast the differences between the effect of ambiguity on ex-
pected utility and safety first pricing we consider the same case dis-
cussed above where the firm is assumed to be insuring identical inde-
pendent Bernoulli risks. The premium per risk, IT, as a function of n is 
computed under the following conditions: 
• No ambiguity; 
• The uniform mixing distribution, 
(e) = f 1 for 0 :s; e :s; 1 
91 l 0 otherwise; 
• The discrete mixing distribution, 
, (8) = S 0.5 for e = 0 or 1 
92 l 0 otherwise. 
Note that both 91 (8) and 92(8) yield E[e = 0.5]. 
Under each of the above conditions, we will use the exponential util-
ity function defined in equation (5) and the following utility functions: 
Ul(X) 
uq(x) 
In(201 + x) logarithmic: with x> -201; and (7) 
-(10 - X)2 quadratic: with -00 < x :s; 10. (8) 
Using equation (6), the expressions for the premiums can easily be cal-
culated. 
Table 1 depicts the resulting premiums for these different utility 
functions and mixing distributions. Although the premium for expo-
nential utility remains constant with no ambiguity, the fact that prf'mi-
ums increase as n increases for all of the mixing distributions means 
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that additivity does not hold under parameter uncertainty. The premi-
ums for the logarithmic utility function for the no ambiguity and uni-
form mixing distribution cases are determined by numerical methods. 
As is the case for the exponential utility function, the premium under 
ambiguity increases with 11. and is higher for the discrete than for the 
uniform mixing distribution. The same results hold for the quadratic 
utility function. For the discrete mixing distribution, the premiums are 
higher than under the uniform mixing distribution due to the concen-
tration of mass at probability zero and one. One interpretation of such 
behavior is a split in expert opinion: one group believes an event is cer-
tain to occur, while another group believes it will not. If the event does 
occur, all risks will suffer losses. This kind of extreme ambiguity, such 
as that given by a discrete mixing distribution, thus translates into a 
perfect correlation of risks. 
Table 1 
Premiums for E[8 = 0.5] 
Mixing Distributions 
Utility 11. NAB 91 (8) 92(8) 
Exponential 1 0.6200 0.6200 0.6200 
10 0.6200 0.8060 0.9310 
20 0.6200 0.8710 0.9650 
100 0.6200 0.9580 0.9930 
Logarithmic 1 0.5006 0.5006 0.5006 
10 0.5006 0.5025 0.5062 
20 0.5006 0.5046 0.5124 
100 0.5006 0.5212 0.5613 
Quadratic 1 0.5125 0.51251 0.5125 
10 0.5126 0.5513 0.6340 
20 0.5127 0.6021 1.0000 
100 0.5134 
Note: NAB = No Ambiguity. 
In general, probability uncertainty introduces correlation into port-
folios that otherwise would consist of independent risks if the value 
of 8 were known. The relation between ambiguity and correlation is 
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particularly clear when both the risks and the parameters are normally 
distributed. In this case, if the normal mixing distribution for 8 has 
variance T2 then the correlation between the risks is also T2 (Heilmann, 
1989, p. 81). Thus, parameter uncertainty translates directly into cor-
relation between risks that are conditionally independent. 
Premiums under ambiguity are calculated in Table 2 using exponen-
tial utility and the safety first stability constraint. In each case we use 
three different mixing distributions: 
93(8) { 5 for 0::0; 8 ::0; 0.2 0 otherwise; 
94(8) { 0.5 for 8 = 0 or 0.2 0 otherwise; 
{ 0.9 for 8 = 0 95(8) 0.1 for 8 = 1 0 otherwise. 
For each of these three mixing distributions E[8] = 0.1. 
Table 2 
Premiums for Exponential Utility and Safety First 
Mixing Distributions 
n NAB 93(8) 94(8) 95 (8) 
Exponential 1 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 
10 0.159 0.188 0.231 0.770 
20 0.159 0.211 0.261 0.885 
100 0.159 0.263 0.288 0.977 
Safety First 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(with stability 10 0.300 0.300 0.400 1.000 
constraint) 20 0.200 0.250 0.300 1.000 
100 0.150 0.210 0.250 1.000 
Note: NAB = No Ambiguity. 
For the exponential utility function defined in equation (5) and no 
ambiguity, the insurer's premium is independent of the number of risks 
and is given by IT = 0.159. Probability ambiguity causes premiums to 
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increase rapidly as 11 increases. For the discrete mixing distribution 
95(8), the premium is as high as 0.977 when 11 = 100. 
For the safety first model the story is completely different, as indi-
cated in Table 2. The premiums required under the stability constraint 
given by equation (2) decline as n increases. In the most extreme case, 
the discrete mixing distribution over [0,1], the constraint never can be 
met because the probability of n losses is 0.10 and we have assumed 
that PI = 0.05 in equation (2). 
Table 3 shows the impact of the survival constraint (given by equa-
tion (4) with pz = 0.00001) on premiums for relatively small values of 
n for the non-ambiguous case and when the probability distribution of 
losses is ambiguous using 93. Consider the non-ambiguous case. In 
order to understand how the firm's surplus and number of poliCies n 
affect TTl', let 
Then for f = 1, 
k(n) = min{k: Pr[K > k] < pz}. 
k(n) w 
TTl' = max{O, -- - -}. 
n n 
(9) 
Thus the insurer's current surplus on hand, w, can be viewed as a mea-
sure of its capacity to accept risks and has its greatest impact for small 
values of n. Insurers with larger capacity are able to charge lower pre-
miums. Note that as n increases (starting from 1), premiums may in-
crease or decrease depending on the behavior of k(n)/n. But, from the 
law of large numbers, k(n)/n goes to £[8] as n goes to infinity. So 
the premium TTl' eventually will approach the expected loss. (See Figure 
1.) Like the stability constraint, the required premiums increase under 
this mixing distribution compared to the non-ambiguous case, but the 
premiums also decline as the number of risks increases. 
Thus a distinction emerges between the predictions of safety first 
and utility theory under ambiguity. With extreme ambiguity, coverage 
will be denied under the safety first criteria, while under more moderate 
conditions premiUms will increase but eventually will decline for large 
11. On the other hand, in utility theory, increased ambiguity results in 
higher premiums and the failure of the law of large numbers to have 
any influence as the number of risks increases. 
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Table 3 
Premiums (TTl') 
Under Survival Constraint 
w n No Ambiguity 93(0) 
0 10 0.60 0.70 
20 0.45 0.55 
50 0.32 0.42 
100 0.25 0.35 
200 0.20 0.30 
5 10 0.10 0.20 
20 0.20 0.30 
50 0.22 0.32 
100 0.20 0.30 
200 0.18 0.28 
10 10 0.00 0.00 
20 0.00 0.05 
50 0.12 0.22 
100 0.15 0.25 
200 0.15 0.25 
20 50 0.00 0.02 
100 0.05 0.15 
200 0.10 0.20 
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4 Empirical Results 
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1990) conducted a survey to test the var-
ious theories of insurance pricing. Actuaries were asked to price war-
ranties on the performance of a component of a new line of microcom-
puters. They were told that the cost of repair is $100, and there can 
be at most one breakdown per period. Experimental variations concern 
the number of units insured, ambiguous and non-ambiguous probabil-
ities of breakdown, and probability levels of 0.001, 0.01, and 0.10. In 
the ambiguous versions of the scenario, respondents were told there 
is considerable disagreement among experts regarding the probability 
of a breakdown of any given unit, while in the non-ambiguous versions 
they were told that the experts all agree on the chances of a breakdown. 
The results are listed in Table 4 in terms of the ratios of the prices 
proposed by the actuaries to the expected losses. It is evident in all 
cases that ambiguity results in higher prices. What is difficult to ex-
plain, however, is that even in the absence of ambiguity, prices increase 
as risks are added for e = 0.001 and e = 0.01 while they decline for 
e = 0.10. Utility theory implies that premiums increase as risks are 
added under decreasing absolute risk aversion, and premiums decline 
under increasing absolute risk aversion (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987; 
see note 5). The above empirical results seem to suggest that the actu-
aries' utility functions exhibit decreasing and increasing absolute risk 
aversion over the appropriate ranges. 
Table 4 
Actuaries' Price-Expected Loss Ratios for Warranties 
e = 0.001 e = 0.01 e = 0.100 
n= 10,000 
N on -ambiguous 1.266 1.149 1.075 
Ambiguous 2.439 1.587 1.370 
n= 100,000 
Non-ambiguous 1.538 1.176 1.020 
Ambiguous 3.333 1.961 1.316 
Source: Hogarth, R. and Kunreuther, H. "Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance." 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1990): 5-35. 
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It is possible, however, to explain the actuaries' pricing from the 
perspective of safety first theory. We noted earlier that the premiums 
implied by the survival constraint can rise for smaller values of n fol-
lowed by declines. The observed patterns of pricing with no ambiguity 
can be explained if premiums are increasing for 8 = 0.001 and 8 = 0.01 
and decreasing for 8 = 0.10 over the range of n being considered. 
Consider, for example, the results exhibited in Table 5 for w = 15. 
For 8 = 0.001 prices peak at n = 40,000, while for 8 = 0.10 prices 
decline over the entire range of values for n. When n increases from 
10,000 to 100,000, prices thus increase for 8 = 0.001 and decline for 
8 = 0.10. This occurs because the relative magnitude of the initial 
surplus is higher for small values of 8. The capacity goes further for 
smaller values of 8 and, therefore, the premiums rise for larger values 
of n. 
Table 5 
Impact of Survival Constraint on Premiums 
With w = 15 and Non-Ambiguous Risks 
TT TT/8 
n 8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100 8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100 
10,000 O.OOllO 0.lll5 1.10 1.ll5 
20,000 0.00135 0.1084 1.35 1.084 
30,000 0.00137 0.1070 1.37 1.070 
40,000 0.00138 0.1061 1.38 1.061 
50,000 0.00136 0.1055 1.36 1.055 
60,000 0.00135 0.1050 1.35 1.050 
70,000 0.00133 0.1046 1.33 1.046 
80,000 0.00133 0.1044 1.33 1.044 
90,000 0.00131 0.1041 1.31 1.041 
100,000 0.00130 0.1039 1.30 1.039 
The fact that for the survey of actuaries relative prices are higher 
for smaller values of 8 is explained readily in the presence of expenses 
that do not vary with the probability of loss. 
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5 Coverage Limits 
The consideration of ambiguity can shed light on another question 
of interest. The fact that insurance companies offer liability policies 
with specified coverage limits is a puzzle from the perspective of util-
ity theory. Models of risk sharing under expected utility maximization 
invariably conclude that the entire risk should be split according to the 
risk preferences of the parties to the exchange. The optimal contractual 
forms do not include coverage limits but involve deductibles and coin-
surance above some level. Only in the case of a regulatory constraint 
requiring insurers to sell a policy with a prescribed actuarial value has 
it been shown that there will be policy limits (Raviv, 1979). Huberman, 
Mayers, and Smith (1983) derive coverage limits when demand is influ-
enced by limited liability under speCific assumptions about the nature 
of the risk, but this does not explain insurers' reluctance to offer poli-
cies with unlimited exposure. In fact, consideration of limited liability 
of insurers would suggest that they would be more than willing to sell 
such poliCies if there were relatively low costs of bankruptcy. 
The above analysis assumes a fixed loss size of one, but it easily is 
extended to a severity of loss sizee. The survival constraint may be 
written as 
IV Pr[K ~ 7 + nIT] ::s; 0.00001, (10) 
where IT is now the premium per dollar of coverage. Note that capacity 
is now IV II! instead of IV. As I! increases, capacity approaches zero, 
which limits the ability of firms to write small numbers of large risks. 
In this case the supply function with IV = 0 in Figure 1 is an appropriate 
representation of the insurer's ability to provide coverage. 
Large values of I! together with ambiguity further will act to raise 
prices and limit availability. From equations (10) and (9), 
ken) IV 
IT-----, 
- n ne 
(11) 
so for large I! the ratio k(n)ln becomes the key determinant of price. 
In the absence of ambiguity k (n) I n will approach 8 (recall that 8 is 
known) as n gets large. This is generally not the case when ambiguity 
is present. For example, when E[8] = 0.5 
• Under the uniform mixing distribution, the probability of all out-
comes is 1/(n + 1), i.e., 
288 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994 
Pr[K = k] = r1 (n)ek(l_ e)l1-kde = _1_. Jo k n+1 
Hence the limit of k(n)/n as n ~ 00 is 1; 
• When the ambiguity is characterized by the discrete mixing dis-
tribution over the [0, 1] interval, the probability of n losses is e, 
so unless nil :5 w + nf.IT the survival constraint always will be 
violated for e > 0.00001. Therefore, the law of large numbers is 
ineffective in cases such as these. Hence, only a relatively small 
number of risks m?y be underwritten. 
Contrast these observations with the case of no ambiguity and inde-
pendent risks: for e = 0.1 the number of risks n need only be six for 
the probability of n losses to be less than 0.00001. 
The company has three alternatives in meeting the survival con-
straint under extreme ambiguity-it can reduce n, raise IT, or reduce f. 
Solving the constraint ni!:5 w + nfIT for n, we get n:5 w/((l-IT)-e). 
In general, the constraint on the number of risks will be 
w 
n :5 (k(l1) _ IT)!:" 
n 
With ambiguity, k(n)/n will be close to one for small values of n, so 
the same analysis goes through under these conditions. This means 
that the capacity w relative to the severity f determines how many 
risks can be underwritten. A natural way to increase the number of 
risks that can be underwritten is to reduce f by way of coverage limits. 
Capacity also is increased by increasing IT, but IT cannot get too close 
to one, especially when expenses are considered. When the constraint 
is reached, nf = w + nfIT and the capacity to assume new risks is 
exhausted. In order to assume a new risk, the premium collected must 
be increased 100 cents to the dollars in order to prevent violation of 
the constraint; that is, IT must approach one and the insurance will not 
be purchased. 
We see that ambiguity and safety first results in a focus on the worst 
possible outcome (nf) that a portfolio of risks may suffer. Empiri-
cal studies of managerial behavior in the face of uncertainty suggest 
that managers do tend to focus on the severity of the worst possible 
BSee Kunreuther (1989) for an interview with an actuary who uses this expression 
to explain his reaction to extre-me ambiguity. 
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outcomes, paying less attention to the probability of their occurrence 
(March and Shapira, 1987, p. 1407). Not only does this describe man-
agerial behavior, but such a focus is prescribed by the leading texts on 
risk management (e.g., Williams and Heins, 1989; Vaughan, 1992). Risk 
management procedures call for prioritizing risks according to their 
potential severity followed by an estimation of the probability of their 
occurrence. The ambiguity inherent in many organizational risks calls 
for a managerial focus on potentially catastrophic risks regardless of 
the probability of their occurrence. 
6 Discussion 
The safety first model of insurance pricing has been shown to pro-
vide significantly different predictions from those of expected utility 
theory. While the utility functions (exponential, quadratic and logarith-
mic) examined here exhibit nondecreasing premiums as risks are added 
to the portfolio, under a safety first model premiums may increase or 
decline for small values of n according to the predominance of the sur-
vival or stability constraints. Under safety first, the value of IT declines 
as the number of insured risks becomes relatively large. 
When ambiguity is present, price increases are exaggerated under 
utility theory, whereas for safety first the results depend on the extent 
of the ambiguity. Under extreme ambiguity insurers often will be re-
luctant to provide coverage at any price except dollar-for-dollar, while 
for more moderate ambiguity, premiums will be higher even though 
they eventually may decline. Safety first theory also has been shown 
to yield a definition of capacity as referring to the ability to underwrite 
relatively small numbers of risks and to provide explanations for the ex-
istence of coverage limits in liability insurance. It appears that Stone's 
characterization of insurer behavior has considerable merit. 
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Abstract 
In the paper entitled "Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings Plans: 
Deferral or Waiver," Robert L. Brown concludes that "the nontaxation of invest-
ment income on qualified funds until taken is a tax waiver or tax subsidy from 
the government to participants of qualified plans". I believe, however, that this 
conclusion is based on flawed assumptions pertaining to: 
• The behavioral responses of taxpayers to the withdrawal of such tax as-
sistance; 
• The definition of an appropriate benchmark tax system against which to 
measure the cost of such tax assistance; and 
• The appropriate basis of comparison of alternative government tax rev-
enue streams. 
Using alternative and reasonable assumptions, I conclude instead that the non-
taxation of investment income on qualified plans until taken provides gains to 
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Introduction 
In Section 2 of his paper entitled "Tax Assistance to Qualified Re-
tirement Savings Plans: Deferral or Waiver," Robert L. Brown states that 
certain assumptions have been made to "simplify the presentation". 
Professor Brown then concludes, at the end of his paper, that "the non-
taxation of investment income on qualified funds until taken is a tax 
waiver or tax subsidy from the government to participants of qualified 
plans". In fact, these assumptions are the only reason that the stated 
conclusion is reached. Using other reasonable assumptions, completely 
different conclusions are possible. 
My discussion of Professor Brown's paper considers several mitigat-
ing factors and does the following: 
• Highlights selected assumptions made by the author; 
• Presents alternative assumptions; and 
• Reaches different conclusions based on the alternative assump-
tions. 
Unless otherwise specified, when an alternative assumption is used be-
low, it is the only aspect of the author's analysis that has been changed. 
At the end of this discussion, however, the combined effect of changing 
several assumptions at once is considered. 
Some, but not all, of the ideas contained in this discussion are bor-
rowed from Section 5 and Appendix B of the document "Troubled Tomo-
rrows-The Report of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries' Task Force 
on Retirement Savings". This document was published in January 1995 
and provides a more thorough treatment of the main topic addressed 
by the author (as well as other interesting and related matters).l 
2 Alternative Assumptions 
2.1 Lack of Behavioral Response-Save or Spend? 
The author assumes that if tax assistance were not provided, tax-
payers would save just as much outside the retirement savings system 
as they now save within it. Another possible response, albeit extreme, 
ITo obtain a copy of "Troubled Tomorrows ... ", write to: Canadian Institute of Ac-
tuaries, Constitution Square, 360 Albert, Suite 820, Ottawa ON KIR 7X7, CANADA. 
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is that taxpayers would spend the money they now devote to retire-
ment savings. In this case, there would appear to be no tax subsidy 
associated with the present system, as shown below. 
The amount of taxes received at time t = 30 by the government if 
the taxpayer saves in a qualified vehicle is: 
Tax $2,000.00 x (1.07)30 x 0.40 
$6,089.80. (1) 
If, during the past thirty years, the taxpayer spends the amount that 
would have been his or her retirement savings, the accumulated value 
of the taxes received by government is exactly the same as is given in 
equation (1), $6,089.80. The calculations are identical. 
2.2 Lack of Behavioral Response-How to Invest? 
The author further assumes that if tax assistance were not pro-
vided, taxpayers would invest their nonsheltered savings in a manner 
that exposes them to the full brunt of the current tax system. In re-
ality, taxpayers are likely to make investments with advantageous tax 
characteristics. 
In Canada, a good example is paying down a home mortgage. Be-
cause mortgage interest is not tax deductible and resale gains are not 
taxable, this is tantamount to earning a tax-free rate of return on the 
extra mortgage payment(s). If all retirement savings could be so redi-
rected, the only tax revenue that government would receive is with re-
spect to the initial contribution of $2,000. Thus, we would again have 
no apparent subsidy in the current tax system. 
2.3 Definition of Benchmark Tax System 
The author assumes that the cost of tax assistance should be mea-
sured by assuming that the benchmark tax system is the current tax sys-
tem minus the existing qualified plan exemptions. Unfortunately, the 
current tax system treats any savings other than qualified retirement 
savings punitively. Specifically, most investment income, whether real 
or not, is fully taxed. 
This is proof of the adage that we should never let government forget 
whose income it is in the first place. Although the retirement savings 
system allows us to keep some of our investment income, this does not 
mean that the amount so kept is a gift from a beneficent government. 
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Consider instead a benchmark tax system where only real invest-
ment income is taxed. Repeating the author's arithmetic, but with this 
modification, we get the following (an inflation rate of 4 percent has 
been assumed for illustrative purposes, i.e., real rate of return is 3 per-
cent). 
Qualified Vehicle: The amount of taxes received by government at time 
t = 30 if the taxpayer saves in a qualified vehicle is $6,089.80. 
Non-Qualified Vehicle: The accumulated value to time t = 30 of the 
amount of taxes received by the government if the taxpayer saves 
what would have been his or her retirement savings, but outside 
a qualified vehicle, is: 
Tax = $2,000.00 x 0.40 X (1.07)30 
+ $2,000.00 x (1 - 0.40) x 0.40 x 0.03 
29 
x L (1.07 - 0.03 x 0.40)k(1.07)29-k 
k=O 
$6,089.80 + $2,622.16 
$8,711.96. (2) 
The apparent tax subsidy is still substantial, but much less than the 
amount calculated by the author. 
2.4 Basis of Comparison of Tax Revenue Streams 
The author has assumed that government's different tax revenue 
streams should be accumulated at the same interest rate as the tax-
payer can invest. No rationale is offered for this chOice, but as with the 
foregOing assumptions, it is crucial. 
The rationale likely is connected somehow to the government's cost 
of borrowing. That is, the underlying presumption is that if govern-
ment defers the collection of tax, then it must borrow the foregone 
amount until the tax eventually is collected. Governments, however, 
need not borrow the amount of taxes they defer. A more prudent ap-
proach would be to defer spending until such time as the tax to warrant 
the spending is collected. 
It is well-known that governments in both Canada and the U.s. are 
highly indebted. The high cost of servicing this debt should not nec-
essarily be attributed to the retirement savings system. Imagine for 
a moment that no government debt or deficits existed. Then the real 
choice easily would be seen to be: 
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Tax now, spend now 
OR 
Tax later, spend later. 
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The fact that past governments have chosen to spend now and tax 
later should not influence unduly a theoretical paper such as that of 
the author unduly. Thus, I suggest that a better approach would be 
to compare tax revenue streams using an inflation-adjusted approach 
rather than an interest-adjusted approach. 
Applying this logic to the author's original analysis yields the fol-
lowing (again, a 4 percent inflation assumption has been used): 
• The amount of taxes received by government at time t = 30 if the 
taxpayer saves in a qualified vehicle again is given by equation (1), 
$6,089.80 . 
• The accumulated value of taxes received by government to time 
t = 30 if the taxpayer continues to invest what would have been 
his or her retirement savings, but outside a qualified vehicle, is: 
Tax = $2,000.00 x 0.40 x 1.0430 
+ $2,000.00 x (l - 0.40) x 0.40 x 0.07 
29 
x 2: (l.07 - 0.07 x 0.40)k(1.04)29-k 
k=O 
$2,594.72 + $3,232.85 
$5,827.57. (3) 
Now the tables are turned. If the government patiently can defer taxa-
tion, it will receive more tax dollars later. 
3 Redrawing the Picture 
Reality is messy. Perhaps the right answer involves a compromise 
between the author's assumptions and those presented in this discus-
sion. Even a modest amount of such blending would temper the au-
thor's conclusion. If the inflation-adjusted approach to comparing tax 
revenue streams is accepted, then the author's conclusion is reversed. I 
conclude, however, that the nontaxation of investment income on quali-
fied plans until taken provides gains to government and taxpayers alike. 
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"Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings 
Plans: Deferral or Waiver": Author's Reply to 
Previous the Discussion* 
Robert L. Brown t 
I greatly appreciate the fact that Mr. Mark Campbell has drawn 
attention to the recent Canadian Institute of Actuaries paper entitled: 
Troubled Tomorrows-The Report of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries' 
Task Force on Retirement Savings. As a member of the task force and 
one of the authors of the report, I am proud of its quality. 
This report points out correctly that the present tax system in both 
Canada and the United States discourages saving, including saving for 
retirement. This is because the present tax system taxes the inflation 
component of any gross rate of return on savings. In this way, the 
present tax system is confiscatory. 
The report then shows that the present tax system does not tax the 
inflation component of qualified (in Canada, registered) retirement sav-
ings. In fact, that is the key tax advantage of such savings. The report 
proves that if the inflation element of savings were not taxed, then the 
only tax advantage of qualified (registered) savings would be tax de-
ferral. That is, the only permanent advantage or subsidy of qualified 
(registered) retirement savings is the nontaxation of the inflation ele-
ment of its gross investment income. 
*Robert L. Brown's article "Tax Assistance to Qualified Retirement Savings Plans: 
Deferral or Waiver?" appeared in Journal or Actuarial Practice 2, no. 1, (1994): 159-
166. 
tRobert L. Brown, F.C.I.A., F.S.A., A.C.A.S., is Professor of Statistics and Actuarial Sci· 
ence and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University 
of Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is cur-
rently on the Society of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He 
is also an elected Councillor in the City of Waterloo. Professor Brown has authored 
several articles and books. 
Professor Brown's address is: Department of Statistics and Actuarial Sci-
ence, University of Waterloo,Waterloo ON N21 3Gl, CANADA. Internet address: 
rlbrown@jeeves.uwaterloo.ca 
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The report correctly points out that if these tax advantages were 
removed by the government, then taxpayers/savers would make differ-
ent decisions as to the mix of consumption/savings with their scarce 
dollars. At the present time, the Canadian government states that the 
tax expenditure associated with the tax deferral and nontaxation of the 
inflation component of savings, given only to registered plans, totals 
$14.9 billion (in 1991). Obviously, that amount of money would never 
be realized if the government changed the tax regime and decreased or 
removed the present advantages offered to registered plans. The report 
goes through a believable set of assumptions as to how taxpayers may 
respond to the removal of these tax advantages and concludes that the 
government may only be losing $4.0 billion to $5.3 billion because of 
the use of registered plans. 
Mr. Campbell, under a different set of assumptions (namely that 
there are no government deficits, and that the government only spends 
money after it has been raised) shows that qualified (registered) savings 
plans then actually would be beneficial to the government's coffers. 
This conclusion is intuitively obvious. If the government charges a 
constant tax rate (e.g. 40 percent) and the economy is growing in real 
terms (Le., after inflation), then the government can expect more tax 
revenue next year than it got this year. 
None of this changes the fact that under today's tax system (which is 
confiscatory) and under realistic assumptions as to gross and net (after 
inflation) rates of return, that there is a permanent (Le., not just tax 
deferral) tax advantage to using qualified (registered) savings plans. 
In that regard, it is both dangerous and misleading for pension ex-
perts to state that the tax advantages associated with qualified (reg-
istered) funds are only advantages of deferral. This often is stated, 
however, and was the cause and purpose of my paper. 



